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I N S I D E

New World Order and U.S. Security Designs in South Asia

Dr. Ahmad Ejaz

Beyond Greed or Grievance Theory – What Explains Civil War?

Mohammad Zahidul Islam Khan

Abu Sayyaf Group's Persistence: A Chronological Analysis of Crime-Terror Nexus in the Philippines and the Isis Connection in Southeast Asia

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Achieving Sustainability through Strategically Managing Development Model for Bangladesh

Showkat Ara Khanam



Bangladesh Institute of Peace and Security Studies
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The Journal provides a forum for debate and discussion on peace, security and development issues in national, regional and extra-regional perspectives.

Original write-up between 6000 to 8000 words not published or submitted elsewhere, may be submitted to the Editor of the journal. The Chicago Manual of Style should be followed in the write-up placing notes either at the bottom of the page (footnotes) or at the end of the essay (endnotes). Table, map and diagrams should be placed in separate sheets.

Contributors are requested to enclose short biographical note and abstract of the article.

The views expressed in the articles published in the each quarters of the Journal not necessarily represent the views and policies of the Editorial Board or the Institute.

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Editor's Note

The latest edition of *Peace and Security Review* comes at a time of emergence as we begin to witness significant changes developing across the globe. Power and perceptions are being reconfigured to accommodate new international dynamics of cooperation, with the potential of establishing countries such as India as key players within the global arena. The proliferation in terrorist activities are being fuelled by the formation of transnational networks which are continuing to engage in new methods of propaganda to state their claim as significant resilient threats. As crime and terrorism becomes heavily influenced by political drivers, we see, concurrently, the emergence of a global platform for justice and peace. A rise in intra-state conflicts and civil wars are destabilising more traditional notions of nation-state sovereignty, as we see patterns of internal-external influence arising motivated by vulnerabilities and opportunities. All these influences are coming into play as Bangladesh progresses to strategically reassess its national development model, dealing with industrial and agricultural stresses which could potentially hinder its direction for sustainability.

The first article titled '*New World Order and U.S. Security Designs in South Asia*', authored by Dr. Ahmad Ejaz, discusses the significant changes within the transformation of the global political and strategic scene. Ejaz examines how the world is entering a new era in which the United States has emerged as a unilateral supreme power. The article investigates the international security threat within the Asia-Pacific region where the swelling Chinese military power has been expatiating new threats to the American interests in this area. Overall, the article confirms the belief of US experts in India's leading role in establishing a constructive impact on South Asia.

In the article '*Beyond Greed or Grievance Theory-What Explains Civil War?*', Mohammad Zahidul Islam Khan deliberates over the greed or grievance theory – a pioneering quantitative research project which explained the Byzantine complexities of the risks and processes of civil war onset. Also known as one of the most digested model of the theory, it examines global data on civil war against three empirical proxies for greed and four for grievance; claiming that the material motivation (i.e. greed) holds more explanatory power than ideational motivation (i.e. grievance, in the context of civil war onset. The

author examines the claim and tries to compare and contrast it with other relevant theories of civil war. He principally argues that the primacy of economic motivation in civil war does not imply the notion of greed and grievance to be placed alongside; instead, both greed and grievance remain inherently adjoined in civil war and reflects a symbiotic relationship.

The paper substantiates the arguments by highlighting the increasing trend of internationalized civil conflicts where various external actors, in exploiting the regional conflict complex and the opportunity structures, can contribute to triggering and/or prolonging civil wars. The paper also highlights the issues of power and wealth distribution in society and how it contends with the model account for group inequalities in economic, political, cultural and social dimensions. In incorporating both greed and grievance, the model is better poised to explain the incidence of civil war onset.

In the article *'Abu Sayyaf Group's Persistence a Chronological Analysis of Crime-Terror Nexus in the Philippines and the ISIS Connection in Southeast Asia'*, Dr. Rommel C. Banlaoi steered into a sequential analysis of the persistence of the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) as a non-state armed group as it morphed into a violent group engaged in both crime and terrorism. Previously linked with Al Qaeda, the ASG had pledged allegiance to Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), which provides this home-grown armed group from the Southern Philippines a fresh outlook through which to justify its violent acts.

The author also discusses several ideas in the crime-terror nexus where he explains the key interests of terrorist groups onto politics and lofty ideological or religious goals. The paper tries to distinguish the line between crime and terrorism, tackling the increasing blurred linear distinction and its further comprehensive counter measure against the ASG.

In the article *'Achieving Sustainability through Strategically Managing Development Model for Bangladesh'* Showkat Ara Khanam provides a roadmap for achieving sustainability through strategically managing Bangladesh's development model, which is laid on the twin pillars of our development model in agriculture and industrialization. The paper concludes that without dual interaction between agriculture and industrialization, based on mutuality, Bangladesh's development will be unsuccessful and dysfunctional. Maintaining the strategies and principles of sustainability through strategically managing Bangladesh's development model holds tremendous contribution to the discourse on sustainability within the country.

BIPSS will continue to publish content which is responsive, engaging and highly analytical of current situations both in Bangladesh and worldwide. Acting as the sole contributor for writing on national peace and security issues, we hope to maintain an international dialogue which helps to foster collaboration and the sharing of knowledge and attributions.

New World Order and U.S. Security Designs in South Asia

Dr. Ahmad Ejaz*

Abstract

The beginning of 1990s witnessed the significant changes in form of transformation of global political and strategic scene. The events transformed the world were the momentous retreat of Soviet Union from Afghanistan in conjunction with the disintegration of Soviet Union, end of the Cold War, and a rapid change of a political and economic system in Eastern Europe. Thus the world entered a new era in which the United States emerged as a unilateral supreme power and unfolded a new agenda to build international political, economic and strategic environment of its own choice. The term, 'New World Order' was initially used by President George Herbert Walker Bush (1989-1993) in a speech which he made in February 1990, hailing the collapse of the 'iron curtain.'¹ The foremost feature of the U.S.-sponsored new international agenda was to secure the political and strategic dominance of the United States in the post-Cold War world, preventing the emergence of a rival power that could challenge the unipolar world system. The future course of action was decided to be executed through regional power centres which were assumed to play significant role both on the political as well as economic fronts of the emerging international scenario. In the post-Cold War world, the balance of power has been transferred from the Atlantic Ocean to Pacific Ocean. The significance of the Asia-Pacific region for the U.S. has been owing to China, which survives the communist base with its huge area and size of population and booming economy and strong military structure that the United States considers as the main rising threat to its

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He has worked with U.S. Security Policy towards South Asia and has various publications on subject including Books, Policy Papers, Monographs and Research Articles, published in Research Journal of national and International repute.

national security and other challenges includes nuclear proliferation and religious extremism. Given the U.S. post- Cold War agenda in Asia-Pacific, the Americans redefined U.S. interests in South Asia, reversing the options of past and setting new trends in diplomacy. They recommended an India-centric policy, underlining India as a largest secular democracy and dominant power in the region that could play an important role to secure the U.S. interests in the area.

This article traces strings of New World Order and U.S. security agenda in Asia-Pacific and its impression on its security policy in South Asia.

The New World Order

It was only after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990 that the idea of building a New World Order became a recurrent theme in President Bush's public oratory. After assembling successfully the coalition against the Iraqi attack on Kuwait, he said in a speech on August 30, 1990: "I look at the countries that are chipping away in here now, I think we do have a chance at a New World Order."² In his speech to the Congress on September 11, 1990, President Bush also referred to this newly coined term of New World Order. He said:

A New World Order, a new era, freer from the threat of terror, stronger in the pursuit of justice and more secure in the quest for peace. An era in which the nations of the world, East and West, North and South, can prosper and live in harmony. A hundred generations have searched for this elusive path to peace, while a thousand wars raged across the span of human endeavor. Today that new world is struggling to be born, a world quite different from the one we have known.³

President Bush further defined the future world: "A world where the rule of law supplants the rule of the jungle, a world in which nations recognize the shared responsibility for freedom and justice, a world where the strong respect the rights of the weak."⁴ Later on, at the beginning of the Gulf crisis in January 1991, President Bush characterized his vision of a new international order by "peaceful settlement of disputes, solidarity against aggression, reduced and controlled arsenals and just treatment of all peoples."⁵ In practical terms, the Gulf War demonstrated the sole military supremacy of the United States. According to one estimate, President Bush referred to the New World Order at least 42 times in his speeches during the Gulf crisis from January to March 1991.⁶ Similarly the senior members of the Bush administration, including Secretary of State James Baker, Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney, National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft and the U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Thomas Pickering, had used the phrase- New World Order -on various occasions, speaking about the American policy in the post- Gulf War era.⁷

The foremost feature of the U.S.-sponsored new international agenda was to secure the political and strategic dominance of the United States in the post-Cold War world, preventing the emergence of a rival power that could challenge the unipolar world system. A U.S. Defense Department planning document of March 1992 interpreted the U.S. strategy: "to prevent the reemergence of a new rival, either on the territory of the former Soviet Union, or elsewhere, to prevent any hostile power from dominating a region whose resources would, under consolidated control, be sufficient to generate global power."⁸

The document spelled out the measures the United States required to take to maintain its dominance:

1. The U.S. must show the leadership necessary to establish and protect a new order that holds the promise of convincing potential competitors that they need not aspire to a greater role or pursue a more aggressive posture to protect their legitimate interests.
2. In the non-defense areas, the U.S. must account sufficiently for the interests of the advanced industrial nations to discourage them from challenging the U.S. leadership or seeking to overturn the established political and economic order.
3. The U.S. must maintain the mechanisms for deterring potential competitors from even aspiring to a larger regional or global role. An effective reconstitution capability is important here, since it implies that a potential rival could not hope to quickly or easily gain a predominant military position in the world.⁹

The statements and comments of President Bush and other senior U.S. administration officials revealed in broader terms, a number of consistent themes, which formed the crux of the idea of New World Order. The guiding principles of the U.S. future global agenda were:

1. New leadership role for the United States. President Bush explained that America had a "disproportionate responsibility to lead" in the new emerging world.
2. Promotion of peace and stability through the collective security system, emphasizing the multinational cooperation against an aggression. In his speech in Alabama on April 13, 1991, President Bush said that the New World Order "refers to new ways of working with other nations to deter aggression, to achieve prosperity and above all, to achieve peace."
3. Control of the weapons of mass destruction by concluding and verifying new arms control agreements and non-proliferation

regimes. President Bush said on July 20, 1992 that “the spread of the capability to produce or acquire weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver them constitute a growing threat to U.S. national security interests and world peace. In a world in which regional tensions may unpredictably erupt in to war, these weapons could have devastating consequences.”

4. Promoting and consolidating the secular democracy, and enhancing the respect for human rights.
5. Promotion of the market economies.
6. Improving and strengthening the U.S. economic potential to accelerate trade, investment, and implementation of effective principles of proportional gains to achieve greater domestic and global prosperity.
7. Shielding against international threats of narcotics, terrorism and environmental problems.
8. Managing the change and instability in such a way that core American values and interests should be safeguarded.¹⁰

The future course of action was decided to be executed through regional power centres. It was assumed that these likeminded players of international politics like Israel, Germany, Britain, India, South Korea, and Japan, would exhibit varied potentials and play a significant role, both on the political as well as economic fronts of the emerging international scenario.¹¹

Talking about the idea of regional centres of power for maintaining and strengthening the U.S. military presence from one corner of the globe to another, President Bush said: “We can help ensure future peace and defend our interests through a range of military arrangements...bilateral alliances, access agreements, and structures....We must adjust our force structure to reflect post-Cold War realities, we also must protect our interests and allies.”¹²

Similarly addressing at West Point on January 5, 1993, President Bush commented that the end of the Cold War did not mean the end of conflicts and threats, and use of military force could not be denied for enforcement of policies in new post-Cold War world. He spoke:

We would risk the emergence of a world characterized by violence, characterized by chaos, one in which dictators and tyrants threaten their neighbors, build arsenals brimming with weapons of mass destruction, and ignore the welfare of their own men, women, and children. And we could see a horrible increase in international terrorism, with American citizens more at

risk than ever before. ...In a world where we are the only remaining superpower, it is the role of the United States to marshal its moral and material resources to promote a democratic peace. It is our responsibility, it is our opportunity to lead. There is no one else. ...At times, real leadership requires a willingness to use military force. And force can be a useful backdrop to diplomacy, a complement to it, or, if need be, a temporary alternative.... Using military force makes sense as a policy where the stakes warrant, where and when force can be effective, where no other policies are likely to prove effective, where its application can be limited in scope and time, and where the potential benefits justify the potential costs and sacrifice.¹³

The U.S. policy makers presented a three pronged strategy of 'Shape, Respond and Prepare' to promote its international security agenda. This three pronged strategy aimed at shaping up the environment to "prevent or deter threats through diplomacy, international assistance, arms control programmes, non-proliferation initiatives, and overseas military presence." This strategic approach was also to maintain the capability to respond, "across the full spectrum of potential crisis," and prepare the capacity to confront the new "challenges of tomorrow's uncertain future."¹⁴ This was dominating approach of the United States dealing with security matters around the world.

The foreign policy aspirations of the Bush administration (1989-1993) based on the guiding principles of the new international order emphasized:

1. Maintaining the international and regional balance of power appropriate for the United States and its allies.
2. Promoting an international trading and monetary system conducive to American prosperity.
3. Supporting the democratic political systems.
4. Securing the rule of law and human rights.
5. Strengthening the frame of international norms and practices to protect standards of order, justice and human rights.
6. Safeguarding the core American values and interests.¹⁵

Asia-Pacific Region: A New Arena of Power Politics

In the post- Cold War world, the balance of power has been transferred from the Atlantic Ocean to Pacific Ocean. Consequently, Asia-Pacific region, occupying a significant strategic position at the crossroads of a number of major sea and air routes, has taken importance for international politics in terms of Asia-Pacific geo-strategic, economic, and commercial motives. In the words of

Admiral Joseph W. Prueher, the Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Pacific Command: "The Asia-Pacific, perhaps more than any other region, represents a confluence of the security, diplomatic, and economic elements of international power. This confluence helps define the significance of the region to the U.S. and the world, and drives our strategy of presence and engagement to promote and protect our national interests."¹⁶

President Bush also referred Asia-Pacific as an important continent for U.S. policy in international order and said: "We will deepen our partnership with our Asian friends in building democracy and freedom....In the area of security, Asia's variety has spawned a diverse pattern of political and strategic cooperation. Our custom-made agreements and relationships provide a strong foundation for future security."¹⁷ During his visit to the Asia-Pacific region in January 1992, President Bush declared that "America will remain engaged in the Pacific area economically, politically, and militarily. After all, we are a Pacific nation, and we should care about us to build a post-Cold War world defined by prosperity and trade, not poverty and isolationism."¹⁸ On another occasion, President Bush said that "we will maintain a visible, credible presence in the Asia-Pacific region with our forward developed forces and through bilateral defence arrangements with nations of the region."¹⁹ He further expressed that the U.S. "plan to base a key Pacific navy command in Singapore spells new naval arrangements in the Pacific. ...The shift may sound a minor affair but this in fact will be relocation the base of the U.S. naval operation in South East Asia and the Indian Ocean."²⁰

For the Americans, the significance of the Asia-Pacific region is underlined owing to China, which survives the communist base with its huge area and size of population and booming economy and strong military structure that the United States considers as the main rising threat to its national security. The second concern for the Americans is the proliferation of nuclear weapons of mass destruction in the region that has reached its alarming point with the unrestrained nuclear capability of China, North Korea, India, and Pakistan as well. Third challenge which centralized the U.S. policy in Asia-Pacific region is the rise of religious extremism.²¹

China's fast growing economic potentials and military might with constant conventional and nuclear force modernization, its activities in South China seas, its intimidating posture towards Taiwan and growing strategic alliance with Pakistan have deep concerns for the Americans. In the U.S. perspective, China can happen to play a global role, which would eventually lead to a multipolar international system against the U.S. aspirations in the world.²² The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) is regarded as a move to undercut the U.S. supremacy in economic and strategic fields.²³ The U.S. Defense Department annual report 2004 on the military power of China termed:

China's aspirations and efforts to achieve great power status have accelerated in recent years, especially the past two, as China's leaders have evinced a greater sense of confidence in the international arena. Largely because of the political influence Beijing has accrued from over a decade of sustained economic growth, as well as the status inherent in China's geographic size, manpower, seat on the UN Security Council, and nuclear-capable forces, Beijing views itself as operating from an increasingly competitive position relative to other established world powers, including the United States.

The report further cited:

While the United States is central to Beijing's calculus for great power diplomacy, China's leaders are seeking to strengthen relations with other powers such as Russia, the European Union, and Japan and institutions such as the United Nations, to expand political and economic ties, and to influence U.S. policies they consider inimical to Chinese security interests. China's leaders evaluate the balance of triangular relationships (China- Russia- U.S., China - Japan- U.S.) and seek to create favorable conditions or exploit opportunities, such as bilateral friction between third parties and the United States, to advance China's goals.²⁴

Similarly an executive summary of the U.S. Department of Defense annual report 2006 to Congress also articulated:

China's rapid rise as a regional political and economic power with global aspirations is an important element in today's strategic environment—one that has significant implications for the region and the world. ... China has the greatest potential to compete militarily with the United States and field disruptive military technologies that could over time offset traditional U.S. military advantages.²⁵

China's expanding relations with other countries, Russia in particular, under its 'peaceful developmental policy' has been seen in United States as China's global activism that can lead to compose a multipolar international system challenging the U.S. dominance in the world.²⁶ Chinese Prime Minister's three-day visit to Moscow in December 1996, which resulted in an understanding to establish a 'strategic partnership' between the two states, had strategic and economic implications, not only for these two states but for the global power balance as a whole. The joint communiqué issued at the end of this visit indicated that "Russia and China are determined to create an equal partnership aimed at strategic interaction in the 21st century" and "building a multipolar world."²⁷ This Russia –China strategic partnership for the 21st

century is taken as a significant attempt to challenge the unipolar world order. The Chinese official news agency, *Xinhua*, carried an editorial saying: "The establishment and development of a strategic partnership between Russia and China is conducive to the multipolarisation of the world and to the establishment of a just and fair international economic and political order."²⁸

The visit of the Russian President Vladimir V. Putin to China in July 2000 sent alarming signals to Washington, when both countries declared to evolve "a common position on the global security balance" and claimed to "push forward a global multi- polar process and establish a new political and economic order."²⁹ The Shanghai Five Mechanism initiated and endured by China with the cooperation of Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan sent signals to undermine the U.S. supremacy in economic and strategic fields. The members of Shanghai Five Mechanism in their Dushanbe meeting in July 2000 came out against the interference of United States and its NATO allies in the internal affairs of other countries, "under the pretext of humanitarian intervention and protecting human rights."³⁰ Later in 2001, the Shanghai Five Mechanism was turned into Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) with the entry of Uzbekistan.

Hafeez Malik, a renowned American expert on U.S. policy towards South Asia, stated that the Americans wanted Chinese to exist but on U.S. terms, likely:

1. Accept the American-led security architecture in Asia.
2. No endeavors to undermine or disrupt it.
3. Undertake military modernization in a gradual and non-threatening way.
4. Evade from building relations with Russia, Europe, or India in to an anti-American alliance, which might alter the balance of power in a fundamental manner?³¹

Given the security situation in Asia-Pacific region, the U.S. foreign policy experts drew the U.S. core concerns in this region and recommended the strategy that accentuated on:

1. Enhance the strategic cooperation with allies through effective diplomacy and joint military ventures.
2. Ensure a strong security structure that would help reduce intra-regional fears and suspicions.
3. Build a structure for economic cooperation and growth that could support an open international trading system.

4. Increase a free and fair trade that could benefit United States and countries of area.
5. Promote democracy and human rights.
6. Maintain the regional political stability.³²

To readjust its policies in the Asia-Pacific region, the United States sought alliance with the regional countries which had the attribute of success in industry, trade, education, science and technology sectors. Consequently, the leading powers of the region like Japan, South Korea, Australia, Thailand, Philippines and Singapore and India were maintained as the centres of power.

India: Invented as a Regional Power Centre

Stretching between West Asia, Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean, the South Asian region always retained its strategic significance. The Cold War controversies had directly influenced the South Asian regional political and security environment. In the post-Cold War U.S.-sponsored international strategic milieu, South Asian region kept up its importance. Selig Harrison, a American expert on United States - South Asia relations, in his study titled 'South Asia and the United States: A Chance for a Fresh Start' suggested to reshape the U.S. policy in South Asia in course of pursuit of U.S. agenda for sole global supremacy and dominance in the region.³³ Similarly, David C. Hendrickson, recommending a new policy in South Asia, argued that all new challenges to the U.S. power in new unilateral world, such as aggression, nuclear proliferation, deterioration of human rights and protection and strengthening of secular democracy were present in South Asia.³⁴

Given the U.S. post- Cold War agenda in Asia-Pacific, the Americans redefined U.S. interests in South Asia, reversing the options of past and setting new trends in diplomacy. They recommended an India-centric policy, underlining India as a largest secular democracy and dominant power in the region that could play an important role to secure the U.S. interests in the area.³⁵ Henry Kissinger, former U.S. Secretary of state, quoted India in his article entitled 'New World Order,' as a dominant power in the South Asian region. He said that "the Indian nation has retained a finely-tuned sense for domination which causes it to insist on prominence over all territories controlled from New Delhi at the acme of British rule."³⁶

The Americans had viewed the Indian swelling military potentials and expanding blue-water navy in particular as massive significant for the U.S. strategic interests in the area, in terms of U.S. access to the Indian Ocean and, to a lesser extent, the Persian Gulf as well as counterbalance to China. Speaking

at an Indo-U.S. strategic symposium, held in India in 1990, Rear Admiral W. Pendley of the U.S. Pacific Command called India as an emerging power of Asia-Pacific that would “play a significant role and set the course for stability in the region.”³⁷ The Americans had also viewed the rising tide of Islamic extremism in Afghanistan and Central Asian republics as a more serious challenge to the new international order. Pakistan had been ranked as a main promoter of Islamic extremism in the region. While India, as a secular democracy, was considered as effective to check the Islamic extremism and terrorism.³⁸

Under the different recommendations by U.S. study groups for evaluation of U.S.-India relations in 21st century, India’s preeminence was acknowledged in the new global strategic architecture, and it was invented as a regional power centre. The U.S. strategic concerns that prompted the U.S. government to form a strategic partnership with India were:

1. China’s emergence with a huge military might in the Asia-Pacific would eventually challenge the U.S. predominance in the region.
2. Russia’s potential revival would likely alter the international security arrangements, inserting new role for Moscow in the European affairs and more so in the Asia-Pacific and Middle East.
3. Emerging strategic partnership between Russia and China would complicate strategic equation on the Western rim of the Pacific.
4. In view of expanding menace of Islamic militancy in Afghanistan, Pakistan and some of the Central Asian Republics, and moreover in Gulf could create grave challenges for the United States and West, on whole.
5. U.S. forward military presence in Asia-Pacific needed to make more effective the sea-lanes security.
6. Pakistan-sponsored potential Talibanization in Afghanistan could most possibility mess up the South West Asia scene.
7. A politically and economically unstable nuclear Pakistan would be dangerous for world peace. Pakistan as a central Islamic state could most probably supply nuclear material to other Islamic countries.
8. In view of expanding Talibanization, Islamists could take control of Pakistani nukes³⁹

Looking at the Indian foreign policy in the post-Cold War period, it seems that New Delhi also adopted new tendencies in relations with other countries, sharing the global concerns. India has been steadily improving its relative

power position both in the international system and in the theater of primary concerns-Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean. India incited inclination towards the United States and moved swiftly to transform its relations with America in a partnership.⁴⁰

India shared the U.S. concerns and responded positively for the improvement in U.S.- India relations. The Indians realized that the strategic partnership with the unipolar world power would carry support in political, military, and economic terms and help build a suitable environment for extension of Indian hegemonic influence in the region. An Indian analyst J.N.Dixit argued that durable partnership with United States would have a vigorous effect on India's expanding role in the international arena and that in turn would enable it to define and defend its interests in global terms.⁴¹ The downgrading image of Pakistan as a promoter of Islamic terrorism and its incredibility in new international political and strategic structure also provided a great opportunity to New Delhi to win the trust of Washington and fill the vacuum left with the end of United States - Pakistan alliance. *Times of India* wrote:

The end of the Cold War and the beginning of the Gulf war has created unprecedented opportunities for India to wean the U.S. away from its traditional ally, Pakistan. The transformation of US-Pak relations is a major security gain for India. In fact, Pakistan is not likely to hand over a nuclear device to fellow Islamic countries, but the pan-Islamic wave sweeping the region can hardly make the U.S. comfortable on this score. U.S. now sees militant Islam as one of the biggest threats (and) Pakistan simply cannot be a credible U.S. ally against militant Islam. In sum, India has a golden opportunity to capitalize the U.S. on downgrading of Pakistan,(and) should not spoil this by knee-jerk anti-imperialist sentiment.⁴²

Here Mr. Misra, former National Security Advisor of India, is quoted here who gave candid advocacy for alliance with America. While addressing at the Council of Foreign Relations, New York, he said:

It is an unquestionable fact that USA is the pre-eminent power in the world today. ...The US economy is as large as those of Japan, Germany and Britain put together. ...It would make poor political or economic sense for a country – or a group of countries – to set itself up as an alternate pole in opposition to USA. Most countries advocating a multi-polar world also affirm that they attach great importance to relations with USA. ...In the world order defined by the Cold War, India and US were not really allies though, to be fair, nor were they enemies. India-US relations reflected a lack of engagement, coupled with wariness and a periodically recurring suspicion whenever the shadow of the Cold War fell over our region.

In the post-Cold War world (and even in the post-9/11 world order), the situation is dramatically different. We have shared geo-political interests and economic opportunities, which can bind an enduring partnership. ...Given its past history, the Indo-US relationship needs to liberate itself from a number of misconceptions and prejudices of past years.⁴³

From the Indian perspective, the factors which derived finally India to prefer to build a strategic partnership with United States were:

1. With its growing stockpile of nuclear weapons and military might, China posed a long range security threat to India.
2. Pakistan's nuclear capability and its exclusive missile armoury added horrifying dimension to South Asian security scenario.
3. The deepening China-Pakistan strategic nexus was perceived to create a security equation in the area, entirely against the Indian interests.
4. Expanding Islamic militancy, sponsored and launched by Pakistan, endangered the Indian security, externally and internally. India singly could not handle this threat of Islamic militancy, therefore it needed international collaboration.
5. Swiftly developing strategic relations between Russia and China were supposed to create equilibrium of power to checkmate the United States in the Asia-Pacific region. China's increasing activism would entirely be against the Indian interests in the region.⁴⁴

Islamic extremism, Pakistan's nuclear capability and China's nuclear and military dominance were the main concerns which provided common ground to the India-United States strategic partnership. India exploited its non-Islamic and secular credentials to convince the Americans that in a world swept by Islamic fundamentalism, India, a non-Islamic heavy weight, was far more reliable than a Muslim Pakistan.⁴⁵ *Newsweek* wrote that in the rising state of Islamic extremism, the United States gazed at India "as the region's last outpost of secular democracy."⁴⁶ Jasjit Singh, an Indian strategist, remarked that "the threat of Islamic fundamentalism and the importance of protecting oil supplies from the gulf" were the new significant common concerns for the Americans and Indians.⁴⁷ The Indians cited China (beside Pakistan) as Delhi's compulsion to maintain huge defense posture and nuclear option. They were of the opinion that despite improvement in relations with China since the path-breaking visit of Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi to Beijing in 1998, India could not remain unconcerned with the swelling military and nuclear power of China in Asia-Pacific region. Amitabh Mattoo, Professor at School of international Studies,

Jawarlal Nehru University, India, wrote that it was a common concern of the United States and India. He said:

In terms of strategic issues, the rise of China and continuing uncertainty in the Asia-Pacific region should be of critical importance and concern to both New Delhi and WashingtonChina's revival as a great power, after a century of western humiliation, is already translating into sporadic acts of aggressiveness. Chinese claim, and the belligerence with which they are asserted, over most of the South China Sea, particularly the Spratly, the Parcel and the Senkaku islands, are only the most recent examples.⁴⁸

The Indian analysts believed that in the new phase of India's relations with the United States, India would be in a better position to serve its strategic interests against Pakistan. Ranjan Gupta pointed out that the strategic alliance with Washington could enable New Delhi to get American full support on the Kashmir issue.⁴⁹ Similarly, M.D. Nalapat, an Indian expert on security and international affairs, argued over the advantages of India's strategic partnership with the United States and said that it would benefit India and help it achieve its security objectives, which included the building up of the nuclear deterrent capability against Pakistan, occupation of Azad Kashmir and provocation of ethnicity in Pakistan, so as to disintegrate the country.⁵⁰

With regard to India's economic aspirations, the Indians believed that United States - India constructive engagement could also be a trigger for a mutual attempt to achieve India's objective of economic modernization and stability. The United States could make vital contributions to the energy, transport, power and technological sectors, if India's economic policies became responsive to the long-term U.S. interests. Brahma Chellaney said:

China's growing assertiveness on global and regional matters flows from its rapidly rising power. China ranks as the world fastest growing nation in economic and military terms. The fact that the Chinese economy is largely unaffected by the current economic travails buffeting much of Asia, indicates that Chinese power will not only continue to expand, but that such power in the years ahead will cast an increasingly long shadow over Asia, including the subcontinent.⁵¹

Chellaney further wrote that China obviously would not like India to emerge as an economic rival, but New Delhi should not miss the opportunity to reinforce close cooperation with the United States because it would be important to achieve the economic interests of India.⁵² V.A. PaiPanadikar observed that India's large markets and democratic political system made a "formidable and seductive combination" that had increased the importance of India for the U.S. multinationals and investors. As the United State had worked

on a “balance of Power” theory against China and picked India as a useful ally, India must show greater sensitivity and forethought to realize that political and economic accommodation with the United States would help it to move on way to becoming a larger economy.⁵³

During the Gulf War 1991, the new tendency in Indian policy appeared when Indian government provided maximum logistic support to the U.S. forces in Indian Ocean. India provided refueling facilities to the U.S. aircrafts transiting from the Far East to the Gulf through India.⁵⁴ As a reciprocal gesture, Washington permitted New Delhi to purchase the supercomputer, and IMF cleared India’s loan of \$ 1 billion.⁵⁵ It was turning point in Indian policy towards the United States–India strategic partnership. The U.S. government hailed the Indian stand on Gulf War. This Indian gesture helped much to bring the two countries close. New Delhi and Washington also developed an understanding to share valuable military intelligence.⁵⁶ In the aftermath of Gulf War, Washington and New Delhi accelerated their efforts to expand cooperation in defense and related matters. Exchange of senior military officials became frequent. The visit of an American defense team to India in December 1991, led by Assistant Secretary of Defense for international security was very important in connection with new strategic consensus between both countries. It was beginning of a structured dialogue between the two sides to build cooperation in field of defense. Later on the exchange of visits of military officials of both sides including Chief of Staff of Indian Army General Sunit Francis Rodrigues, General Johnny Corns, head of the U.S. Pacific Command, and Admiral Frank B. Kelso, the U.S. Chief of Naval Operation resulted in drawing up a plan for cooperation between the U.S. and Indian armies.⁵⁷ The meeting between the Indian Defense Minister Sharad Pawar and the U.S. Defense Secretary Dick Cheney in Washington in April 1992 was concluded with an agreement identifying measures for cooperation in field of defense. The agreement said:

1. The United States would help India upgrade its defense capability, filling a vacuum created as a result of decline of Soviet Union.
2. India would provide port facilities to the visiting U.S. naval ships, including refueling.⁵⁸

The U.S.-India defense cooperation also broadened to the participation of the two armed forces in mutually worked out contingencies to meet specific threats in the area. It reflected in the agreement underlining collaboration with each other, in the form of joint exercises and training.⁵⁹ This clause of the agreement came to implementation in the subsequent month of May when a U.S. Marines team completed a month-long training of a group of Indian Para-commandos, in a Rajasthan desert tract, about 320 Kilometers from the Pakistani border.⁶⁰ Similarly the Indian Army officers were reported to

participate in a Brigade-level exercise with the U.S. forces in Hawaii.⁶¹ There were also reports that the United States substantially increased funds for India under the U.S. International Military Exchange Training Programme and for the exchange of officers between the U.S. Army Training Command and the Indian Army Training Command.⁶²

This U.S.- India military partnership swiftly expanded with the continuation of various projects and supply of military equipment and technologies. Robert S. Greenberger wrote that the swelling Indian naval strength had a symbolic value for the Americans and joint naval exercises in the Arabian Sea indicated a convergence of interests of both states in this field.⁶³ An Indian analyst Shahnaz Anklesaria Aiyar said that the American pursued India for a future role in policing the sea-lanes from the Gulf to the Straits of Malacca.⁶⁴ Likewise an Indian veteran defense writer Babani Sen Gupta commented that the United States had picked India as a power, entitled to play a role in the Gulf regional security.⁶⁵ This strategic alliance was believed to be gainful in economic terms too. India offered large opportunities for the American investors. The U.S. companies including General Motors Corp, Kellogg Co, Du Pont Co, and Motorola Inc started projects in India.

The U.S.-India strategic partnership swiftly took shape as in mid- January 1995, U.S. Defense Secretary William Perry toured India and signed a defense agreement and also established a 'Defense Policy Forum, to reexamine the strategic options of both the countries in post- Cold War era, promote links between officials of both sides and increase steadily the opportunities of training and joint exercises. This landmark agreement on military cooperation was a breakthrough in India- U.S. relations.⁶⁶ Strategic links between the two states swiftly expanded with the continuation of the various projects and supply of military equipment and technologies. The strategic dialogue between Washington and New Delhi in aftermath of nuclear blasts paved a way to explore further possibilities to harmonize their security perceptions. Eventually, the Americans maintained a high-handed approach towards the nuclearization in South Asia, treating India as a nuclear democracy, and considering Pakistan as a dangerous proliferating state. They finally decided to broaden India's access to nuclear technology. While, Pakistan's nuclear programme comparatively was dealt in a critical and rigid way and pressure was put on Pakistan to stop its efforts for nuclearization. The course of expanding ties and widening engagement between Washington and New Delhi gathered new momentum and strength in 2000 when President Clinton had visit to India in March 2000 and produced a unique groundbreaking agreement called 'India-U.S. Relations: A Vision for the 21st Century' signed by President Clinton and Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee. The agreement defined the agenda of the strategic partnership between the two states in the 21st century.

United States-Pakistan Alliance Relegated

Since the end of Cold War, United States downgraded its relationship with Pakistan on the ground that the new global environment did not warrant the old strategic partnership. The reorientation of the U.S. security interests in South Asia dented the decades-old relationship between the two countries. Pakistan once accorded with title of 'most allied ally' and stood as the 'front line' state in war against Soviet occupation of Afghanistan had lost its strategic significance for the United States and relations between the states had reached its lowest point. The downgrading trend in the U.S.-Pakistan relations reached distressing point when new perception captured the thinking of the U.S. policy makers that Pakistan had been promoting the Islamic extremism and militancy. The first meeting of the U.S. - India Army Steering Committee was held in January 1992 to draw up the future course for U.S.- India strategic cooperation. The committee bracketed Pakistan with those countries that sponsored the Islamic fundamentalism.⁶⁷ Subsequently Washington and Islamabad were engaged in fire-fighting, over the issues related to nuclear and terrorism. Pakistan was underlined as a state of terrorism, and started to be regarded as an incredible country in new international strategic settings. Senator Larry Pressler- author of the Pressler amendment that suspended military and economic aid to Pakistan in October 1990 in a bid to halt Pakistan's nuclear programme, also referred Pakistan as a state that backed Islamic fundamentalism. During this visit to India in early 1992, Larry Pressler warned the Indians about the emergence of a new grouping of Pakistan with Afghanistan, Turkey, Iran and Central Asian Republics that possessed the nuclear weapons capability. Mr. Pressler said that this alliance of Islamic countries could provide the ground for the growth of Islamic extremism.⁶⁸ He stressed that this "Islamic fundamentalism can travel from Pakistan."⁶⁹ He embarked on the possibility of formation of a federation by these countries that eventually could "cause a problem to India." Pressler also conjectured that one day these Muslim countries might be taken over by the Islamic fundamentalists.⁷⁰ Similarly in a testimony to the U.S. Senate on April 21, 1993, the CIA Director James Woollsey mentioned that Pakistan had supported the insurgents in "waging terror campaigns against the Indian government in the States of Kashmir and Punjab."⁷¹ This rising perception about Pakistan in Washington had built Pakistan's image as a dangerous state.

Thus upholding India as a secular democracy, the U.S. officials toed the India-centric approach on most pressing issues in South Asian region, like nuclear proliferation and Kashmir dispute. They started to treat India as a nuclear democracy and accordingly a high-handed approach towards the nuclear proliferation in South Asia was maintained. The Americans willfully kept mum on Indian nuclear power and decided to broaden India's access to

nuclear technology. Over time the prospect of nuclear engagement with India was enlarged. While, Pakistan's nuclear programme was started to be dealt in a critical and rigid way and pressure was put on Pakistan to stop its efforts for developing its nuclear capability. The tool of sanctions was frequently used. Economic and military restrictions were imposed on Pakistan under Pressler amendment, a country-specific law that singled out only one nation on the nuclear issue. One outcome of the Pressler sanctions was the U.S. decision to withhold Pakistan military equipment contracted prior to 1990, worth about \$1.2 billion, even though Pakistan had paid for this. Further sanctions were imposed on Pakistan under MTCR (Missile Technology Control Regime) for allegedly receiving missile technology from China.⁷²

The nuclear standoff continued between Pakistan and United States. Pakistan was being watched as a nuclear proliferator. It was also presumed by the Americans that Pakistan could supply nuclear technology to other countries, Muslim countries in particular. Later on Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan's nuclear black market network provided firm ground to Washington to check Pakistan's nuclear capability. Though Pakistan took measures to dismantle the nuclear black market network and ensure effective export controls, and to prevent the possibility of nuclear proliferation from Pakistan, Pakistan's nuclear option was internationally maligned.⁷³ Pakistan's international image as a state sponsor of terrorism in the region also added more agony for its nuclear capability. It was suspected that in view of free mobility and growing influence of extremist groups on its soil, Pakistan's nuclear arsenals could be any time fall in hands of terrorists. We quote here U.S. Defense Secretary Leon Panetta who expressing danger about fall of Pakistan's nukes into hands of terrorists, said: "The great danger we have always feared is that if terrorism is not controlled in their country, than those nuclear weapons could fall into the wrong hands."⁷⁴ Seymour M. Hersh, a noted analyst of U.S. policy to South Asia, said that there was a great threat from terrorists of "overrunning Islamabad," but more than that there was a danger of a revolt that "extremists inside the Pakistani military might stage a coup, take control of some nuclear assets, or even divert a warhead."⁷⁵ The Indian lobbies in America played an effective role to mold the American approach against Pakistan's nuclear programme.

On Kashmir dispute, Washington redesigned its policy pursuing the Indian stand that Pakistan had been waging terrorism in Indian-held Kashmir through training, arming and infiltrating the terrorists across the Line of Control. The Indian claim emphasized that the situation in Kashmir constituted the most serious threat to India's territorial integrity and secular polity. India exploited the U.S. agenda for containment of the Islamic extremism. The Indian lobbies in United States attempted to convince the American policy makers on this

point and asked U.S. government to declare Pakistan as a terrorist state.⁷⁶ The American perception over the rise of Islamic fundamentalism lastly termed Kashmiri fighters as terrorists.⁷⁷ Accordingly, Pakistan came under severe pressure to stop support of terrorist groups fighting in Indian part of Kashmir. Departure from its conventional policy was openly heralded on March 6, 1990 when U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, John H. Kelly, speaking to Congress Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific affairs of House Foreign Affairs Committee, said that the United States no longer adhered to its original policy of seeking a plebiscitary settlement of the dispute.⁷⁸ In 1991, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Teresita C. Schaffer, during the Congressional hearings held jointly by the U.S. House of Representative Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs and the House Subcommittee on Human Rights and International Organizations, referred Kashmir as an unstable region by terrorists' activities and condemned them and called upon to stop any external support.⁷⁹ Supporting the Indian position, the United States went a step forward and threatened Pakistan that its name would be put on the list of the terrorist states if it did not abandon its policy of sponsoring the 'terrorists' in Kashmir. The U.S. Secretary of State James Baker in a letter to Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif warned that Pakistan would be designated "as a terrorist state under a 1985 Congressional mandate if it did not cease and desist from aiding the Kashmiris."⁸⁰

The BBC and the VOA reported in December 1992 that United States sought to include Pakistan's name in the list of countries which supported terrorism.⁸¹ However, in its final list which the State Department sent to the Congress on December 31, 1992, the name of Pakistan was not mentioned with other countries that according to U.S. perception supported international terrorism. However, on the charge of supporting separatists in Kashmir, Pakistan was "under observation" for four to six months.⁸² The U.S. State Department spokesman reported in January 1993 that the United States was:

concerned about the continuing reports of Pakistani support for Kashmiri militants who commit terrorist acts in India... and the US has raised this issue frequently with the Pakistan government (and that was) aware of our views, and we hope they will take them into account.... and the United States was keeping the situation under active review.⁸³

Pakistan's Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Siddique Kanju, referring to the situation, told the National Assembly of Pakistan that the U.S. government, for the "time being," had put off the matter of including the name of Pakistan in its list of countries sponsoring terrorism but the U.S. government had asked Pakistan to stop "backing freedom-fighters in (Indian) held Kashmir." Kanju said that the matter would be reviewed again after four to six months.⁸⁴

Washington constantly pressed Islamabad to take measures to rein in the organizations fighting in Kashmir and eliminate their training camps on Pakistan's soil. Pakistan, which had been denying for long time all kinds of links with the groups fighting in Kashmir, finally had to ban in January 2002 the Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Muhammad and Jamiat Ulema-i-Islami and other organizations fighting in Kashmir and cracked down on their camps and hideouts.⁸⁵

Conclusion

In the post-Cold War period, the Asia-Pacific region has emerged as the international security theater where the Chinese swelling military power has been expatiating new threats to the American interests in this area. The New World Order, to readjust the political, economic and strategic trends across the world, focused its attention on Asia-Pacific region where it concentrated on alliance with the regional countries like Japan, South Korea, Australia, Thailand, Philippines, Singapore and India which are maintained as the centres of power. The prime aim of these regional centres of power is to protect the US political, economic and strategic interests in the region. In South Asia, the US launched an India-centric policy that over time brought both countries close to be engaged in a new strategic partnership and its effects are executed mainly in fields of defense and nuclear. In June 2005, United States and India signed a landmark defense agreement that tremendously enhanced the military cooperation between the two countries. Similarly both countries signed a civil nuclear cooperation agreement in 2008. By concluding these two agreements the United States and India strategic partnership took concrete shape.

Picking India as a potential ally in the Asian security affairs, the Americans embark on the India's growing stature and its rise as a leading power to play a prominent role in Asia-Pacific affairs, checking the China's military and economic maneuverings in the region. The US experts also bet that India's leading role will have a constructive impact on South Asia, and this, security deficit region will be more stable and undivided under leadership of United States. The Indian new move to construct an engagement with neighbours, is seeking an integration of the region. But all things are not in upgraded shape. India and other nations of South Asia are not entirely on agreeable ground. Pakistan-India relations in particular are still not moving in a settled manner. Thus the Indian idea of regional integration still seems unfeasible.

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Beyond Greed or Grievance Theory – What Explains Civil War?

Mohammad Zahidul Islam Khan*

Abstract

The near absence of inter-state conflicts and a parallel increase in the incidence of intra-state conflicts/civil wars reflects that “orange is the new black” in the context of 21st century history of warfare. Amidst such fundamental changes, Paul Collier and his team offer the greed or grievance theory – a pioneering quantitative research to explain the Byzantine complexities of the risks and processes of civil war onset. The most digested model of the theory examines global data on civil war against three empirical proxies for greed and four for grievance claiming that the material motivation (i.e. greed) holds more explanatory power than ideational motivation (i.e. grievance) in the context of civil war onset. This paper critically examines their claim, comparing and contrasting it with other relevant theories of civil war. It argues that the primacy of economic motivation in civil war does not necessarily imply that the notion of greed and grievance to be juxtaposed; instead, both greed and grievance remain inherently indivisible in civil war. The interplay of greed and grievance in civil war is dynamic and reflects a symbiotic relationship. They are often the shades of same problem and can mutate into one another such as into political greed and economic grievance. The paper substantiates its arguments by highlighting the increasing trend of internationalized civil conflicts where various external actors, exploiting the regional conflict complex and the opportunity structures, can contribute to trigger and or prolong civil wars. Finally the paper highlights the issues of power and wealth distribution in society and argues that inequality plays a central role in conflict as postulated in the horizontal inequalities (HIs) theory. It contends that the inclusiveness offered in the HIs model to account for group inequalities in

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economic, political, cultural and social dimensions incorporating both greed and grievance makes this model better poised to explain the incidence of civil war onset.

Key words: civil war, intra-state war, greed and grievance, horizontal inequality.

Introduction

The near absence of inter-state wars and a parallel increase in the incidence of intra-state civil wars nearly implies that “orange is the new black” in the context of 21st century history of warfare. Despite an overall decline, recent trend in civil wars around the world indicates a 21 per cent increase compared to the beginning of this decade. According to the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP), out of 40 active conflicts recoded in the year 2014 in 27 locations worldwide, only one was intra-state¹ while the remaining were within states and 13 of them were *internationalized*.² The Human Security Report (2012) shows that central and south Asia is currently world’s deadliest region and death tolls from civil conflict have escalated more than quintupling between 2005-2009.³ Amidst such alarming trend of civil war occurrences, researchers have focused on explaining the phenomenon using various theories, data and model. The “greed or grievance” theory is one such pioneering attempt to achieve a level of generalization about the civil war onset. Centred around the primacy of economic rationality, this theory, introduced by Paul Collier and his team is one of the most cited and debated interpretive framework in contemporary civil war literature not least because it presupposes greed (i.e. material motivations) having more explanatory power than grievance (i.e. ideational motivation). Stressing such primacy, the theory argues that “where rebellion is feasible, it will occur: motivation is indeterminate, being supplied by whatever agenda happens to be adopted by the first social entrepreneur to occupy the viable niche.”⁴ Through a series of intriguing quantitative assessment, Collier’s theory gained much prominence in the midst of ever-increasing trend of civil war and the urgency of understanding its risks and processes.

Against such compelling empirical arguments, this paper critically examines the greed or grievance theory probing beyond the juxtaposed proposition. To set the context, the paper **first** outline the importance of examining civil war amidst its increasing trend. Contrasting the conventional view that world is getting more peaceful, it contends that the decline in inter-state wars is no panacea for a world peace, hence knowing what causes civil conflict remains important. **Second**, it, outlines Collier’s successive versions of the theory charting its variations and critical claims to contrast it with different

schools of thoughts involving socio-economic, political and resource predation literature of civil war. It demonstrates that explaining the 'Byzantine complexities'⁵ of civil war is not limited to the putative economic motivation derived through a number crunching exercises of tenuously linked proxy variables as postulated by Paul Collier and his team. **Third**, the proxy variables and statistical method used in the model are examined and compared with similar quantitative studies on civil war to identify their inadequacies. **Fourth**, different leading schools of thoughts is discussed leading to the discussion of Frances Stewart's Horizontal Inequalities (HI) theory as a more comprehensive model to explain civil war. It argues that the primacy of economic motivation in civil war does not necessarily impel the notion of greed or grievance to be juxtaposed, instead, both greed *and* grievance bears a symbiotic relationship and remains inherently indivisible in civil war onset.


Civil wars: 'orange is the new black'?

Warfare in the 21st century has fundamentally changed. One visible trend is the overall decline of the war – particularly interstate war, convincing many that the world is becoming more peaceful. The most cited (and debated) contemporary work depicting this trend comes from Steven Pinker's acclaimed book *Better Angles of Our Nature*. Taking a historical sweep of 12 plus millennia, Pinker informs us of six long-term trend of declining warfare, homicides and a wide variety of forms of violence.⁶ According to Pinker, in our quest to retreat from violence, we are now in the era of "New Peace" the fifth trend, that started since the end of cold war in 1989. We arrived at this trend following the "Long Peace" that ushered after the end of World War II, when the great powers have stopped fighting and there was an overall decline of inter-state wars. Overlapping these two trends is the "Rights Revolution" starting with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948 and more recent acknowledgements of gay, lesbian, animal, child and human rights issue.

According to Pinker, the current ear of 'new peace' is more *tenuous*, yet, contrary to popular believe, armed violence such as civil wars, genocide, repression, terrorism has *declined* – a claim contested by many. Critics have argued against the measures used by Pinker to arrive at his conclusions. Pinker asserts that the most appropriate metric for estimating the deadliness of wars is not the absolute number of fatalities but the number of war deaths relative to the size of the population. From this perspective, a conflict that kills 10,000 people in a society with a population of 100,000 is 10 times deadlier than one that kills 10,000 people in a society of a million people even though the numbers killed are identical. Although, Pinker does not dispute the fact that World War II almost certainly killed more people than any other war in history,

the methods used by him makes it only the ninth-deadliest episode of sustained violence in human history.⁷


Taking a departure from the conventional criticism of the *Better Angles*, I posit a different argument as to why the view that “world is more peaceful today than before” is *fallacious* in general requiring us to focus more vigorously on incidences of civil conflicts/war in particular. Almost all accounts of projecting the world as a more peaceful one relies on accounting the number of battle related deaths, incidence of war/civil wars/conflicts etc. Such measures account for the manifested ‘static’ property of violence – one that resides on ‘actuality’ and disregards the ‘potentiality’ that resides on the *dispositional* properties of violence.⁸ Dispositions are intrinsic. They are independent of the instantiation of other properties, especially of their manifestations. Dispositions embodies two fundamental characteristics. First, an entity/system can hold both static and dispositional properties at the same time. There is nothing about the actual behaviour of the object that is ever *necessary* to have a dispositional property. Second, dispositional ascriptions exhibits its characteristic manifestations under some ‘stimulus conditions’: ‘ x is violent at t ’ is associated with ‘ x would wage war/use weapon of mass destruction/chemical weapons, when faced with certain stimulus conditions at t ’. Such a view point of violence, and particularly organized violence such as wars require us to probe into more inquisitive comparison of not just the ‘actuality’ (manifested battle-death) but also the ‘potentially’ (potential battle-deaths) of war making – that has increased manifold with the advent of nuclear weapons, weapons of mass destruction (WMD) etc. in this era of “New Peace” (see table 1 below).



Source: Arms Control Association, available at, <https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/Nuclearweaponswhohaswhat/> accessed on 18 December 2016.

The world today is armed with too many earth-shattering nuclear weapons and all other sorts of WMD. Thus, while the relative number of battle related deaths have declined, the *potential* number of battle/conflict related death involving WMD that can happen under a range of 'stimulus conditions' in the era of 'New Peace' will be far greater. According to one report, even a regional war with an exchange of 100 nuclear weapons, apart from the death and destructions, can produce 5,000,000,000 kg of black soot that can block the sunlight lasting for 25 years, temporarily destroying much of earth's protective ozone layer and ushering a global nuclear famine.⁹ Viewed this way the happy proposition of "world becoming much more peaceful" loses much of its ground to be confirmed. The civilizational process that has landed us at the doors of the "New Peace" is accompanied by humanity's most earth-shattering weapons having more than enough destructive power to wipe out the human race for good.

Second, the tenuous nature of the 'new peace' and the blurring distinctions amongst different types of war informs us that the *decline in inter-state wars is no panacea* for a world peace. In the context of civil war, the regional and international players are not always be a 'passive' actors resulting in 'spill over' effects but also an 'active contributors' and 'opportunistic interventionists'. Indeed as conflicts data between 2006-2015 shows, there is an increase in the *internationalized civil conflicts* – defined as those armed conflicts between a government and a non-government entities where the government side, the opposing side, or both sides, received support from other governments that actively participate in the conflict, are on the rise (see table 2 below).



Source: Author's compilation from UCDP data sources.

Internationalized intra-state conflict has increased from just 15 percent in 2006 to 40 percent in 2015. At the same time, the self-sustaining internal civil wars have declined from 84 percent in 2006 to 58 percent. This clearly indicates that rebels/insurgents are not necessarily the *only* conflict entrepreneurs. A mix of external and internal war entrepreneurs, together with the transnational terrorist organizations, the political economy of intra-state conflicts, and its regional and global links to licit and illicit trade and financing structures hint at the real possibilities of inadvertent possession and subsequent use of WMD or so called 'dirty bombs' in such conflicts. Such a reality and the potential deadliness of civil wars indeed reflects that "orange is the new black" in the context of modern warfare. Today, more than ever, the ability to destroy, disrupt or paralyze a city, village or vital infrastructure is not limited to formal state actors but can be carried out by ideologically motivated and materially empowered non-state actors. Such reality informs us to take a critical look at the civil wars going beyond the polarized view along the greed or grievance theory juxtaposing the "loot-seeking" and "justice-seeking" motives of rebellion.

Greed or grievance theory of civil war: the primacy of economic motivations

Contrasting the conventional qualitative analysis on civil war by the political scientists, Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler first introduced the greed or grievance theory of civil war onset in 1998 using the global data on civil war from the Michigan University, USA. It is the *pioneering quantitative* research that analyses the factors that might account for the onset of conflict. Their initial effort was revised in 2004 and again in 2006 to include omitted data and to make the results more definitive. The first study of 1998 included 78 large civil conflicts between 1960-99, the second study involved 54 wars and 688 observations while the core regression of their latest 2006 version is based on 71 wars and over one thousand observations involving 172 countries covering the period from 1965-2004.¹⁰ Prior to such quantitative research, academics emphasized the relevance of 'Tolstoy effect' — i.e. 'all happy families are alike while every unhappy family is unhappy in its own way' in the context of civil war analysis. Hence, fieldwork-driven case studies on civil war were preferred over quantitative analysis asserting that the latter method would lack capturing "the kind of nuance and attention to detail"¹¹ that are common in 'unhappy families' (i.e. civil wars).

Breaking the barrier, Collier and his team focused on quantitative global data to explain the risks and processes of civil war. Their most digested model, 'greed versus grievance', examines global data against three empirical proxies

for greed and four for grievance. The proxies for measuring greed are the level, growth and structure of income and all proved statistically significant in conflict risk. According to the theory, faster growth reduces conflict risk as it raises the opportunity cost of joining rebellion. Connecting the low opportunity costs for recruitment in poverty stricken countries, they assert that poorer countries with low per capita income (proxy for level of income) are more likely to experience civil war. Although the relationship is non-linear, they find countries with abundant natural resources (proxy for economic structure) have a higher risk of conflict. Most controversially their initial findings indicate that social fractionalization measured in terms of religious and ethnic diversity *lowers* the risk of conflict. However, in their later version, they distinguish between 'greed rebellion' from 'grievance rebellion', and suggest that 'ethnic dominance' — i.e. where one ethnic group makes up 45-90 percent of the population, poses higher risks for civil war. It also contends that the risk of civil war recurrence decline as the duration of peace is lengthened. However, as highlighted before, the theory has been revised three times. The initial 'greed versus grievance' model was renamed as 'motive versus opportunity' (2004) and then to 'feasibility theory versus motivational theory' in 2006 with an amended title of the paper as '*Beyond Greed and Grievance: Feasibility of Civil War*' (italic added).

The 2006 version of the model speaks of feasibility theory and motivational theory, the latter being subdivided into greed and grievance. Subsequently they reject the motivational theory and concludes, "where rebellion is feasible it will occur: motivation is indeterminate, being supplied by whatever agenda happens to be adopted by the first social entrepreneur to occupy the viable niche."¹² The primacy of the *material dimension* as opposed to any motivational factors is premised on their argument that regardless of its agenda or appeal, the establishment of a rebel army is both prohibitively expensive and extremely dangerous in civil wars. Thus, the relatively rare circumstances in which rebellion is materially feasible constitute an important part of any explanation of civil war. Regarding the other variables, they now conclude that linguistic and religious fractionalization significantly *increases* the risks of civil war and adds that mountain terrain and proportion of males in 15-29 age groups adds *significant risks* while large diasporas contributes to *reduced risks* of civil war. Regarding their earlier assertion on civil war recurrence they now predict a much lower 23 percent in first four years and 40 percent in ten years' time frame. However, regardless of the changes, their claim that their "core findings have survived"¹³ that keeps the debate on.

Can 'greed' alone explain civil war?

Despite several refinements, the theory remains highly contested if not problematic on various accounts. **First**, the theory models rebellion as 'an industry that generates profit from looting' and focuses on the predatory activities of the rebels, typifying the large scale organized violence by the rebel army as the 'defining feature' of civil war.¹⁴ Such focus may yield partial view categorizing all insurgencies as an extreme form of common criminality. It also restrict the analysis of several conflict-promoting acts by the internal or external actors, political economy and most importantly the opportunity structures that may prevail in a particular context.¹⁵ Arguably, in Kosovo, Nepal, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Sierra Leone, the severely diminished military capacity and legitimacy of the state, internal decay and geopolitical shift hastened the civil war.¹⁶ The creditors, donors and contractors to the weak states could also trigger and contribute in creating shadow states. For example, the creation of *sobel* (soldiers by day and rebels by night), in Sierra Leone was triggered by the financially pressed government's decision to trim one third of state employees allowing the armed soldiers to engage in "Operation Pay Yourself".¹⁷ Such a project resulted in over 20 percent soldiers of the woefully under resourced Sierra Leone military to engage in freelance armed activities like killing civilians, extorting money and engaging in illegal diamond trading like the rebels.¹⁸ The coinciding economic interest and incentives of the Sierra Leone's military and the rebels under a 'regional conflict complex' and 'opportunity structure' prolonged the war.¹⁹ More so, when the state itself is criminalized, corruption and rent seeking by the elite undermines government's legitimacy and eventually transform the state being "above politics and into the prize of political competition." Consequently the creation of 'shadow states' where the government's misrule combined with the linkage of well-functioning state machineries with the international and regional clients - both licit and illicit, makes the state more attractive for armed contestation.²⁰ Regrettably, the defining role of such conflict 'complexes' and structures, and their corresponding impact on social capital and breeding inequality, that may trigger and contribute to civil war onset do not feature prominently in the greed or grievance model.²¹

Second, the model views rebels as a *unitary actor* with an interest of predation. Such a view is inadequate to define the distinctive nature and actions of the core rebel leadership and the peripheral activities by the followers in civil war. As a result it undermines and/or overlooks the possibility of capturing the interactions of the economic (or other) incentives and rationales that are at play amongst the central leadership (i.e. master cleavage) and at the peripheral followers (i.e. local cleavage). Indeed as Ballentine and Sherman

argues, while followers on all sides may be attracted by the prospect of material gain, they may also be attracted by ideological zeal, ethnic loyalty, or aspirations to power.²² Tracing the ontology of political violence, Stathis Kalyvas highlights this issue more vividly:²³

“...civil wars are not binary conflicts, but complex and ambiguous processes that foster the “joint” action of local and supra-local actors, civilians, and armies, whose alliance results in violence that aggregates yet still reflects their diverse goals.”

According to Kalyvas, ‘greed’ is anchored in Hobbesian inspiration²⁴ (of competition, diffidence and glory) and hence reflects the private sphere; while the ‘grievance’ dimension is best captured from a Schmittian lens – that entails an ontology of civil wars based on abstract group loyalties and beliefs, whereby “the political enemy becomes a private adversary only by virtue of a prior collective and impersonal enmity”.²⁵ Contrasting the Hobbesian view, the Schmittian perspective stresses the fundamental political nature of civil war and its attendant processes offering better explanatory leverage to interpret its different variants including ethnic civil war that stress strong beliefs, group enmity, and cultural antipathy. Rejecting Collier and others’ juxtapose dichotomy, Kalyvas points to the interactions of political and private identities and actions. Exposing the disjunction between the ‘centre’ and ‘periphery’, Kalyvas suggests that the actions on the ground are often more local and private. Interestingly, Collier et al. recognizes such disjunction and yet rejects the narratives of grievances saying “grievance is to rebel organization what image is to a business”.²⁶ Drawing rationality from the Machiavelli Theorem, “no profitable opportunity for violence would go unused” they characterize the (*false*) *sense of grievance* as a tool to generate support and facilitate recruitment to sustain rebellion. Citing a controversial parallel from the Marxist theory, Collier and authors assert that “even where the rationale at the top of the organization is essentially greed, the actual discourse may be entirely dominated by grievance.”²⁷ However, Michael Pugh contends that Collier’s greed or grievance model focuses on economic data and not the ideational processes – that is at the heart of the Marxists theory. As such drawing parallel with the Marxist theory and contending the primacy of material dimension amounts to “inverting the meaning of the Marxist concept”.²⁸ Nevertheless, Collier, responded to his critics expanding his thoughts on three possible variants of the theory and asserted that ‘*doing well out of war*’ is what matters irrespective of whether rebel’s motivation is linked to power-seeking or grievance and rejects the notion of objective grievance. As he succinctly puts elsewhere.²⁹

“...rebellion is motivated by greed, so that it occurs when rebels *can do well out of war*. On the power seeking variant of the predation theory, rebels are motivated by a lust for power, but rebellion occurs only when rebels *can do well out of war*. On the subjective grievance variant of the predation theory, rebels are motivated by grievances, imagined or real, but rebellion occurs only when rebels *can do well out of war*.” (Italics added)

While ‘doing well out of war’ thesis appears convincing in plain sight, it remains highly contested when one discovers that ‘well’ is defined only in terms of material gain, rejecting the ideational aspects of civil war. Such a fallacy encourages us to probe into the proxy variables and data used in such models.

Limits of the proxy variables, data and model

The variations in the statistical relationship and the corresponding significance level as reported in different studies on civil war is listed in table 1.³⁰ As evident, despite the obvious advantages of quantitative methods to arrive at generalization, the clarity of the statistical methods and the use of proxy variables in greed or grievance model is theoretically problematic and empirically unsatisfactory. First, the empirical link of social/ethno-religious fractionalization with civil war disregards the *political dynamics* associated with civil wars. Collier’s model combines the data of ethnicity and religion aspect to proxy social fractionalization; ethnic dimension is measured by the probability that two randomly drawn individuals from a given country do not speak the same language. For the religious dimension, they use the data from Barrett (1982) and construct an analogous religious fractionalization index aggregating various religious affiliations into nine categories: Catholic, Protestant, Muslim, Jew, Hindu, Buddhist, Eastern Religions (other than Buddhist), Indigenous Religions and no religious affiliation. The final fractionalization indices range from zero (for completely homogenous society) to 1 (for completely heterogeneous society).³¹ Notwithstanding such sophistication the proxy remains a poor indicator to capture the *political dynamics* because not all ethno-linguistic/religious groups *matter* for civil wars. The linguistic, religious and cultural diversity among the population is mediated through the internal frictions that manifest in the *hierarchies* in either socio-economic terms or in terms of their visibility in the political arena.³² Data reflecting politically relevant groups is missing from the model. As reflected in table 1, the Fearon and Laitin’s study does not report any significant relationship while the 2006 study of Collier reports a *highly significant positive* relationship between the civil war onset and social

fractionalization. Again the study on civil war recurrence by Call and Schmitt reports a highly significant but *negative* relationship.

Second, the per capita GDP and percentage of oil export/primary commodity dependency is considered as a proxy for limited economic opportunity in Collier's model while the same is used as the proxy for state weakness by Fearon and Laitin. Highlights the fallacies of using such tenuously related proxy, Christopher Cramer (2006) points out that a decline in GDP and primary commodity dependency could also be a reflection of many factors including failed policy, missing economic dynamism, introducing the structural adjustment plan (SAP), a probable shortage of consumer goods and imports and widespread grievance or dissatisfaction. More so, belligerent's economic agendas are hard to quantify as the volume of all primary commodity exports (i.e. agricultural goods) may not show up in national accounts.³³ Thus, such creative use of available cross-national data *may not* be perfect to confirm or reject the hypothesized causal connection. Indeed as table 2 below reflects the variations in statistical significance and relationship, arrived at by different studies using such thin and questionable proxy variables. Contrasting Collier's findings, Fearon and Laitin reports that "neither the share of primary commodity exports in GDP nor its square is remotely significant when added to the model."³⁴ Again, reporting on the civil war recurrence, Call and Schmitt find that GDP (lagged) is not a significant predictor of civil war while confirming its negative relationship.³⁵

Table 1: Relationship of proxy variables as reported in different studies of civil war.

	Statistical relationship in quantitative studies		
	Collier, Hoeffler and Rohner (2006)	Fearon and Laitin (2003)	Call and Schmitt (2009)
Dependent Variable	Civil war onset	Civil war onset	Civil war Recurrence
Independent variables			
<i>Economic Growth, level and structure</i>			
GDP per capita growth / Per capita income	Negative and highly significant(at 1%)	Negative and highly significant (p < .001)	Negative <i>but not significant</i> .
Share of oil export	-	Positive and significant (p<0.01)	Positive and significant (at 1%)
Share of primary commodity exporter	Positive and significant (at 10%)	Not significant.	-
<i>Demography</i>			
Log of total population	-	Positive and highly significant (p<0.001)	
Proportion of young men in population	Positive and highly significant (at 1% level)	Positive but <i>highly insignificant</i> (p=.21)	Positive and highly significant (at 1% level)
<i>Terrain condition</i>			
Mountainous terrain	Positive and significant (at 5%)	Positive and significant (p<0.01)	-
Noncontagious territory	-	Positive but insignificant	Negative but insignificant.
<i>History</i>			
Prior instability/war	Negative but insignificant.	Negative but significant (p<0.01).	Positive and highly significant (at 1%)
Former French colony	Negative but insignificant	Not measured	Not measured
New state	Positive and highly significant (at 1%)	Positive and highly significant (p<0.001)	Not applicable.
<i>Social</i>			
Ethnic/social/religious fractionalization	Positive, highly significant (at 1% l)	Positive but not significant	Negative and highly significant (at 1%)
Democracy	Positive but insignificant.	Positive but insignificant.	Negative but insignificant.

Sources: Author's compilation from the mentioned studies.

Third, the blurring distinctions between civil war 'onset' and 'recurrence' and the coding of 'war' and 'conflicts' also results into considerable anomalies.

A 'conflict' is defined as producing more than 25 battle deaths in a year while the same is coded as 'war' when the battle deaths reaches 1000/year. As a result only a minor adjustment in the coding rules can have quite dramatic effects. For example, the 2006 version of Collier's model starts with those observations that has reached the 1000 battle death ending in the year when the armed conflict did not generate any deaths. What if a conflict has generated only 999 battle death in the first year? Such coding also poses the danger of merging civil war 'onset' data with 'recurrence'. A clear distinction between 'onset' and 'recurrence' is particularly important as each can produce divergent statistical relationship. Call points out that Colliers's study between 2002 -2006 reports remarkably divergent rates of armed conflict recurrence including 50 percent, 44 percent, 23 percent and 21 percent.³⁶ Such anomalies argues in favour of exercising caution while accepting the claims made in these studies.

In sum, these statistical models along with their tenuously linked proxy variables not only marginalizes objective grievance as a potential cause of civil war but also over simplifies the political economy of civil war. Viewed from the narrow lenses of greed, the quantitative approaches tend to over aggregate the dependent variable and treat civil wars as though they have uniform causes. It ignores the fact that civil wars are just not the outcome of everyday encounters between individuals; they are the result of interactions between the state and ethno political movements that challenge state authority. Thus, many observers that Collier's statistical model has not generated convincing regularities. They highlight that the Gini coefficient used in the model captures vertical inequality as opposed to horizontal inequalities telling us very little about the actual condition that may trigger rebellion. Indeed comparison of such data across a range of countries is problematic. For example, Rwanda had low Gini coefficient prior to the war and genocide. However, Collier et al. accepts that any quantitative analysis based on global data sets could have severe limitations and suggests that the findings arising out of such quantitative research be seen as "complementing qualitative in-country research rather than supplanting it".

What explains civil war?

Notwithstanding its intellectual rigor and methodology, the 'greed or grievance' model is neither absolute nor most obvious. The model is also at odds with other economic approaches to civil war that views resource wars not only as a function of predation but also as a *distributional conflict*, poor governance or as a response to the structural adjustment. The unjust distribution of revenue, economic vulnerability, weak governance structure, inefficiency, corruption, institutional conservatism, disruptive social impacts,

subsidization of politicized schemes, leadership etc. can foment greed and generate grievance, creating conditions for civil war in countries endowed with abundant natural resources.³⁷ The persistent diversion of state assets by neo-patrimonial rulers in 'shadow states' and their subsequent fragmentation can breed 'war entrepreneurs' and creates condition for civil war. Such internal decay coupled with global and regional connections is a reality but does not feature in Collier's model. Thus, it is not surprising to see that contrary to the Collier's contentions, Lebanon and Indonesia (Aceh province) experienced civil wars at a time when both the countries were having high growth. In case of Aceh, the expansion of extractive resource industry flocked migrant workers leadings to a second order effect in massive land seizures which reinvigorated the Acehanese rebel movement coinciding with the high growth period.³⁸ However, Kenya, despite a weak economy and low GDP per capita, has managed to avoid civil war arguably through a strong authoritarian rule. Again Papua New Guinea with strong income from primary commodity export (over 40 percent of GDP) for two decades could not avert the rebellion. All these suggest that state capacity may be less of a function of its resource base than its ability to manage the resources effectively.³⁹

Joel Migdal (1980) and K.J. Holsti (1996), are the two early proponents who attempts to links intra-state war with state weakness in general and the legitimacy dimension – i.e. the degree of state-society cohesion, in particular. According to Holsti, a deficiency in vertical and horizontal legitimacy reflecting weak state-society cohesion is the main cause of civil war.⁴⁰ Vertical legitimacy is the belief that a select group of individuals and organizations (such as state actors) have the right (i.e., it is appropriate) to act as representatives of society. Horizontal legitimacy is the belief that all people (or peoples) within the boundaries of the nation-state are acceptable partners in the collective endeavour fundamental to the political, economic, social, and cultural health of a society. Thus lacking such legitimacy fragments state-society relationship. As a result, even when a state is very powerful in its ability to command over the instruments of social surveillance, coercion and terror, it remain fragile and can slip into the abyss of civil war. Evidence supporting this hypothesis is overwhelming. Many post-colonial states invested heavily on security sectors to achieve better social control with the assistance of foreign donors and governments. Yet, the rapid growth of the security forces in these post-colonial countries failed to achieve the degree of social control and were affected by coup incidences, political repressions often facilitated or triggered by external actors.⁴¹ Indeed, as Powell and Thyne in their study on global incidence of coup reveals that within two decades of their entry onto the world stage, the newly created Third World states experienced a total of about 200 coup incidents which had a lasting impact on state-building.⁴² Between 1950-2015,

Africa (42.3 percent) and the Americas (30.9 percent) experienced the most coups, while Asia and the Middle East accounted for 13.1 percent and 10.14 percent coup attempts respectively. In contrast, Europe had the fewest (3.6 percent) coup attempts. Such prevalence of coup incidences in weak states hindered developing strong state-society relationship, weakening government's legitimacy and ultimately contributing towards the incidence of civil war.

Michael E. Brown and Kristian S Metternich and others highlight the role of *regional and international* factors for the initial outbreak of civil wars and the escalation dynamics of conflict once underway.⁴³ In a similar vein, Christopher Cramer (2006) compares and contrasts the liberal interpretation with the romantic utopian view of violence to forge an alternative view of understanding civil war as a product of the transition to capitalism and of global economy.⁴⁴ Highlighting the need to contextualise civil wars, Nicholas Sambanis argues the need for case study based analysis dispensing the large N analysis that tends to focus on generalization missing the nuance aspects.⁴⁵ However, Collier's model fails to capture such international dimension of civil war.

Some suggest that the onset of civil war and its link to the natural resource predation can be explained by examining the 'lootability' of the resources. For example, Le Billon distinguishes natural resources based on their proximity from the centre of power in both spatial and political terms (i.e. proximate and distant) and also in terms of their physical characteristics and socio-economic linkage (i.e. point and diffused). Projecting his classification with the help of a matrix, Le Billon illustrates the type of conflicts associated with each set of resource categories. He concludes that 'diffused' and 'distant' natural resources like gems and diamonds are associated with warlordism while 'point' and 'proximate' resources like oil, gas typically generate coup-d'état. Conversely 'proximate' but 'diffused' resources like coffee generate peasant/mass rebellion and the 'distant' but 'point' resources generate secessionists' movement. Such typology and classifications surely adds to our clarity of understanding on civil war but does not go further to facilitate our understanding about the contextual and ideational factors.

However, the most formidable challenge to Collier's model perhaps comes from the theories that connect inequality and exclusionary behaviours as prime source of grievance causing civil war. Notable early efforts along this line include Ted Robert Gurr's work that explains civil war based on relative deprivation theory. Analysing the behaviour of 275 politically active ethnic groups during the 1990s, Gurr lists four main determinants of civil war: ethno

cultural identity, level of actual or perceived grievance, mobilizing capacity of the ethno political groups and the available opportunities for political actions by each group. His views are consistent with constructivists approach as it focuses on the political mobilization of elites by political entrepreneurs and the social construction of identity that is often used as a mobilization device. Charles Tilly in his book *Durable Inequality* offers another prominent model rooted on inequality. Tilly highlights people and societies form 'categorical pairs' by drawing boundaries between 'us' and 'them'. The institutionalisation and sedimentation of these paired categories generates "durable inequality." The diffusion and institutionalisation of such *inequality* takes place over time as modes of exploitation and opportunity hoarding are extended, copied, and adapted, leading to violent conflicts. Focusing on the political instability and regime transitions, Håvard Hegre and others models civil war as the result of *opportunity for violence* as opposed to opportunity for predation to settle prior *grievances*. They argue that the probability of civil war is a function of a host of factors that reduce the net expected costs of *political violence* and generate an expectation that violence will resolve prior grievances. A similar conclusion is drawn by Call (why peace fails) as he reports that the most important factor that plays a common causal role in civil war recurrences is political exclusion and not the economic and social factors.⁴⁶

In sum, all these models informs us the common causal role of *inequality* in civil wars. The centrality of inequality in human convulsions was succinctly put by Alexis De Tocqueville, nearly 181 years ago: "Remove the secondary causes that have produced the great convulsions of the world and you will almost always find the principle of inequality at the bottom." However, as noted before, greed or grievance model finds (vertical) inequality 'insignificant' to explain civil war. Thus these theories are at odds and challenges the primacy of economic dimension in civil wars as espoused by Collier's model. Frances Stewart's horizontal inequalities (HIs) model, introduces in 2008 reconciles these differences as it goes beyond the traditional methods of capturing inequality. Stewart's model is built on Gurr and Tilly's work focusing on group inequality and extends to link civil war with state weakness and authoritarian repressions offering rich and diverse analytical tools to examine civil wars that we examine next..

Horizontal inequalities (HIs) and civil war

HIs model argue that significant presence of HIs contributes to civil war. The root of the model can be traced to Gurr's relative deprivation and Tilly's categorical inequalities theory. Combining these two, HIs intimately relates to

the issues of power and wealth distribution in the societies. At the heart of the HI model is the *principles of inequality* manifested in the political, economic, social and cultural status of different groups (figure 3).



However, defining group boundaries is always challenging if not impossible since identities are malleable, fluid, multiple and may even be endogenous. However, many have argued that group identity intensifies in times of social, economic and political crisis. In the context of civil war in Bosnia Herzegovina, the influential Canadian political scientist Janice Gross Stein reports: “Muslims in Bosnia Herzegovina identified themselves as Serbs or Croats until it was no more possible.” Similarly, in the context of Chittagong Hill Tracts insurgency in Bangladesh, Eva Gerharz stresses the importance of political power and socio-economic entitlement concluding that “Being a Chakma, Marma, Mro or Lushai is (thus) more important in people’s everyday lives than collectivising notions.” Contrasting these examples is the *Orang Asli*, an active indigenous group in Malaysia, which was developed as a group out of at least eighteen different identities to help people mobilise, first against the British and subsequently for their rights in independent Malaysia. Similarly, the struggle for liberation of Bangladesh was also a mix of different groups and ethnicity who felt indifferent with the Pakistani oppression. This raises the question as to what should be a valid measure to draw the group boundaries. Addressing this problem, HIs model uses the “felt differences” criteria arrived at variety of survey methods. It is argued that ‘feeling different’ is “important enough and clear enough in many societies to make it possible to measure group performance.”

Despite its inheritance from Gurr and Tilly's work, HIs theory differs from them on two important areas. First, HIs theory presupposes the notion that relative rich or poor could both initiate conflict. As a result it provides a framework to explain why rich Tutsi's attacked the poor Hutu's in Burundi in 1993 or why Côte d'Ivoire remained peaceful under the politically inclusive regime of Félix Houphouët-Boigny and yet degenerated into chaos after his death in 1993 under successive regimes who adopted a policy that barred and curtailed the opportunity of the northerners to participate in the political process.⁴⁷ Second, HIs is also viewed as close cousin of social exclusion (SE) hence one could relate it with Call's ("why peace fails") arguments on civil war recurrence that focuses on exclusionary behaviours. While defining the size of a "critical mass" required for the HIs to trigger any civil conflict, Stewart argues that it would require at least 30 percent or more people subjected to such inequalities. Of course, it would be a matter of judgment, he adds.⁴⁸

HIs theory stand out from the 'greed or grievance' model on several counts. First, it focuses on culturally defined groups instead of individuals and measures group inequalities in economic, political, cultural and social dimensions to explain civil war onset. Second, in HI model, the proxy variables are relatively nuanced, contextual and politically relevant. For example, the economic dimensions focuses more on the *power relationship and entitlement* instead of crude economic indicators such as income level, Gini coefficient. It includes issues like: access and ownership of financial, human, natural and social assets as well as income level and employment opportunities. Social HIs are counted against education, health care and housing while political HIs reflects the distribution of *political opportunities and power* among groups and their representation and participations in government organizations; Finally the cultural status of HIs is measured in terms of *recognition and standing* of different language, religion, customs, norms and practices of the respective groups. Leveraging the country specific Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) data, researchers have used innovative questionnaires such as economic household assets (whether or not each household has electricity, a radio, a television, a refrigerator, a bicycle, a motorcycle and/or a car), educational, vocational and employment opportunities (percentage in public/private, skilled/unskilled etc.), infant mortality rates and the possession of children's health cards etc., to capture the *power and entitlement* aspects of HIs present in a society. Such methods allows us to go beyond capturing the vertical inequalities and provide a nuance understanding of group-identity and polarization dynamics of civil war and the complex interplay of *both* greed and grievance.

Based on a combination of hypotheses HIs theory asserts that convergence of political and social exclusion together with economic deprivation can

significantly contribute to the civil conflict while cultural differences alone do not lead to violent conflict unless there are also major economic and/or political causes. Analysing global data, Lars-Erik Cederman, Gudrun Østby, Stewart, Brown and Mancini among others provide substantial evidences including econometric and case study based analysis supporting HIs theory.⁴⁹ Thus, taken together, HIs theory appears to be multidimensional and inclusive of both greed *and* grievance and better poised to explain the risk and process of civil war.

End thoughts

Be that as it may, the interplay of greed and grievance in civil war is dynamic and shares a symbiotic relationship. They are often 'shades of same problem' as we see more of "political greed and economic grievance."⁵⁰ The potential of organized crime, rent seeking attitude by the state itself together with corruption and manipulation of market may create 'grievances' that would in turn facilitate the rebels to materialize their 'greed'. Indeed in countries based on "the politics of bellies", grievance can be as much as political and greed for the control of primary commodity can often be associated with such political grievances. Collier's absolute rejection to objective grievance as a potential cause of civil war also stands in sharp contrast to several schools of thought on civil war. Thus Collier's conclusions that civil war onset is based exclusively on economic characteristics and not on exclusionary behaviours, horizontal inequalities that triggers objective grievance seems to be an exaggeration. That however, is not same as saying the model has lost its relevance in entirety. While it makes sense to link civil wars with economic decline, growth collapse, high level of poverty, unemployment and feasibility of resources predation by the rebels in a world where civil wars are increasingly understood and explained as a 'rationale economic choice', the empirical certainty postulated in the model depicting that the material factors *alone* contributes in rebel mobilization is far from being convincing. The reality of political economy, regional and international commerce, together with HIs and the dynamics of group identity impels us to reject the juxtapose dichotomy as stipulated by Collier and his team and rather embrace the fact that both greed *and* grievance are at work simultaneously in civil war.

1. The only one active inter-state *conflict* in 2014 was between India and Pakistan. It led to fewer than 50 fatalities hence not meeting the 1000 battle deaths criteria of 'war'. See There'se Pettersson and Peter Wallensteen. "Armed Conflicts, 1946–2014". *Journal of Peace Research* 52(4)(2015):536–550.
2. The internationalized conflicts include: Afghanistan, Azerbaijan (NagornoKarabakh), Iraq, Mali, Nigeria, Somalia, South Sudan, Uganda, Ukraine (Donetsk), Ukraine (Lugansk), Ukraine (Novorossiya), USA (the conflict with Al-Qaeda), and Yemen. See Pettersson and Wallensteen, "Armed Conflicts", 537.
3. See. Simon Fraser University, *Sexual Violence, Education, and War: Beyond the Mainstream Narrative*. Vancouver: Human Security Press, 2012. Print. Human Security Report p.156.
4. See the third and final version of the theory, Paul Collier, Anke Hoeffler, and Dominic Rohner. 2006. "Beyond Greed and Grievance: Feasibility and Civil War". CSAE WPS/2006-10. <https://www.csae.ox.ac.uk/workingpapers/pdfs/2006-10text.pdf>.
5. Cited in Stathis N. Kalyvas, *The Ontology of "Political Violence": Action and Identity in Civil Wars*. *Perspectives on Politics*, 1(2003): 479.
6. The six long term trend outlined by Steven Pinker are: 1. "Pacification Process" —the uneven transitions from anarchic hunter-gatherer, horticultural and other early human societies to the first agricultural civilizations and then nation-states. 2. "Civilizing Process" that runs from the late Middle Ages to the twentieth century and was accompanied by the growth and consolidation of the nation-state system in Europe. 3. "Humanitarian Revolution" anchored in European enlightenment of the seventeenth and eighteenth century resulting in the decline and abolition of slavery, elimination of judicial and other forms of torture and a long-term reduction in all manner of other cruel and inhumane practices. 4. "Long Peace" started since the end of World War II in which the great powers have stopped fighting each other. 5. "New Peace", started since the end of cold war in 1989 because of its tentative nature. Pinker's sixth trend, "Rights Revolution" overlaps the era of 'long peace' and 'new peace'. See Steven Pinker, *Better Angle of our Nature, A history of Violence and Humanity*, (U.S.A.: Penguin Books, 2011) xxiii.
7. For an enlightened discussion on Pinker's argument and critics, see Human Security Report 2013, *Decline in the Global Violence, Evidence, Explanation and Contestation*, Simon Fraser University (Vancouver, Canada : Human Security Press, 2013), 17-49.
8. See Sungho Choi, and Michael Fara, "Dispositions", *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Spring 2016 Edition), available at, <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2016/entries/dispositions/> accessed on 12 December 2016. Also see Micheal Esfield, ed., *John Heil Symposium on his Ontological Point of View*, (U.S.A.: Transaction Books, 2006), 79-81.
9. Michael J. Mills, Owen B. Toon, Julia Lee-Taylor, Alan Robock, Multidecadal global cooling and unprecedented ozone loss following a regional nuclear conflict, *Earth's Future*, 2,(2014), 161–176.
10. See Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, "On Economic Causes of Civil War", *Oxford Economic Papers*, 50 (1998): 563-73. Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler. "Greed and Grievance in Civil War", *Oxford Economic Papers*, 56 (2004): 563-95. And Collier, Hoeffler and Rohner, "Beyond Greed and Grievance", 8.
11. See Nicholas Sambanis, "Conclusion: Using Case Studies to Refine and Expand the Theory of Civil War," in *Understanding Civil War: Evidence and Analysis*, eds., Paul Collier

- and Nicholas Sambanis, (Washington DC: The World Bank, 2005), 303-329.
12. Collier, Hoeffler and Rohner, "Beyond Greed and Grievance," 20
 13. *Ibid*, 27.
 14. Collier and Hoeffler, "Greed and Grievance", 3 and *Ibid*, 4.
 15. For the economic dimensions of civil war that goes beyond 'greed', see Karen Ballentine, "Beyond Greed and Grievance: Reconsidering the Economic Dynamics of Armed Conflict," in *The Political Economy of Armed Conflict - Beyond Greed and Grievance*, eds. Karen Ballentine and Jake Sherman, (London: Lynne Rienner, 2003), 259-285.
 16. For country specific analysis on Nepal, see John Bray, Leiv Lunde and Mansoor S Murshed, "Nepal: Economic Drivers of the Maoist Insurgency" in Ballentine and Jake, eds., "Political Economy of Armed Conflict" 107-132. For Kosovo, see Yannis Alexandros "Kosovo: The Political Economy of Conflict and Peacebuilding", in Ballentine and Sherman, eds., "Political Economy of Armed Conflict", 167-196. For DRC and Sierra Leone see Michael L. Ross, (2003) "Oil, Drug and Diamonds: The Varying Roles of Natural Resources in Civil War", in Ballentine and Sherman, eds., "Political Economy of Armed Conflict", 47-72.
 17. Ballentine and Sherman, eds., "Political Economy of Armed Conflict", 90. Also see Michael Pugh, Neil Cooper and Jonathan Goodhand, *War Economies in Regional Context Challenges of Transformation*, (London: Lynne Rienner, 2004), 17-45.
 18. The quality and discipline of the Sierra Leone army declined after 1991, when the force was dramatically expanded, from 3,000 to 16,000, in order to intensify the war against the RUF. However, the government was unable to pay for such a large army. See Robert L. Feldman and Michel Ben Arrous, "Fighting irregular Fighters Confronting Africa's Sobels" *Parameters*, 43(4), Winter 2013-14, 67-75.
 19. For an excellent account of the economic network of regional conflict complex with illustration of the Colton supply chain see Pugh, Cooper and Goodhand, "War Economies", 26-28; while Ballentine, "Beyond Greed and Grievance", 264-268, illustrates opportunity structure.
 20. See William Reno, "Shadow States and the Political Economy of Civil Wars", in *Greed and Grievance Economic Agendas in Civil War*, eds. Mats Berdal and David M. Malone, (London: Lynne Rienner, 2000), 43-65. And Dietrich Jung, ed., *Shadow Globalization, Ethnic Conflict and New Wars a Political Economy of intra-state war*, (London: Routledge, 2003) 9-27.
 21. Jean-Francois Bayart identifies five symptoms in the context of sub-Saharan African states and also highlights the lack of social capital. See Jean-Francois Bayart, Stephen Ellis, and Beatrice Hibou, *The Criminalization of State in Africa*, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1999), 4-8 & 69-114. William and Picarelli highlights the organized crime dimension. See Phil Williams and John T. Picarelli, "Combating Organized Crime in Armed Conflict" in: Karen Ballentine and Nitzschke Heiko, ed., *Profiting from Peace Managing the Resource Dimension of Civil War*, (London: Lynne Rienner, 2005), 127.
 22. Ballentine and Sherman, "Political Economy of Armed Conflict", 8.
 23. Kalyvas, "Ontology of 'Political Violence'", 474.
 24. Hobbes outlines three principal causes of quarrel: competition, diffidence and glory. He argues that human nature of 'competition' 'maketh men invade for gain' using violence to make themselves 'master of other men's persons, wives, children, and cattle;' Thomas

- Hobbes, , "The Leviathan", 1660, available at http://www.ttu.ee/public/m/mart-murdvee/EconPsy/6/Hobbes_Thomas_1660_ The_Leviathan.pdf, accessed on 12 November 2016.
25. Kalyvas, "Ontology of "Political Violence", 475.
26. Collier, Hoeffler and Rohner, "Beyond Greed and Grievance", 92.
27. Collier et al (2000), p.92.
28. Pugh, Cooper and Goodhand, "War Economies", 22
29. Paul Collier, "Doing Well out of War: An Economic Perspective" in Berdal and Malone eds., "Greed and Grievance", 91-112.
30. Compiled from Collier, Hoeffler and Rohner, "Beyond Greed and Grievance", James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, "Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War", *American Political Science Review*, Volume 97, Issue 1, February 2003, 75-90 and Charles T. Call and John Schmitt, "Why Peace Fails: Explaining Civil War Recurrence," Paper presented at the annual conference of International Studies Association, New York, 2009.
31. Collier, Hoeffler and Rohner, "Beyond Greed and Grievance", 28.
32. See Andreas Wimmer, Lars-Erik Cederman and Brian Min, "Ethnic Politics and Armed Conflict: A Configurational Analysis of a New Global Data Set" *American Sociological Review*, Volume 74, (April 2009), 316 –337.
33. Sambanis "A review of recent advances and future directions in the quantitative literature on civil war", *Defence and Peace Economics*, Volume 13(3), (2002), 221.
34. Fearon and Laitin, 'Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War', 78.
35. See table 2.1 in Call, "Why Peace Fails" and Charles T. Call and John Schmitt, "Why Peace Fails: Explaining civil war recurrence"
36. Charles T Call, 'Why Peace Fails', 61.
37. As Le Billon contends that "even the well governed countries have found it difficult to break out of resource dependence when faced with unfavourable geography and a legacy of resource based public welfare". See Philip Le Billon, *Wars of Plunder- Conflicts, Profits and Politics of Resources*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012), 9-33 and 224-225. Also see M. Humphreys, "Natural Resources and Armed Conflict: Issues and Options", in Ballentine and Nitzschke, eds., "Profiting from Peace", 25-41; and Jeffry Herbst, *States and Power in Africa*. (Princeton U.S.A.: Princeton University Press, 2000),
38. Sambanis, "Conclusion: Using Case Studies", 306
39. Ballentine, 2003, p.265.
40. See K. J. Holsti, *The State, War, and the State of War*, (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 84, 90, Chapter 5. Also see K. J. Holsti, "International Relations Theory and Domestic War in the Third World: The Limits of Relevance," in *International Relations and the Third World*, ed., Stephanie G. Newman (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1998), 113-114, 119-122. Joel Migdal, *Strong Societies and Weak States: State-Society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World*, (USA: Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988).
41. See Joel Migdal, *State in Society: Studying How States and Societies Transform and Constitute One Another*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), And Jeffry Herbst, (2004), "Let them Fail : State Failure in Theory and Practice", in *When States Fail: Causes and Consequences*, ed., Robert I. Rotberg, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004), 301 –

316. Also see Mohammad Z.I. Khan, 'Paradox of State Fragility: The Role of International Structures in the context of Bangladesh', *BIPSS Monograph*, available at http://www.bipss.org.bd/images/pdf/monograph/monograph_200614.pdf/, accessed on 12 December 2016.
42. See J.M Powell and C. L. Thyne, "Global instances of coups from 1950 to 2010: A new dataset", *Journal of Peace Research* 48(2) (2011), 249–259. And Mohammad Z.I. Khan, "The Fallacies of State Fragility Indices, Is there a Fragility Trap?", Upcoming BIIS Paper, 14-15.
43. See Michael E. Brown, (1996). *International Dimensional of Internal Conflict*. (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996), 31-36; and Nils W.Metternich, Kristian S. Gleditsch, Han Dorussen and Andrea Ruggeri "International Dimensions of Internal Conflict", in Graham K. Brown and Arnim Langer, eds. *Elgar Handbook of Civil War and Fragile States*. (U.S.A.: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2012), 214-222.
44. See Christopher Cramer, *Civil War is Not a Stupid Thing: Accounting for Violence in Developing Countries*. (London: Hurst & Company, 2006), 7-8.
45. See Sambanis, "Conclusion: Using Case Studies", 303-329.
46. See Ted Robert Gurr, *Why Men Rebel*. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press 1970), 24-32. And Ted Robert Gurr, *People Versus States: Minorities at Risk in the New Century*, (Washington D.C.: Institute of Peace Press, 2000).
47. See, Charles Tilly, *Durable Inequality* (Berkeley, CA : University of California Press, 1998),
48. Håvard Hegre, Tanja Ellingsen, Scott Gates, Nils Petter Gleditsch, "Toward a Democratic Civil Peace? Democracy, Political Change, and Civil War, 1816-1992", *American Political Science Review*, Volume 95(1) (Mar 2001), 33 – 48.
49. Call, "Why Peace Fails", 4.
50. Alexis De Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, trans., Henry Reeve, (New York, Bantam Classics), chapter XXI.
51. Frances Stewart, "Horizontal Inequalities as a Cause of Conflict A review of CRISE Findings", available at <https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/57a08b0e40f0b64974000936/CRISE-Overview-1.pdf/>, accessed on 12 December 2016. Frances Stewart, "Horizontal inequalities as a cause of conflict", Bradford Development Lecture 2009, available at <http://www.bradford.ac.uk/social-sciences/media/socialsciences/BDLStewart.pdf/>, Accessed on 12 December 2016; Frances Stewart, "Horizontal Inequalities and Conflict: An Introduction and some Hypotheses". In: Frances Stewart, ed., *Horizontal Inequalities and Conflict: Understanding Group Violence in Multi-ethnic Societies*, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 3-23. Frances Stewart and Graham Brown, "Fragile States", available at <http://www3.qeh.ox.ac.uk/pdf/crisewps/workingpaper51.pdf/>, accessed on 12 December 2016
52. See, Janice Gross Stein, Image Identity and Conflict Resolution, in *Managing Global Chaos, Sources of and Responses to International Conflict*, eds., Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hamson and Pamela Aall, (US Institute of Peace, Washington DC, 1998), 93-107.
53. Eva Gerharz, "What is in a Name? Indigenous Identity and the Politics of Denial in Bangladesh", available at <http://edoc.hu-berlin.de/suedasien/band-4/115/PDF/115.pdf/>, accessed on 15 December 2016.
54. Frances Stewart, Graham Brown and Luca Mancini, "Why Horizontal Inequalities Matter: Some Implications for Measurement," (CRISE Working Paper number 19, June

2005) available at <http://www3.qeh.ox.ac.uk/pdf/crisewps/workingpaper19.pdf/> , accessed 14 December 2016.

55. *Ibid*, 8
56. For a detail account of ethnic representation in government of Côte d'Ivoire between 1980 – 2003, see table 21 in Stewart and Brown, "Fragile States", 68.
57. Stewart and Brown, "Fragile States", 15
58. Lars-Erik Cederman, Nils B. Weidmann and Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, 'Horizontal Inequalities and Ethnonationalist Civil War: A Global Comparison'. *American Political Science Review* 105, no. 3 (01 August 2011): 478–95. Gudrun Østby, "Horizontal Inequalities and Civil Conflict", A paper prepared for presentation at the 13th Annual National Political Science Conference, Hurdalsjøen, Norway, 5–7 January, 2005.
59. Sambanis, "Conclusion: Using Case Studies", 329.

Abu Sayyaf Group's Persistence: A Chronological Analysis of Crime-Terror Nexus In The Philippines and The Isis Connection In Southeast Asia

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Abstract

This article is a chronological analysis of the persistence of the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) as a non-state armed group involved in crime and terrorism. Despite efforts to defeat the ASG by various Philippine governments, the group continues to survive by conducting many criminal acts, particularly kidnap-for-ransom operations. The ASG also persists in pursuing bombing operations in the Philippines. Thus, the ASG falls under the nexus of crime and terrorism. Previously linked with Al Qaeda, the ASG has pledged allegiance to Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), which provides this homegrown-armed group from the Southern Philippines a fresh outlook to justify its violent acts.

INTRODUCTION

Because of its recent violent activities, the ASG is in the spotlight of international discussions again. The ASG's growing abhorrent behavior has prompted many foreign embassies in the Philippine to raise their security warnings and travel advisories in the country, particularly in Mindanao. The deterioration of safety situation of tourists and sea workers in the shared maritime borders of the

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Philippines, Malaysia and Indonesia also encouraged the three governments to level up their trilateral maritime security cooperation in order to address the escalating threat of the ASG in the triborder area.

Since the September 11, 2001 (9/11) terrorist attacks, the United States has consistently tagged the ASG as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO). But the Philippine government continues to downplay the status of the ASG as a mere bandit or criminal group. Some scholars have already debated on whether the ASG is a terrorist group or just a criminal organization.¹ But there seems to be no end to the debate in sight because of limited understanding of the ASG's nebulous character.

This paper contends that viewing the ASG as a mere bandit group or just a terrorist organization is like looking erroneously at the proverbial glass that is either half full or half empty. The ASG has, in fact, effectively mutated into a hybrid violent group that arguably falls under the complex nexus of crime and terrorism. Using a chronological analysis, this paper argues that the ASG through the years has acquired a schizophrenic violent personality that steadfastly navigates the murky spectrum of crime and terrorism. The ASG has ingeniously developed a dubious multiple character that exhibits both the nasty attitude of a criminal organization and the virulent behavior of a terrorist group.

In other words, the ASG resiliently exists in an intricate crime-terror continuum where the ASG's enormous involvements in crimes have created a new genre of terrorism in the post-modern world.² Thus, some scholars have called the ASG a post-modern terrorist group that is deeply involved in both crime and terrorism.³ Having been linked with Al-Qaeda and now with ISIS, the ASG has undoubtedly acquired the label of an international terrorist group.⁴ But the ASG as a terrorist group has strongly established links with criminal groups and lawless elements in its areas of operation in the Southern Philippines. The ASG, itself, has also resorted to a lot of criminal and unlawful activities, particularly kidnap-for-ransom and extortion, to survive and thrive. Grappling with the myriad of threats currently posed by the ASG, therefore, needs a comprehensive and nuanced approach that addresses both the ASG's criminal nature and terrorist character. In short, countering the ASG threat urgently requires a new knowledge of the ASG in the context of crime-terrorism nexus.

CRIME-TERRORISM NEXUS: UNDERSTANDING THE ASG THREAT

It is customary to differentiate criminal organizations from terrorist groups in terms of their strategic goals and operational tactics. Conventional wisdom

tends to advance the idea that criminal organizations are more interested in money and parochial economic gains. Terrorist groups, on the other hand, are more interested in politics and lofty ideological or religious goals. There is even a legal argument saying that terrorism is inherently a criminal offense. Others regard crime as inherently a terroristic act because of its very traumatic effects on victims and the larger society.

Beyond efforts to dichotomize crime and terrorism, there is a perceptual agreement among experts, scholars and laypersons that both indisputably are bad things.⁵ Crime and terrorism are both anathema to peace and they pose imminent threats to public order. They are evil twins, so to speak.⁶ They are the bad guys in the neighborhood. They share malevolent similarities in terms of their definitional ambiguity, social constructions, cross-disciplinary boundaries, perpetrator demographics and ability to undermine social trusts.⁷ But technically speaking, terrorism stringently differs from usual crimes because of the following observations:

- Terrorism is not a specific offense
- Terrorism crosses jurisdictional boundaries
- Terrorists seek public recognition
- Terrorists operate toward a broader goal “altruists”
- Terrorists innovate⁸

On the one hand, deeper examination reveals that terrorism is also conceptually similar to specific crimes because of the following factors:

- Organizational Structure
 - Organized crime, Gang activity, corporate crime
- Sustained Program of Violence
 - Organized crime, Gang activity, Serial murder
- Victim Selection
 - Mixture of targeted versus convenient
 - Personal versus impersonal⁹

Because the line between crime and terrorism has increasingly become so blurred,¹⁰ recent academic literatures have disclosed increasing interests on their nexus studying relationship and cooperation among criminal organizations and terrorist groups. Studying Hezbollah’s links with the Los Zetas Drug Cartel¹¹ and the Medellin drug traffickers’ use of terror tactics “to coerce the government into abandoning its policy of extraditing drug traffickers to the United States”¹² are just examples growing academic interests on crime-terrorism nexus.

However, there is a strong contention that cooperation between criminal organizations and terrorist groups does not automatically yield a firm nexus because of some anomalies in other cases. Nonetheless, it is argued, "some ground exist for suspecting that criminal organizations and terrorist groups are, in some cases, forging closer links with one another."¹³ As aptly observed by a scholar, "Both terrorist and criminal organizations operate in the same underworld, and often in the same geographic area or weak state; they have similar needs in terms of false documentation, weapons, and money; and each type of organization could find advantage in forging closer links with the other."¹⁴

As a result, there is an increasing research interest examining the relationship between criminal organizations and terrorist groups. There are even studies investigating instances of criminal organizations using terrorist methods and terrorist groups engaging in organized crimes.¹⁵ The Al-Qaeda, for example, forged links with various crime networks to mobilize resources in a limited scale as it opted to run its own criminal enterprises to have more stable sources of funds.¹⁶ Even ISIS has been involved in various transnational organized crimes to fund its own global reign of terror.¹⁷

The ASG also intractably exhibits the complex feature where crime and terrorism become two sides of the same coin. The ASG is in the "gray area phenomenon" where crime becomes integral to terrorist operations and where terror becomes essential in the commission of crimes.¹⁸ The ASG is at the intersection of crime and terror, so to speak.¹⁹ Like other violent groups elsewhere, the ASG has a Janus face of crime and terrorism. Understanding this ambiguous face is essential for the development of an innovative counter-measure to overcome the constantly evolving ASG threat.

TERRORISM IN THE PHILIPPINES AND THE EMERGENCE OF THE ASG:

A CHRONOLOGICAL ANALYSIS

Many publications have already been released to describe the emergence of the ASG. But many of these publications have sadly failed to really examine the ground origin of the ASG and the right context of its development as a violent group engaged in both crime and terrorism. Conspiracy theorists stressed that the ASG was the creation of the Philippine military to infiltrate Muslim resistant groups in the Southern Philippines for the purpose of "divide and rule". Others suspected the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) as the main creator of the ASG because of its Al Qaeda connection.

But a more nuanced analysis of its evolution indicated that the ASG was actually a homegrown creation of Abdurajak Janjalani who originally founded

the ASG in 1989 in his hometown in Basilan, Southern Philippines. When he established the ASG, Abdurajak Janjalani had the decisive political intention to establish an “independent Islamic State” in Mindanao.²⁰ As a voracious reader, Abdurajak Janjalani acquired the idea of Moro independence from various history books describing the struggle of Muslims in the Philippines for freedom.²¹ He also learned a lot from leaders of the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), which during his time was the largest Muslim resistant group in the Southern Philippines founded and still chaired by Nur Misuari. Abdurajak Janjalani joined the MNLF when it was created in the early 1970s because he believed that Muslims in Mindanao (called Moros) should enjoy their rights to self-determination through political independence or separation from the Philippines.

But when the MNLF entered into a peace negotiation with the Philippine government in the mid-1970s to implement the idea of Muslim autonomy, Abdurajak Janjalani started to mingle himself with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), the first splinter group of the MNLF. The MILF formally separated from the MNLF in 1976 when the Philippine government signed the Tripoli Agreement, which mandated the creation of autonomous Muslim government in Mindanao. When he studied Islamic courses in Libya and Saudi Arabia in the 1980s, he associated himself more with many MILF members.

Abdurajak Janjalani was more comfortable with the MILF being more “Islamic” in orientation than the MNLF being more “secular” in outlook. The MILF, in fact, sent Moro Mujahideen to Afghanistan in the 1980s to join the Taliban in driving away the former Soviet Union. He joined this group of Moro Mujahideen with the encouragement of MILF leaders. But contrary to other studies, he failed to actually reach Afghanistan. He only stayed in Peshawar, Pakistan where he met a lot of Taliban and Al-Qaeda leaders. It was in Peshawar where he read so much about jihad, Islamic revolution, and ideas of Sayyid Qutb. He also learned about the “living legend” of Abdul Rasul Sayyaf, a well-known Taliban warlord associated with Al-Qaeda of Osama bin Laden. Abdurajak Janjalani admired Abdul Rasul Sayyaf so highly that when he returned to Basilan in the late-80s, he used the *nom de guerre*, Abu Sayyaf, in his writings, sermons and fatwas.

While in Pakistan, Abdurajak Janjalani got actively involved in various activities of Jamaat Tabligh, a pious religious group doing Islamic propagation worldwide. Thus when he returned to Mindanao, he organized a local version of Jamaat Tabligh in Basilan. Using his own Tabligh group, he preached in Zamboanga City, Sulu and Tawi-Tawi until he became popular as an Ustadj with a new outlook. His popularity led him to organize a core group of “freedom fighters” adhering to Salafi Islam, a transnational Muslim faith that

he acquired from his foreign travels.²² He called this group of freedom fighters as the Al Harakatul Al Islamiyyah (AHAI) or the Islamic Movement. Within the AHAI was an armed group called Mujahideen Al-Sharifullah, which the Philippine military mistakenly called as the Mujahideen Commando Freedom Fighters (MCFF) in various intelligence reports. Most members of the AHAI originally came from the disgruntled members of MNLF and the MILF operating in Zamboanga City, Basilan, Sulu and Tawi-Tawi.²³ Because the AHAI and the MCFF were personally associated with Abdurajak Janjalani, many labeled his group as the ASG, the group of Abu Sayyaf or simply, the group of Ustadj Abdurajak.

For his followers, therefore, the ASG was a genuine resistant group – a group of freedom fighters and a movement of Moro revolutionaries. As such, the ASG got involved in a lot of violent activities like bombings, ambushes, assassinations, and guerilla operations. The ASG members learned their firefighting capabilities from their ancestors who fought Spanish colonial rule for almost 400 years. The ASG acquired its modern bomb-making skills from foreign fighters associated with Al Qaeda²⁴ and Jemaah Islamiyyah (JI).²⁵ The well-known Al Qaeda operative sent to the Southern Philippines to help organize the ASG was Mohammed Jamal Khalifa, the brother-in-law of Osama bin Laden.²⁶

During the early stages of the ASG, the group carried out many violent attacks that were certainly hallmarks of terrorism than crime. The ASG's landmark terrorist attack was the August 1991 bombing of Motor Vehicle (MV) Doulos, a Christian missionary ship conducting some religious projects in Zamboanga City. It was during this attack that Abdurajak Janjalani publicly announced the existence of the ASG. The ASG attacked the MV Doulos as a vehement "retaliation" against Christian missionaries who used derogatory words against Islam and called Allah a false God."²⁷

The ASG started to gain international notoriety as a terrorist group in May 1992 when it brutally assassinated Fr. Salvatore Carzedda, an Italian priest pursuing missions in Zamboanga City. In April 1995, the ASG pursued its massive and historic terrorist attacks when it was identified to be the main group responsible for the violent raid of around 200-armed men in Ipil town of Zamboanga Sibugay where 100 persons died including the town chief of police. As a result of the Ipil raid, Philippine government ordered a manhunt against Abdurajak Janjalani, until he was killed in 1998 in a violent encounter with law enforcement authorities in Lamitan, Basilan.

FROM TERRORISM TO BANDITRY: KIDNAPPING-FOR-RANSOM AND THE CONTINUOUSLY EVOLVING THREATS OF THE ASG

In the aftermath of Abdurajak Janjalani's death, the ASG degenerated into a bandit group that was deeply engaged in what a scholar would call a "carnival of crime".²⁸ From an outlaw with a hitherto political agenda,²⁹ the ASG became a new entrepreneur in violence because of its iniquitous involvements in moneymaking activities using its skills in the use of violence, particularly bomb making, as the main capital.³⁰

With the loss of an ideological beacon to guide the group's original jihadist mission, the ASG got wilder as a violent group like a loose cannon. It rapidly deteriorated as a criminal organization under the leadership of Abdurajak Janjalani's younger brother, Khadaffy Janjalani. Under Khadaffy Janjalani, a more criminally minded sub-commanders like the late Commanders Robot, Abu Sabaya, and Kosovo became the proverbial tail that wagged the dog in the ASG's new leadership arrangement.

The ASG's main moneymaking activity was kidnapping-for-ransom (KFR). The ASG masterminded many KFR incidents in Mindanao under the new leadership. But its most publicized KFR activities were the March 2000 attacks of primary schools in Tumahubong, Basilan,³¹ the April 2000 attack of a beach resort in Sipadan,³² Malaysia, and the May 2001 attack at the Dos Palmas beach resort in Palawan.³³

Since Khadaffy Janjalani took the helm in 1998, the ASG has been involved in a lot of KFR activities targeting both local and foreign victims. Between the years 2000 and 2001 alone, the ASG kidnapped a total of 140 persons being ransomed.³⁴ Between 1992 and 2008, the ASG earned a total of US\$35 million from ransom payments of its kidnap victims, including the case of Philippine television journalist, Ces Drillon.³⁵ In January 2009, the ASG conducted another high-profile kidnapping operation when it abducted three workers of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). Though Philippine authorities recorded no case of big kidnapping case by the ASG in 2010 after the killing of Commander Albader Parad responsible for the ICRC abduction, the Philippine Anti-Kidnapping Group, however, listed 105 cases of kidnapping operations by the ASG in 2011-2015 involving 183 victims both Filipinos and foreign nationals combined.³⁶ In 2015 alone, the ASG collected a ransom payment of around P151 million or US\$3.3 million from its victims.³⁷

Involvement of the ASG in KFR operations is not really new. The ASG has already conducted some KFR activities since its infancy stage in the 1990s. But its KFR activities during its early period had some political intentions. For

example, when the ASG kidnapped in April 1993 Luis Biel, a five-year grandson of a bus company owner in Basilan, the ASG demanded for his release the removal of all Catholic symbols in the province. When it kidnapped in August 1993 Ricardo Tong, a prominent shipyard owner in Zamboanga City, the ASG demanded for the banning of all foreign fishing vessels operating in the waters of Sulu and Basilan. When family of Mr. Tong paid a ransom of Five million Philippine pesos (around US\$100,000) for his safe release, the ASG immediately bought powerful firearms and ammunitions, explosive materials and mortar tubes.

The ASG was also able to build its manpower using money from ransom payments. From a ragtag non-state armed group of only around 30 members in 1989, the ASG was able to develop an effective army of around 250 members by the end of 1994. The ASG was able to recruit some MILF fighters who were trained in Afghanistan during the war against the former Soviet Union. Through the help of Jamal Khalifa, Bin Laden's main emissary to the Philippines, the ASG was also able to train its local fighters in guerilla warfare and commando operations with reported additional seed money of US\$6 million from Al Qaeda.³⁸ With some Al Qaeda funds, Jamal Khalifa also established an Islamic school in Marawi City called Darul Imam Shafee where key ASG young leaders, including Khadaffy Janjalani, received training in extreme interpretation of jihad.

These military training and Islamic indoctrination activities prepared the ASG to carry out the Ipil raid in April 1995, as briefly mentioned earlier. By 1996, the ASG already built its international image as a fierce terrorist group in Mindanao. It was the same year when the Philippine government and the MNLF signed the Final Peace Agreement, which justified the creation of the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). The ASG vehemently opposed the ARMM because it demanded the creation of an independent Islamic state in Mindanao. This original idea of Islamic state made it easier to succumb to the current Islamic propagation of ISIS.

But as mentioned earlier, the death of the ASG founder in 1998 started the demise of the ASG as a "freedom fighter" with a label of a terrorist group. When a new leader took the helm, ASG's penchant for KFR has grown exponentially.³⁹ From 1999 to 2006, the ASG under Khadaffy Janjalani became seemingly no more than a bunch of bandits pursuing KFR activities involving almost 200 victims. The ASG's KFR operations became even bolder from 2007 to 2015 under the leadership of Radullan Sahiron, the ASG Commander based in Sulu. Puruji Indama, ASG sub-commander in Basilan, also joined the KFR spree.

While many of the ASG activities under Khadaffy Janjalani were on KFR, there was a faction of the ASG in Basilan convincing the new ASG leader not

lose tract of its original political purpose. Two ASG commanders, Khair Mundos⁴⁰ and Isnlon Hapilon, sustained the ASG's Islamic propagation activities by training younger Muslims (particularly those orphaned by armed conflicts) to strengthen their Islamic faith. Though Mundos and Hapilon also joined some of the ASG's kidnapping activities, the two continued to advance the ASG's Islamist agenda. Mundos and Hapilon strengthened their links with some JI operatives in Mindanao - particularly with Dulmatin and Omar Patek from Indonesia as well as Marwan from Malaysia and Mauwiyah from Singapore. ASG and JI militants joined forces in order to realize their dream of creating a Daulah Islamiyah or the Islamic caliphate in Southeast Asia.

RECENT DEVELOPMENT OF CRIME-TERROR NEXUS IN THE PHILIPPINES:

ASG'S PERSISTENT THREAT

Thus, after the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United States, the ASG resumed momentarily its terrorist activities by conducting series of bombing operations not only in Mindanao but also in Metro Manila. At the same time, ASG continued its KFR activities in Mindanao.⁴¹ The ASG's nexus with crime and terrorism took greater shape after 9/11.

It should be noted, however, that a year before 9/11, series of bomb explosions occurred in five locations in Metro Manila on the eve of Rizal Day celebration on 30 December 2000. Called the 2000 Rizal Day bombings, five blasts took place in Plaza Ferguson in Malate, Manila; a gasoline station near Dusit Hotel in Makati City; a cargo handling area of the Ninoy Aquino International Airport; a public bus traveling along Epifanio Delos Santos Avenue; and, a train cab at the Blumentrit Station of the Metro Manila Light Rail Transit. Though the ASG was not responsible for these bombings, the incidents inspired the ASG as they were carried out by JI master-bomber, Fathur Rahman Al Ghozi, and rouge elements of the MILF: Mukhlis Hadji Yunos, Abdul Fatak Paute, and Mamasao Naga. Some ASG bombers acquired their bomb-making skills from Al Ghozi.

After the Rizal Day bombings, the ASG suspended in 2003 its KFR activities upon order of Khadaffy Janjalani who wanted to revive the ASG's original Islamist agenda. But other ASG commanders, particularly those based in Sulu and Tawi-Tawi, became addicted in amassing more wealth from KFR than pursuing bombing operations for political purposes. Thus, many of its members still resorted to KFR in order to mobilize resources. Nonetheless, Khadaffy Janjalani ordered some members of the ASG to join a series of bomb training activities through the help of top JI operatives: Dulmatin, Omar Patek, Marwan and Basit Usman.

Through joint trainings from JI, many ASG members and affiliates already acquired sophisticated bomb-making skills. Using its affiliates from Rajah Solaiman Islamic Movement (RSIM), the ASG masterminded the bombing of MV Superferry 14 on 27 February 2004. This incident (described at that time as the worst maritime terrorist attack in Southeast Asia) killed 116 people and wounded at least 300 others.⁴² The ASG claimed responsibility for the bombing as a “just revenge” for the brutal murder of Muslims in Mindanao.

There was a claim, however, arguing that the ASG bombed the ferry because the ferry company refused to pay the extortion money demanded by the ASG. Thus, some experts regarded the bombing as “piratical” rather than a terrorist attack. By deeper examination, in fact, the Superferry 14 bombing marked the ASG's nexus with maritime crime of piracy and maritime terrorism.⁴³

On 14 February 2005, the ASG conducted a high profile bombing operation when it masterminded the simultaneous bombings of three cities (Makati, Davao and General Santos) on Valentines Day. The trio bombings resulted in the death of 11 persons and the injury of 83 others. The ASG officially claimed responsibility for the 2005 Valentines Day bombings. The late Abu Solaiman, then ASG spokesman, announced on radio that the ASG conducted those bombings to fight for justice of Muslims in Mindanao. In his statement, Abu Solaiman stressed, “We will find any means to inflict more harm to your people's lives and properties, Allah willing. We will not stop until we get justice for the countless Muslim lives and properties that your people have destroyed. May the almighty Allah punish your nation again through our hands.”⁴⁴

The Valentines Day bombing and other violent activities of the ASG convinced the Philippine government to implement its “Oplan Ultimatum” that justified the deployment in August 2006 of around 6,000 Philippine soldiers to Sulu in order to hunt Khadaffy Janjalani other JI operatives, particularly Dulmatin and Patek. The Oplan Ultimatum resulted in the death of Khadaffy Janjalani and Solaiman in January 2007.⁴⁵ With the demise of Khadaffy Janjalani, the ASG lost again a central leader that would provide the political direction to the organization. At that time, the Philippine government declared the ASG a spent force.

But in August 2007, around 30 ASG militants ambushed a military convoy in Jolo, Sulu killing 26 soldiers with others gruesomely beheaded and decapitated. This occurred despite the signing into law of Philippine Anti-Terrorism Law (called Human Security Act) in March 2007. In January 2008, ASG operatives raided a convent in Tawi-Tawi and killed a Catholic priest in a kidnapping attempt to scare Christian missionaries in the province. On 14 February 2008, the ASG planned to assassinate then President Gloria

Macapagal Arroyo who ordered to crush the ASG by 2010, but to no avail. On 11 June 2010, just two days after the Philippine Congress proclaimed Benigno Simeon Aquino III as the new President, the ASG beheaded three Christian loggers in Basilan as a resentful retaliation against military offensives there. The ASG also participated in the bloody military encounter between the Philippine Army and the MILF on 17 October 2011 in Al Barka, Basilan where 19 soldiers died. These violent incidents indicated that the ASG was still engaged in various acts of terrorism.

But on 5 December 2011, the ASG conducted another high profile KFR activity when its members kidnapped Australian national Warren Rodwell at Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay. On 26 December 2012, just a day after Christmas, the ASG uploaded on YouTube a proof-of-life video of Rodwell crying for help and begging for his life after more than a year in captivity. The ASG demanded US\$2 million for his release.

Rodwell's video was a landmark in the history of the ASG because for the first time, the group utilized the social media for its KFR venture. The ASG also displayed in the video a black flag associated with ISIS. The ASG released Rodwell only on 23 March 2013 after receiving a ransom payment from the sale of the family house of the victim.⁴⁶ Some sources said that the family paid an initial ransom of P5 million (around US\$120,000). But the ASG only received P1.5 million (around \$35,000). A local politician, who negotiated for Rodwell's release, allegedly pocketed the rest of the money.⁴⁷

The ASG mounted another high profile kidnapping activity with the abduction of birdwatchers Ewold Horn (Dutch) and Lorenzo Vinciguerra (Swiss) on 1 February 2012 in Tawi-Tawi. The ASG demanded a ransom of P50 million (US\$1.1 million) for the release of both victims. But Vinciguerra escaped on 6 December 2014. Horn remained in the hands of the ASG as of this writing.

On 12 June 2012, the ASG kidnapped another foreign national, Baker Atyani, a Jordanian journalist at Pan-Arab Al Arabiya News Channel based in Dubai. Because the ASG asked no ransom payment for his release, there was a suspicion that he was a guest of the ASG to launder some funds for the group using a media interview as a cover.⁴⁸ But the ASG reportedly accused him of being an agent of the CIA.⁴⁹ Atyani claimed, however, that he was allowed to interview ASG commanders in their lairs in Sulu when the group suddenly held him as hostage. He claimed to have escaped from his captors on 4 December 2013. But others claimed that the ASG voluntarily released him after mounting several kidnapping operations not only in Mindanao but also in Sabah.

On 15 November 2013, the ASG kidnapped Chang An Wei, a Taiwanese woman, and killed her husband, Lim Min Hsu, in a beach resort in Pom Pom

Island off Sabah. Authorities reported that they rescued the victim a month after. But there was an allegation of ransom payments for her release. On 2 April 2014, the ASG attacked Sabah again when it kidnapped Gao Hua Yan (a Chinese tourist) and Marcy Dayawan (Filipina resort worker) at the Singamata Adventures Reef and Resort in Semporna. The ASG demanded a ransom payment of USD\$11 million for their release. But authorities claimed to have rescued the victims on 31 May 2014 through the combined operations of Malaysian and Filipino forces.

The ASG made another very disturbing kidnapping operation when it kidnapped a German couple (Viktor Stefan Okonek and Henrike Dielen) on 25 April 2014 while having a boat trip in Palawan Island. Their abductors brought them to Jolo in the lairs of the ASG. On 24 September 2014, the ASG uploaded a video on Facebook and YouTube showing the two German victims crying for help. The video displayed again the black flag of ISIS and threatened to behead one of the victims if the ransom demand of P250 million (US\$5.6 million) would not be paid. The ASG also demanded the German government to stop its support to the coalition forces against ISIS in Iraq and Syria.

The abduction of the German couple was the second time that the ASG used the social media and the black flag of ISIS in its KFR operation. On 17 October 2014, the ASG released the two Germans. On 4 November 2014, it uploaded another video on Facebook with a tantamount display of what it claimed was the P250-million ransom it collected for the release of two victims.

Though the ASG seemed to have collected huge sum of money already from their kidnap victims, the ASG (particularly members operating in Sulu and Tawi-Tawi) continued its KFR operations in Sabah while other ASG members, at the same time, were pledging their allegiance to ISIS. On 6 May 2014, the ASG kidnapped Yang Zhai Lin, a Chinese fish farm manager in the Baik Island of Semporna, and took him to Jolo. After the ASG threatened to behead him, the group freed him in July 2014 after receiving a ransom payment. On 16 June 2014, the ASG kidnapped Chan Sai Chiun, another Chinese fish farm manager, in Kampung Air Sapang, Kunak, and Sabah. The ASG threatened to behead the victim again but released him on 10 December 2014 after receiving the ransom payment.

On 15 May 2015, the ASG attacked the Ocean King Restaurant in Sandakan, Malaysia and abducted two Malaysian Chinese victims: Thien Nyuk Fun, the seafood restaurant owner, and Bernard Then, a consultant. Earlier on 4 May 2015, the ASG kidnapped two personnel of the Philippine Coast Guard – Rodilyn Pagaling and Gringo Villaluz - and a barangay captain, Rodrigo Boligao, in Aliguay Island in Zamboanga del Norte. The three were brought to Sulu. The ASG released Thien on 8 November 2015 when his family paid a

ransom of P30 million (around US\$660,0000). The group beheaded Boligao on 12 August 2015 and Bernard on 17 November 2015 for some anomalies associated with the ransom. The two Coast Guard personnel, on the other hand, reportedly escaped on 19 August 2015.

So far, the most internationalized kidnapping operation of the ASG after 9/11 was the abduction on 21 September 2015 of Robert Hall (Canadian), John Ridsdel (Canadian), Kjartan Sekkingstad (Norwegian) and Marites Flor (Filipina) at the Holiday Oceanview Resort in the Island Garden City of Samal, Davao del Norte. It was in this kidnapping incident when the ASG intensified its use of social media to demand for ransom payments of its victims.

Using the black flag of ISIS as its backdrop, the ASG posted a video on Facebook, Twitter and YouTube on 12 October 2015 showing the four kidnap victims begging for their lives. In this video, the ASG did not ask yet for ransom but demanded the Canadian and Philippine governments to cooperate with abductors arguing:

I deliver a message to the Canadian government and to the Philippine government. Once your cooperation with us and to meet all the requirements (sic). Number one, that there must be no military operation and there must be no artillery attack and all of this harmful against us. Once you meet our requirements, then we can talk about negotiation and demand.⁵⁰

On 3 November 2015, posted another video on social media demanding P4 billion (US\$84 million) for the release of four hostages and set 8 April 2016 as the deadline to produce the money. When the money was not delivered as scheduled, the ASG released another video lowering its ransom demand to P300 million (US\$6.3 million) for each victim and scheduled 25 April 2016 at 3:00 PM as the new deadline for payment. The ASG threatened to execute its victims without the ransom payments. Failing to get the complete ransom payments on time, the ASG beheaded Ridsdel at 4:00 PM on 25 April 2016.

The ASG released the video of Ridsdel beheading on 3 May 2016, the same day when the ASG released a separate video demanding for ransom payments of the three remaining victims and threatening to behead them. In this video, the ASG stressed, ““Notice to the Philippine government and to the Canadian government: The lesson is clear. John Ridsdel has been beheaded.”⁵¹ In June 2016, the ASG beheaded Hall. The beheading of Ridsdel and Hall raised anew the international profile of the ASG.

Meanwhile, when the ASG abducted ten Indonesian nationals in the waters of Tawi-Tawi in March 2016 and four Malaysian nationals in the waters of

Sabah on 1 April 2016, Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines decided to conduct coordinated patrols of their triborder maritime areas to confront the ASG. But after five weeks in captivity, the ASG released the ten Indonesians on 1 May 2016.

More than a decade after 9/11, the ASG was able to demonstrate it was not yet a spent force but a strong force to reckon with. Based on the aforementioned discussions, the ASG proved its resilience as a violent group by doing both crime and terrorism.⁵² Its resilience grew further with the introduction of new ideas from ISIS. Money coming from KFR and new religious outlook coming from ISIS became essential sources of the ASG's current staying power.

THE ASG AND ITS ISIS CONNECTION IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

It is not yet very clear how and when ISIS reached the lairs of the ASG. But the awesome power of social media provided ISIS a very powerful tool to spread its narrative worldwide.⁵³ Many ASG members, particularly those younger ones, were social media savvy making them reachable by ISIS propaganda. ISIS followers from Malaysia, Indonesia and the Middle East entering Mindanao also contributed to the spread of ISIS ideology in the Philippines. After years of degeneration as a bandit group, the ASG rekindled its penchant for terrorism because of ISIS connection in Southeast Asia.⁵⁴

The formation of ISIS was traced back to 1999 when an Iraqi militant, Abu Musab al Zarqawi, organized the Jama'at al Tawhid Wal Jihad (Organization of Monotheism and Jihad).⁵⁵ In 2004, Zarqawi pledged his allegiance to Al Qaeda and renamed his group to Tanzim Qaidat Al Jihad Fi Bilad Al Rafiadayn (Organization of Jihad's Base in Mesopotamia) more known now as the Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). The AQI provided a new face of Al Qaeda because of its very violent attacks against American-led coalition forces in Iraq.⁵⁶

When Zarqawi died in 2006 by an American air strike in Iraq, Abu Ayyub Al Masri succeeded him. Al Masri merged with other Iraqi militant groups, which declared the establishment of the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) naming Abu Omar al-Baghdadi as its Emir with Al Masri serving as its Minister of War.⁵⁷ ISI became so popular among Sunni militants in Syria and other parts of the Middle East because of its indiscriminate use of violence against coalition forces. Its popularity made the group a serious target of sustain counter-terrorism operations of the coalition forces that led to the killing of Abu Omar Al Baghdadi and Al Masri in 2010.

Abu Bakr Al Baghdadi took the helm of ISI. Under his leadership, he became more violent and draconian in its operations encouraging suicide and

car bombings to confront the coalition forces. When ISI operations expanded to Syria, Abu Bakr Al Baghdadi declared in April 2013 the formation of the ISIS. On 29 June 2014, Baghdadi proclaimed himself as the overall leader or a Caliph of a so-called independent ISIS Caliphate, which followers would call as Al-Dawlah Al-Islamiyah Fi Al-Iraq Wa-Al Sham. Many Sunni militant groups worldwide pledged allegiance to ISIS including those militant groups in the Southern Philippines.⁵⁸

The first group in the Philippines that pledged allegiance to ISIS was a shadowy group called Ansar Dawlah Fi Filibbin. This group posted a video in May 2014 showing a few men in white dress performing a Bay-ah, or oath of allegiance, to Baghdadi as a caliph. Men on video spoke in Filipino to reiterate their allegiance to ISIS and submission to Baghdadi.⁵⁹

The ASG also pledged allegiance to ISIS in June 2014 through Isnilon Hapilon, the group's commander in Basilan.⁶⁰ While ASG commanders in Sulu and Tawi-Tawi were busy making money through KFR activities, Hapilon was busy organizing ISIS-inspired groups of militants in Mindanao.

But even before Hapilon pledged his allegiance, ISIS influences in the Philippines were already spreading in 2012 through some militant activities of the so-called "Black Flag Movement" (BFM).⁶¹ This movement was initially identified with a shadowy group known by the Philippine intelligence authorities as the Khilafah Islamiyah Mindanao (KIM). The KIM was composed of younger Filipino Muslim militants associated with the ASG, the MILF, the RSIM, and Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF). Thus, the KIM initially served as the hub of young Filipino Muslim militants inspired by ISIS ideology.

The known leader of the KIM was Humam Abdul Najid who styled himself like Zarqawi based on various photographic evidences collected by a Philippine intelligence agency. Between 2012 and 2013, Najid worked closely with Patek, Marwan and Usman in conducting bomb-training activities in Central Mindanao in the lairs controlled by the BIFF, a splinter group of the MILF. Najid went to Afghanistan in 2005 to receive various trainings in waging jihad. When he returned to his hometown in Marawi City in Lanao del Sur in January 2012, he introduced the black flag currently being used by ISIS.

With the support of younger militant members of the ASG, RSIM, MILF and BIFF, Najid discreetly organized the BFM whose members would form the core of the KIM. The Philippine police identified the KIM as the group responsible for the July 2013 Cagayan de Oro bombing that killed 6 persons and wounded 48 others. The group was also responsible for the 16 August 2012 bombing of the Rural Bus Transit in Barangay Guiwan, Zamboanga City.

On 11 October 2012, the KIM carried out the bombing of Maxandrea Hotel along JR Borja Street in Cagayan de Oro City. Police investigations revealed that Zulkipli bin Hir (alias Marwan), a JI operative in the Philippines, guided KIM in the Maxandrea Hotel bombing. On 24 December 2012, the group orchestrated the bombing of Pension House in Iligan City. The KIM blatantly used the ISIS black flag in all of its bombing operations and bomb-training activities. Thus, the KIM was thought to be the vanguard of ISIS in the Philippines.

But the use of ISIS black flag in the Philippines actually first appeared publicly on a video released on 6 November 2012 by a certain Abu Jihad Kahir Rahman Al Luzuni who claimed to be representing a jihadist group of young Muslims in the Philippines called Jamaal Al Tawhid Wal Jihad Philippines.⁶² Apparently, members of this group claimed that they belonged to the Philippine branch of Jamaal Al Tawhid Wal Jihad, the forerunner of ISIS, originally founded in Iraq by Zarqawi. The video, showing a man with a covered face against the backdrop of an ISIS flag, called upon all Muslims, particularly the Muslim youths in the Philippines, to perform jihad.

Intelligence investigations by the Philippine authorities would later identify the man on video as Dinno Amor Rosalejos Pareja. The United Nations listed Pareja on 4 June 2008 as an Al Qaeda associated individual being one of the key leaders of the RSIM. Pareja received bomb-making training from JI in several ASG camps. He was accused of a failed attempt to bomb Cebu City during the 12th Summit of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 2007. Pareja was also one of the prime suspects for the Makati Bus Bombing on 1 March 2012. Pareja's Facebook account pompously displayed a black flag that later on would be associated with ISIS.

Interestingly, Pareja was the brother-in-law of Ahmad Santos, the founding chairman of the RSIM. Santos married Pareja's younger sister named Hannah. The Philippine police arrested Santos in 2005 for terrorist bombings and criminal charges associated with terrorism. At the time of his arrest, Ahmad was already serving as the media bureau chief of the ASG indicating the RSIM-ASG link. While in Philippine prison, Santos continued his militant activities along with other Muslim detainees accused of various crimes associated with terrorism. Ahmad even participated in the translation in Filipino language of an Al Qaeda document on Muslim prisoners of war. With the help of some JI detainees, Santos even led in prison the pledge of allegiance to ISIS, the video of which was uploaded on YouTube on 4 July 2014.

Santos is also the brother-in-law of Reener Dongon, one of the key leaders of the KIM. Reener is the younger brother of Norrain Dongon, the second wife of Santos. Reener actively participated in various bombing operations of the

KIM being an expert on the manufacture of improvised explosive device (IED). Reener got this skill from his brother-in-law, Marwan who married the former's older sister, Joromee Dongon. Interestingly, Joromee was also the former wife of the late ASG chief, Khadaffy Janjalani.

Thus, Santos, Reener, Marwan and Khadaffy Janjalani are not only brothers-in-arms but also brothers-in-law. Their family relationships solidified the ties that bound the ASG, RSIM, JI, and KIM. Islamic militancy is all in the family.

In collaboration with ASG, RSIM, JI and KIM outside of prison, Santos and Pareja were prime suspects for the constructions of some websites promoting the black flag of ISIS in the Philippines. Some of these websites were the Black Flag Movement⁶³ and the Islamic Emirate of the Philippines.⁶⁴ All these websites contained Filipino language translations of some Al Qaeda documents and inspirational messages from the late Umbra Kato, the founding chairman of BIFF. In July 2012, core members of the KIM with a few members from ASG visited Kato who died of heart attack on 14 April 2015. Kato's successor, Esmail Abu Bakar, pledged allegiance to ISIS as early as August 2014.

On 12 September 2014, another shadowy group calling itself as Ansar Khalifah Sarangani (AKS) produced its own video pledging allegiance to ISIS. Led by the late Basit Usman, the AKS was more known by its followers as the Jemaah Islamiyah Philippines. When Usman died on 3 May 2015, he left behind some followers whom he trained in bomb making. Usman's deputy, Mohammad Jafar Maguid (alias Commander Tokboy) took the helm of AKS and renamed the group as Ansar Khalifah Philippines (AKP).

The AKP (represented by Abu Shareefa believed to be Commander Tokboy) together with the ASG (called as Alharakatul Islamiyya represented by ISIS follower Isnlon Hapilon) and two other groups called Ansar Al Sharia (represented by a Malaysian ISIS follower, Abu Anas Al-Muhr, a.k.a. Mohammad Bin Nib Bin Hussein) and Marakat Al Ansar (represented by a certain Abu Harris, an ISIS-inspired ASG member representing Sulu), performed a "unified" pledge of allegiance to ISIS in December 2015 in a ceremony held in Basilan. A video of this ceremony was posted on YouTube in January 2016.

In the ceremony, the four groups declared its unity and proclaimed Hapilon as their over-all leader or Amir with the official title, "Sheikh Mujahid Abu Abdullah Al-Filipini". ISIS official newsletter, Al Naba, praised the unification ceremony and acknowledged Hapilon as the over-all leader of ISIS followers in the Philippines. One academic argued that with the unification ceremony, the Philippines has become a candidate for an ISIS wilayah or

province in Southeast Asia along with Indonesia and Malaysia where significant ISIS followers were identified.⁶⁵

With many armed groups in Mindanao pledging loyalty to Baghdadi as their over-all caliph, ISIS threats to Philippine security have become real rather than imagined.⁶⁶ In fact, some foreign nationals, previously linked with Al Qaeda and now linked with ISIS, are currently in Mindanao working with the various armed groups in the conflict affected areas. As of the first quarter of 2016, Philippine intelligence sources identified nine ISIS-linked foreign terrorists still operating in Mindanao with the ASG, to wit:

- Muhammad Ali Bin Abd Al Rahman or Muawiya (Singaporean)
- Zacariah or Qayyim (Indonesian)
- Abdul Azis Raman (Indonesian)
- Abdul Malek Yamen (Indonesian)
- Mohd Amin Bacho or Abu Jihad (Malaysian)
- Mujammad Joraimie Bin Awang Raimee or Abu Nur (Malaysian)
- Mahmud Bin Ahmad or Abu Handzalah (Malaysian)
- Jeknal Bin Adil (Malaysian)
- Engr Hattab (Malaysian).⁶⁷

Muhammad Nib Hussein (Abu Anas), another ISIS-linked Malaysian national died in December 2015 during an ASG encounter with the Philippine military in Al Barka, Basilan. The Al Furat Media, an ISIS media outlet in Russia, released a video of his death on 15 February 2016.

Philippine authorities are also suspecting at least 60 ISIS-inspired foreign terrorists being coddled by the ASG in Mindanao.⁶⁸ These foreign terrorists are not only involved in the ASG's bomb-training activities. They also participate in the ASG's criminal activities. The case of Amin Bacho is an example of foreign terrorist involvement in ASG's criminal activities, particularly in KFR.⁶⁹

Philippine intelligence reports revealed Bacho's involvement in the abduction of several victims from Sabah. Bacho is also the son-in-law of Commander Hajan Sawadjaan, mastermind of several high profile kidnapping activities of the ASG. While in Mindanao, Bacho released a video in April 2016 pledging allegiance to ISIS with armed men associated with ASG and AKP.⁷⁰ Along with other ISIS-inspired foreign terrorist personalities in Mindanao, Bacho is being suspected to be the main ISIS operative in Southeast Asia linking the ASG with Katibah Nusantara, an ISIS military unit in Southeast Asia led by an Indonesian militant, Abu Ibrahim al-Indunisiy.⁷¹

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

From the foregoing chronological analysis, the ASG has already morphed into a violent group engaged in both crime and terrorism. Its high profile kidnapping activities made the ASG an organized criminal group. But its association with ISIS and its involvement in major bombing and other violent activities in the Philippines also made the ASG a terrorist organization.

As a criminal organization, the ASG is interested in amassing wealth that it uses to attract members and to buy loyalty of its affected communities. As a terrorist group, the ASG is involved in political propaganda and publicity stunts to justify its violent acts. The Philippines government has been struggling to decimate the ASG. But the ASG has the ability to regenerate itself because of its resilience to navigate between crime and terrorism.

There is no doubt that the ASG provides an excellent example of a complex nexus of crime and terrorism. This growing nexus must therefore, inform the development of any comprehensive counter measure against the ASG.

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Achieving Sustainability through Strategically Managing Development Model for Bangladesh

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Abstract

Development of a country has two faces-cosmetic and real. Real development enhances a country's goals of sustainable development through its socio-economic and environmental prosperity. The present article is an effort to give a guideline of how a country can achieve sustainability by following a viable development model. The proposed model under the article is based on twin pillars of agriculture and industrialization. Various countries develop various models while gearing up their development activities. Most underdeveloped and undeveloped countries try to enhance development through emulating other countries' models. As a result, the goals of their development are not achieved in most cases. On the surface, these countries are called developed. However, their development becomes a result of their environmental damage and possibly other long-lasting effects. These development pictures are merely the face of cosmetic development which might fade away after a few years. The real focus needs to be given on sustainable development which is deeply rooted in the real development thrust of a country. The author believes that a viable development model needs to be devised based on the science of strategic management in order to prevent cosmeticity of development.

The present paper provides a roadmap for achieving sustainability through strategically managing Bangladesh's development model which is laid on the twin pillars of our development model-agriculture and industrialization. The paper concludes that without agricultural upliftment, Bangladesh's development merely through industrialization may not be successful and mere agriculture without paying attention to industrialization will also be dysfunctional. Maintaining the

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strategies and principles of sustainability through strategically managing Bangladesh's development model can tremendously contribute to the sustainable development discourse of the country.

1.1. Introduction

The development of countries today is seen from two perspectives-appearance and real. Most underdeveloped and undeveloped countries try to enhance development through emulating other countries' models. As a result, the goals of their development are not achieved in most cases. On the surface, these countries are called development. However, their development becomes a result of their environmental damage and possibly other long-lasting effects. These development pictures are merely the face of cosmetic development which might fade away after a few years. The real focus needs to be given on sustainable development which is deeply rooted in the real development thrust of a country. The author believes that in order to prevent cosmeticity of development a viable development model needs to be devised.

This is the reason why the development scientists today are emphasizing on sustainable development which will bring long-term goals in perspective. The economists are now developing various models by which sustainability is achieved. The author puts emphasis on strategic management in order to ensure sustainable development for Bangladesh. The present paper provides a roadmap for achieving sustainability through strategically managing Bangladesh's development model which is laid on the twin pillars of our development models-agriculture and industrialization.

1.2. Hypothesis and Analytical Roadmap

The present paper hypothesizes that no development model is perfect unless it provides sustainable growth and development and as the means towards achieving sustainability, the author recommends strategically-managed development models of agriculture and industrialization. Structurally and content-wise, the article is divided into sections. After the introducing the hypothesis and analytical roadmap in the first section, the terms strategic management and sustainability are defined in the second section. The third section finds the nexus between strategic management and sustainability which is followed in the fourth section by the process of strategically managing development model. The fifth section describes the theoretical insights and operational strategies of agriculture through which sustainable development can be attained. The sixth section organizes the viable theory and sustained implementation of the theory of industrialization for the purpose of achieving

sustainable development of Bangladesh. Finally, the article ends with a conclusion.

2. Conceptualizing Strategic Management and Sustainability

Strategy is a term used in the texts and literatures on military science to imply courses of action by which a target is achieved. The word management is a business term which refers to certain tools and instruments by which the goals of a business are attained. The combination of these two terms from the two different disciplines gives birth to a distinct managerial *modus operandi* by which the goals and objectives of organizations may be actualized for a longer period. Strategic management has appeared as an autonomous discipline in the contemporary era of globalization. Although greatly neglected and ignored, most people are now prone to utilize the benefits of strategic management for their long-lasting achievements of efficiency and effectiveness. Different authors on strategic management provided different definitions to the term.

Most important authorities among them are Professor Fred R. David, Professor Alex Miller, Professor Gregory G. Dess, Professor Arthur A. Thompson, Jr, Professor A.J. Strickland, and so on so forth. To sum up the views of these strategic management authors, we may say that strategic management refers to a process which comprises the art and science of developing vision and mission of an organization, setting its goals and objectives, crafting strategies and techniques towards achieving cross-functional those objectives of organizations, and implementing and evaluating strategies, tools and instruments for those organizations' sustained returns. This definition fairly depicts the stages of strategy-taking enunciated by Thompson, Jr., Strickland III and Gamble.ⁱ The purpose of strategic management is to achieve competitiveness in order to outperform the rival organizations and the competitors. Two things are the core themes and characteristics of strategic management that distinguish itself from the mainstream management system. The principle of competitiveness constitutes the most fundamental elements of effective management which means that an organization must compete with one or more organizations in a given period of time within a definite territory. The territoriality of competitiveness differs from organization to organization, country to country, and region to region.

The principle of sustainability is the second integral element which refers to a phenomenon in which the chosen strategies and perceived objectives are calculated from long-term perspectives. The concept of sustainability requires certain preconditions, such as inclusiveness of the parameter, structure and paradigm of development. From this point of view, a development for its

sustainability must incorporate a holistic premise which includes the multidimensional aspects of society, economy, politics and ecology. The strategic management of an organization speeds up its sustained growth, productivity, and development. This precondition adheres to a third inherent principle of productivity which is composed of efficiency and effectiveness. The term efficiency may be defined as the process by which the management can produce to the optimum level with the least bundle of resources whereas effectiveness provides a process by which the management can choose the best among all alternatives.

The principles of competitiveness and productivity are the central to the themes of sustainability. In another word, competitiveness and productivity enhance sustainability. The strategic management model as envisaged by David focuses on achieving sustainability based on the long-term planning.ⁱⁱ In his comprehensive strategic management paradigm, David explains how sustainability is achieved through a number of phases that are structurally intertwined.ⁱⁱⁱ The concept of sustainability through strategic management is explicitly illustrated in the definition of Dess and Miller in which they say that strategic management consists of the analyses, decisions, and actions an organization undertakes in order to create and sustain competitive advantages. The key attributes of such management are to: (a) direct the organization to overall goals and objectives; (b) include multiple stakeholders in key decision-making; (c) incorporate short-term and long-term perspectives, and (d) recognize trade-offs between efficiency and effectiveness.^{iv} Mannan explains how strategic management is a guarantee of sustained growth and expansion of an organization for today and tomorrow.^v

3. Nexus between Strategic Management and Sustainability

Sustainability appears to be a very difficult and challenging task for a country in the arduous journey of its development during the fast changing era of globalization of the twenty first century. We understand that the millennium development goals (MDGs) have already taken the shape of sustainable development goals (SDGs) reiterating for us the scope and urgency of achieving sustainability. Countries of the world are prone to gear up their development activities in a way which will provide long-lasting socio-economic prosperity and politico-security stability. Bangladesh has already graduated to the level of a middle-income country. The target of the present Government now is to move towards the level of a high income country within a stipulated time. This might seem to be a bit ambitious on the surface; however, in reality Bangladesh has meanwhile started to tiptoe towards that goal. The expected development goal may be achieved if we can devise a viable development model sketching a clear vision of this model and illustrating

concrete mission for that. Noted strategic scientists are of the opinion that the absence of a vision and related mission wears away the essence of sustainability. The author believes that any development model for its sustainability must contain the characteristics and features that would prevent cosmetic development. To that end, strategic perspective for a development model emerged as an important topic in the contemporary development studies.

4. Strategically Managing Development Model

A development model refers to a paradigm which explains the structure of a country's overall development, provides its directions and guidelines, details its activities and areas, formulates its operational strategies, and gears up its implementation. Models are different based on the different attributes of countries including their geopolitical location, strategic significance, physical structures, external orientations, natural resources, anthropological construct and size. The model of a country is therefore unique. However, a country may emulate its model from other countries keeping its distinctiveness intact which distinguishes itself from others.

It is widely believed that the development of Bangladesh depends on the twin pillars of agriculture and industrialization. Some people who would like to ignore the significance of agriculture for development in the era of globalization may think that our country must elevate through industrialization. There may be some truths to this claim. In fact, there is a dire need of rethinking and re-sketching our development paradigm combining the twin pillars of our development-agriculture and industrialization. The two sectors of our development must possess distinct natures of their indigeneness. Too much stereotype and traditionality of agriculture as well as too much cosmeticity of industrialization may jeopardize the expected goals of Bangladesh's development. This article is a brief outline of a sustainable development paradigm of Bangladesh. Our agricultural model must be based on our own geo-historical realities and incorporate the modern scientific tools and technologies which will make it sustainable. Our industrialization process must flourish through balancing geo-ecological effects and combining agro-based industrial strides which will bring sustainability.

The strategic aspect of managing development models looks into the matter from long-term perspectives which may ensure sustainability. The strategic management provides a model with its long-lasting goal-a vision-, figure out activities-a mission-, sustained strategies-intended and realized-, operational modus-operandi and implementation guidelines. Once the models

are set in the development discourse in line with strategic considerations, the path towards sustainable development is accelerated.

5. The Theory of Agriculture

We may have a brief look into the theory of agriculture. Both conventional and modern wisdom recognize agriculture as an indispensable element of effective development.^{vi} Rostow considers an agricultural revolution as a necessary condition for successful take-off.^{vii} Some scholars hold that agricultural development is the first step towards inauguration of industrialization. Nurkse argues that the industrial revolution in Britain would not have been successful if the agricultural revolution had not preceded it.^{viii} Thus modern development analysts find a close association between agricultural productivity and economic development. The modern views suggest that the potentials for huge productivity can be achieved if the “science-based agriculture”^{ix} is introduced, an “appropriate agricultural policy”^x is designed, the “computerized farming and agro-industries”^{xi} are established, a “green revolution”^{xii} is geared up and above all, the “transformation of the peasant subsistence to specialized commercial farming” is conducted.^{xiii} It is to be noted that many of these policies, however, can be ecologically disastrous and non-sustainable in the long-term.

5.1. Viable Agricultural Model

We need to understand the economics of agriculture and devise a viable agricultural model without which our development cannot be stimulated. It is widely believed that as ours is an agricultural country, agriculture is the nucleus of our economy. The development of our country largely depends on our agriculture. Once we believe that agriculture can promote our development, we need to think of developing our agricultural sector. It may be convincingly said that the development of our country cannot be geared up without an appropriate attention to this area.

The agro-based development strategy, therefore, needs to focus on the multidimensional aspects of agriculture. The first and the foremost task is to modernize agriculture through technology in order to increase labor or land productivity and thereby to increase production. The agro-technology may be of two kinds- mechanical and biological. These differ from country to country. The mechanical package of technologies includes tractors, combines and other machineries that increase labor productivity. The biological package includes improved plant varieties such as hybrid corn or rice that improves land

productivity. The US and Japan have increased labor and land productivity through the use of modern agro-technologies.

The establishment of an efficient institutional set up is another important job. Agricultural subsidies, rural bank and credit cooperatives, rural markets, strong research and development (R&D) agencies, improved communications and transportation for agro-products and, above all, infrastructural development, are necessary conditions for exploiting agriculture based development.^{xiv} The government incentives for the rural entrepreneurs in order to establish agro-industries equally play an important role in this regard. Finally, agricultural strategy needs to focus on both national and international policy aspects. The prices of agro-products in international trade have declined since the 1950s and 1960s. These poor terms of trade need to be revised both in national and international trade.

5.2. Challenges Ahead of Bangladesh's Agriculture

The development strategy based on agriculture has been on the top of the development agenda of our country which resulted in the remarkable success in our policies towards agricultural sector. A number of constraints and issues stand as barriers to the development of our agriculture. Despite these challenges, the prospects for improving agricultural sector do not seem to be bleak. Certain preventive and corrective measures may be adopted that are useful for overcoming the prevailing constraints.

The first and the foremost challenge is related to the stereotype cultivation procedure prevailing in our agro sector. This is the direct result of the wide spread rural poverty. Another important issue is concerned with the rapidly shrinking land base. While the country's population is growing at the rate of 1.6 percent per year, demographic pressures and increased urbanization cause cultivated areas to decline at a rate of 1 percent per year. Another important problem emanates from the shortage of seeds and fertilizer. During each and every harvesting season rural farmers face several hassles in this regard. The lack of availability of seeds and fertilizer in both private and public agencies creates serious concern among them. Besides they cannot afford to purchase necessary seeds or fertilizer because of the sky high rise in their prices. While the NGO sector in Bangladesh is well developed and the quality of informal institutions is improving, formal rural institutions remain very weak. The Government agencies at all levels face overlapping functions, lack of coordination, low levels of skills and lack of responsiveness.^{xv} Despite the perceived emphasis to be given on agriculture by the Government, the required attention is not paid on the institutional set-up in the rural areas for gearing

up the programs for the promotion of agriculture. The lack of easily accessible markets and collusion by the traders pose significant constraints on both agricultural input and output markets. Marketing margins are high relative to the services provided. The lack of market information and infrastructure, the poor law and order situation, the existence of syndicates, and collection of illegal tolls further aggravate the situation. Bangladesh is the terminal floodplain delta of three large rivers – the Ganges, the Brahmaputra and the Meghna. Every year about 20 to 30 percent, and every few years about 40 percent, of the country is flooded, causing serious damage to infrastructure, crops and our overall economy. Projected climatic changes and the predicted rise in the sea level are likely to worsen the situation. Since independence in 1971, the Government has made large investments to prevent natural calamities like floods, hurricane, sitor, draught, cyclones and so on.

5.3. Achieving Sustainability in Agriculture

The prime objective of achieving sustainability requires our agriculture laying ever-lasting contribution to Bangladesh's development agenda. Our agricultural vision must spring from the spirit of relying on our indigenous growth. Agriculture must grow with the spree of enlivening our environment and ecology. For example, the excessive use of chemical fertilizer and insecticide in the name of scientific way of agricultural development may disastrously affect our environment and derail sustainability. On the reverse, green revolution, green economy and green GDP may increase sustainability through agriculture. Through strategically managing agro-sector, Bangladesh may achieve the long-term sustainable development goals.

The strategic management of our agriculture enlists a number of operational strategies by which our agricultural sector might outperform other sectors of our development. The agricultural policies therefore must be made in a way that may overcome above challenges facing the agricultural sector and ascertain the objective of the country's sustainable development. The policy makers especially the Agriculture Ministry should consider the following operational modus-operandi in order to stimulate our economic growth through agriculture.

Stereotype cultivation procedure should gradually be phased out in order to increase food products. Without an exact evaluation of the existing human resources base and the fertility of our land we overemphasize on our disadvantages. The shortage of our agro-products, insufficient food stock, the lack of our product and quality competitiveness and our foreign trade inefficiency- all these are the direct result of understanding the root of the

problems. An appropriate attention needs to be given to the rationalization of the government subsidy to agro sector. Despite opposition to agro subsidies in different WTO meetings, the developed Western countries have greatly subsidized their agriculture since the start of the developed economies. The intention of their present position on the prevention of subsidy to this primary economic sector is not clear. However, LDCs including Bangladesh should allow subsidies required for flourishing agriculture which is the foundation of the economic development of these countries. The planning commission should undertake policies related to agro-subsidy by adjusting the vision of our agricultural development as well as the proposed restrictions of the developed countries. The revised agro-loan system as well as the appropriate utilization of foreign aid for agro sector is another important area. The farmers should be provided agro loans free of interest or on soft terms. In its election manifesto, Bangladesh Awami League declared that efforts would be taken to expand the agro-loan sectors and to provide agro-loans on very soft terms.^{xvi} The present Government under Sheikh Hasina is playing pioneering role in this respect.

Bangladesh receives foreign aid mainly for non-agricultural sectors. A significant portion of the external assistance must be allotted for our agriculture. If our industrious farmers can avail the required financial support, they can make splendid contribution in order to build up an economically prosperous Bangladesh. Attention should also be given to attain the necessary gains from international trade through the export of agro products in large volumes. The voice of LDCs including Bangladesh must be raised much more loudly in the international negotiation forums such as WTO, North-South dialogue, bilateral and multilateral business dealings and so on.

Education is the key to all considerations. Soon after the establishment of our Agricultural University, students from the east and southeast countries including Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia, Philippine rushed to study agriculture at our university. Going back to their countries, these students contributed significantly to promote the agricultural development of their countries. Unfortunately, our agriculture graduates do not seem to get involved closely in enhancing our sectors owing to the policy constraints of Bangladesh. For example, the BCS system does not specify the positions related to agriculture for those graduating from Agriculture University. The agro education needs to be expanded and to that direction, specialization in agriculture should be offered in both public and private universities. Agri-business programs at both BBA and MBA levels should be taught keeping in consideration of application of this study in our real life agriculture. Agro-industrialization should be emphasized instead of focusing on heavy

industries. The industrialization process of Bangladesh needs to be focused on environment-friendly industrial ventures and to that end, agro-industrialization must get the first priority. Malaysia generated the bulk of its capital from the agricultural sectors. The International Airport at Bangkok is flooded with sophisticated agro-products, rural crafts and rural industrial products that demonstrate Thailand's agro-focused developmental scenario. Almost all industrialized countries have a history of agriculture in the initial stage of their development

Effective disaster management programs should be chalked out in order to fight natural calamities that hinder our agriculture. The government as well as the non-government agencies should work together in this regard. We should also seek support from the donor countries in facing the situation so that they need not come up with aid package on the eve of natural calamity almost every year. Many scholars on development might have their distinct views on the topic; however, I strongly believe that we can improve our economy primarily through modernizing and mobilizing our agriculture and secondarily through industrialization.

6. The Theory of Industrialization

Industrialization refers to the development of industry on an extensive scale.^{xvii} Industrialization is a historical phase and experience. Industrialization is the overall change in circumstances accompanying a society's movement population and resources from farm production to manufacturing production and associated services.^{xviii} The literatures on development economics indicate a strong positive relationship between industrialization and development. The terms industrialization and development are used synonymously in the writings of many economists. Immediately after the industrial revolution in Great Britain which was followed by other parts of Europe, people in developing countries also planned to move towards industrialization.

Industrialization began in England and from there spread to other parts of the world. The Industrial Revolution was the major technological, socioeconomic and cultural change in the late 18th and early centuries resulting from the replacement of an economy based on manual labor to the industrial and manufacturing products.^{xix}

The causes of the Industrial Revolution are complex and have remained a topic for debate for centuries. Some historians see the Revolution as an outgrowth of social and institutional changes brought by the end of feudalism in Great Britain after the English Civil War in the 17th century.^{xx} The Enclosure movement and the British Agricultural Revolution made food production more

efficient and less labor-intensive, forcing the surplus population who could no longer find employment in agriculture into cottage industry, such as weaving, and in the longer term into the cities and the newly-developed factories.

6.1. Viable Industrial Model

Unlike the Newly Industrialized Centuries (NICs), Japan, other ASEAN countries, most underdeveloped and developing countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America are still in the primitive level in terms of industrial development and industrialization. It is very important that some efficient strategies for industrialization process in those countries need to be considered in order to uphold a viable industrial model. Capital accumulation, savings generation, phased transition from import substituting strategy to export-oriented industrialization and an effective trade strategy may lead a country to adopt a viable industrial policy.

The most important strategy is to accumulate capital through generating savings. This history of industrialization helps us understand that agriculture is the foundation of agriculture through which a country's economic prosperity is achieved. Invested savings is the main source of capital accumulation, which is the number one condition to plan, develop and promote any development strategy. The savings are generated from income.

In the developing countries, income may come from diverse sources. The comparative advantage of most of the developing countries lies with mainly two sectors- their primary products and their human resources. Development economics theory as well as empirical evidence suggests that these two sectors can contribute a significant portion of the capital required for their growth and development if the appropriate strategies can be evolved. Therefore, the development strategies of these developing countries need to be made keeping in consideration of these two sources of income.

Another important strategy is to stimulate a dual focus and outward orientation. An integrated industrial structure with a dual focus on both primary and secondary industries is the best option to achieve that goal. In another words, a country needs to undertake phased diversified industrialization programs starting from the primary to manufacturing to heavy industries. Yet the key is an outward-looking strategy, that is, the country has to produce various goods so that these can be traded on international markets and at the same time it can obtain some goods overseas to its advantages. Malaysia, for example first concentrated on primary industries that include minerals, agricultural and forest resources and then moved gradually to manufacturing and technology-oriented industrialization.

The third pillar of a viable industrial policy is to formulate a trade policy. After World War II, the policy makers of most of the developing countries had reservations about outward-oriented trade strategies owing to the frustrating international trade experience following the Great Depression, volatility of the prices of primary goods and their declining terms of trade. In the 1970s, the resurgent Neoclassical economists found positive association between openness and growth that shifted trade focus from inward-orientation to an outward-oriented direction. Since then international trade has been considered as the engine of growth. Bangladesh needs to adopt a sound trade policy ensures its gains through achieving competitiveness and to adept its trade strategy to the changing realities of globalization.

6.2. Bangladesh's Industrial Model

From the very beginning of independence, the strategies of Bangladesh paid attention to the multidimensional perspectives of development. Initially an inward-oriented Import-Substitution (IS) Industrialization, nationalization and the framework of socialist political economy were geared up. In view of the failure of these policies, the country's development strategies underwent massive reorientation and reorganization right from the late 1970s. The new policies focused on the outward-oriented trade liberalization in order to enhance the economy through export expansion.

The ineffectiveness of the policies of socialism, nationalization and import-substitution led to the rethinking of the post independence development strategies. Initiatives were taken to revise the ideology of socialism by reducing government interventions, privatizing the state-owned enterprises (SOEs), restructuring the industrial sector, liberalizing the foreign trade, incorporating structural adjustment programs and, above all, strengthening macroeconomic policies. Bangladesh now entered into an era of export-orientation and trade liberalization. Since then the country's industrial policy evolved through four phases.

The Revised Investment Policy of December 1975 (RIP-'75) and the amendment of socialism by the post-1975 government facilitated the path towards a mixed economy model that significantly contributed to denationalization, privatization and liberalization processes in Bangladesh. The new policy started a limited privatization and liberalization process, which opened the new phase of industrial growth and export performance in the development history of Bangladesh. The second phase started with the introduction of the New Industrial Policy (NIP-'82) in 1982. It aimed at

providing a new dimension and greater thrust to industrialization of the country through stimulating greater participation of the private sector in the process.^{xxi} The Revised Industrial Policy (RIP-'86), which existed during the 1986-91 period, inaugurated the third phase of the export-led growth strategy. It combined a broad and diversified industrial policy package. The strategy focused on: (a) removal of a large part of the Quantitative Restrictions (QRs) on imports; (b) rationalization of tariffs; (c) reduction in the number of tariff slabs; (d) zero-tariff access to imported inputs; (e) subsidization of export credit; (f) concessions and incentives for export-oriented activities.

The most comprehensive and intensive reforms were made through the fourth phase that started in the early 1990s and is still continuing. The industrialization policy introduced during the 1991-92 period contributed to an environment that resulted in export promotion through reduction of anti-export bias in the country's economy. In order to strengthen the participation of private sector, the government undertook plans to improve key areas including infrastructure, financial and capital markets, law and order situation and, above all, institutional and regulatory framework.^{xxii}

The industrial policy of the present Government is aimed at attracting foreign investment to give stimuli to our development endeavor.. Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina seems to have inaugurated a brilliant chapter in the country's development history by shifting its aid-focused policy to investment-oriented strategy. She gave a life-awakening call to domestic and global investors to "grab business opportunities in Bangladesh" through her seminal speech at the Bangladesh Investment and Policy Summit started on January 24, 2016. The entire industrial policy of Bangladesh is now geared up in that direction.

6.3. Facing the Challenges for Achieving Sustainability

In order to achieve sustainability in placing our industrial model, we need to identify the problems and issues in this regard and take bold steps to prevent them. By following the viable industrial model as provided above and by overcoming the inherent issues, we may achieve sustainability in Bangladesh's industrialization process.

There are a number of problems that stand barriers to our industrial development. First, any investment if it wants to mean business can't be effective in a bad the infrastructural condition. Serious government attention needs to be laid on the development of roads, high-ways, transportation,

business plants, gas and electricity generation, economic zones and so on. Focusing her policy to that end, Sheikh Hasina said Public Private Partnership in infrastructure investment offers a new window of opportunity for investors while the Existing Export Processing Zones and Special Economic Zones are being expanded for competitive manufacturing in local and global markets. The Prime Minister's declaration to establish Bangladesh Development Authority for the simplification of investment procedure might be an important task ahead. The government plan to set up one hundred economic zones should immediately be implemented in order to create congenial atmosphere for investment.

Second, deteriorating law and order situation of our country poses a severe challenge to the prospective investment-based industrialization. First pages of everyday's newspapers are splashed with dreadful news of killings, hijacking, robbery, bombing and other terrorist, road accidents, traffic jams and traffic congestions due to shutdowns and political demonstrations. The investors-both foreign and domestic-are scared to invest in expensive and long-life projects due to the increasing insecurity and disorder. The public order management, police patrol and intelligence need to be brought under major overhaul. Despite a few government steps towards containing terrorism, there is enormous scope to broaden the anti-terror preventive measures. Social awareness through radio, electronic and print media can play a very effective role in combating these disorders.

Third, politicization and political muscle-flexing in achieving undue financial gains from the investors obstruct the smooth process of privatization. The business stages from license-giving to plant-setting to business operations-all are, on many occasions, dependent somehow or other on political boon. Moreover, the red-tapism and bureaucratic complexities should also be removed. Too many restrictions discourage the investors. Thanks to Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina for her guarantee of security and profitability of investment in Bangladesh. But these utterances should not be kept borne with political rhetoric, rather be substantiated with action-oriented policies and effective implementation.

Fourth, all sorts of tariffs and non-tariff barriers for Bangladeshi investors in foreign countries need to be removed in order to strengthen equal opportunities for both domestic and foreign businesses. Domestic savings-both individual (s) and national (S) must be encouraged and to that end, citizens should avoid excessive expenditures. It is wrong that we invite and depend on only foreign investments. We must strengthen our own investments through wide-savings so that we can build up solid domestic-foreign collaboration through investments and business.

Last but not the least, Bangladesh should gear up business research and development studies. Mere establishment of Private Sector Development Policy Coordination Committee (PSDPCC) is not enough to meet the demand of research and study for systematic, research-backed and fact-based business operations. According to known sources, around forty thousand foreigners are working as key-executive positions in different manufacturing and industrial sectors. Time is now to prepare our own graduates providing the required education and training so that they can shoulder the responsibilities of these business organizations. That will check the lawful and unlawful cash outflow from Bangladesh and be a great contributing factor for the investment-oriented growth and development strategies. The opening speech of the Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina will be enshrined in the annals of the history of the sustainable development of Bangladesh.

7. Conclusion

Achieving sustainability in Bangladesh's development model must incorporate a strategy that combines the twin-themes of development based on agriculture and industrialization. Without agricultural upliftment, Bangladesh's development merely through industrialization may not be successful. Mere agriculture without paying attention to industrialization will also be dysfunctional. Maintaining the strategies and principles of sustainability mentioned above can tremendously contribute to the development discourse of Bangladesh.

The present article argues that industrialization should start with the industrialization of our agriculture which will gradually spill-over in other areas of industrialization. In other words, agro-based industries and agriculture-oriented industrial activities need to be given the utmost importance. Bangladesh can generate huge capital from agricultural sector for its transformation towards large-scale environment-friendly industrialization.

Investment-oriented development strategy which is put forward by the present Government with utmost significance seems to be a major policy shift in Bangladesh's sustainable development discourse. The present Government understands that our development policy must backfire if sustainability is not achieved. The government of Sheikh Hasina, therefore, emphasizes on strengthening our development through sustainability by addressing security measures. Various concerns of both traditional and non-traditional security are now getting preponderance in that policy. Apart from fighting terrorism and militancy, her Government plans to ascertain social security through women empowerment. As the recognition to her achievement in this regard, she obtained Planet Fifty-Fifty Award and Agent of Change Award during the 71st

General Assembly of the United Nations. In order to achieve sustainability in Bangladesh's development endeavor, the country must eradicate terrorism. Thus the Prime Minister has also placed a counter-terrorism model to the world. If the international community works together for a combined global security, global development must not succumb to failure.

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