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Editor's Note

Peace may be a pre-requisite for security, but it often is not a sufficient condition for ensuring the latter. The two categories — peace and security — occasionally used interchangeably are, nevertheless, distinct if mutually dependent phenomena. The phrase, 'peace of the graveyard,' has been used to describe the status of the Bosnian city of Srebrenica after more than 8,000 men and boys from the area were herded by Serb militias and killed in cold blood during the civil war which pulverised the former Yugoslavia.

This is not to say that peace and security cannot co-exist. In fact, they must; without one, the other is incomplete, hollow and transient. However, especially since al-Qaeda's attacks on New York and Washington on the 11th of September, 2001, the discourse on security has been almost mono-cultural in focus on varieties and versions of Islamist extremism. For some years since the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, that theatre of operations was conflated with the anti-al-Qaeda campaign mounted by the USA; over the past year or so, Afghanistan, where most of it began in the late 1970s and early 1980s, has become the pre-eminent motif.

Despite a shift of tactical focus, change of rhetoric, and even an apparent transfer of emphases, the international system currently displays neither peace nor security. It could, in fact, be argued that somewhat akin to the certitudes of the Cold War's bipolar frigidity, the late Bush Administration's 'Global War on Terror/ism' did lend some appearance of sharpness and structure to the fundamental fluidity of the post-Cold War security milieu. Now that the 'Long War' has, at least semantically, supplanted the GWOT, and the Obama Administration is actively engaging some so-called 'rogue states,' and 'pariah entities,' the loss of consistency has occasionally led to questions about meaning and purpose.

This is significant on several counts. Although some analysts have already decided that the United States is decidedly on its way down from its perch of systemic pre-eminence and that China is about to go head-to-head with this 'sole superpower,' many Chinese themselves have noted with cogency that

despite this dialectic dynamic reshaping the system, the United States is, and will remain for a long time, the pre-eminent actor in it; they also note that China's ability to mount a challenge is very modest. Most importantly, Chinese party-political and military leaders have consistently vouched a lack of interest and ability to mount such a challenge in the first place. With so much evidence to hand, the international security community could perhaps grant the systemic order a bit more time than has been suggested in recent years.

Assuming, then, that the current hierarchy will evolve with the USA in its position of pre-eminence but increasingly in a collegial constellation of major and rising powers — why not call it the G-20, for instance — what Washington says and does will continue to matter to the rest of the system. President Barack Obama's visionary commentary on a more egalitarian and caring world, a world hopefully bereft of nuclear weapons, collective responses to global challenges, and a generally more peaceful milieu where all parties feel secure may suggest elemental changes in the wings. However, expressions of concern registered by his Secretary of Defence, Robert Gates, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Michael Mullen, and the newly-appointed Commander, US Pacific Command, Admiral Robert Willard, over China's military modernisation and 'lack of transparency' hint at very little having changed since at least 1996. So, is Obama being naive or careless? His Asian tour in mid-November should help answer at least part of that question.

However, the 'international security system' is a theoretical construct with many shades of gray. While that paradigm evolves, perhaps most acutely in the minds of security analysts, 'real people' and their societies have to contend with the experience of their own realities. And in that myriad histrionic multiplex, shows are as variegated and dramatic as it gets. This edition of the Journal presents a sampler of this diversity of the 'real world' experience of peace and security — or absence thereof.

In South Asia, the evolution of Nepalese politics has often been characterised as a struggle between Maoist revolutionaries and the former Hindu Kingdom's conservative reactionary forces. Few observers have commented at length on the many other actors who have been playing key roles in that ongoing saga. **Nischal Pandey** draws attention to the Terai plain's Madhesi communities which, in recent years, have become actively engaged in defining Nepal's political evolution, with violence sometimes as their response to perceived grievances, and occasionally as the expression of their capacity to shape their collective future. How other Nepalese respond to the Madhesi game-plan, and what role India plays in influencing this dynamic will colour and shape the new Nepal emerging before our eyes.

Three authors recall with acuity aspects of the Bush Administration's 'Global War on Terrorism' which defined much of the past decade. **James Veitch** recounts the sequential history of the GWOT narrative, the key players in the drama which followed al-Qaeda's attacks on New York and Washington, the motivations driving Washington's often unilateralist bent and pre-emptive stratagem, and the evolution of the rhetorical tools deployed by the administration to win the argument while not winning the 'war.' **Safdar Sial** delves deep into the often-misunderstood and occasionally misconstrued *Taliban* phenomenon to examine what the movement seeks and what its capabilities are. From this analysis he draws rather gloomy conclusions regarding the implications for southern Asia. **Hrishiraj Bhattacharjee** exposes the frequently popular myth that Islamist extremism is an incoherent agglomeration of disillusioned local militias fighting their specific battles but using the collectivising *genre* of al-Qaeda-affiliated groupies. He demonstrates with rigour the existence of a strategic vision — that of drawing the 'imperious adversary' into an enervating imperial overstretch likely to lead to a haemorrhaging of its substance, resulting in economic decline.

Obayedul Hoque Patwary explores a relatively novel field within the security studies realm — security-related consequences of climate change. While scientists have written about polar icecaps and mountaintop glaciers melting, sea-levels rising, and weather patterns changing irreversibly unless current trends are arrested, he looks at how society and state cope with the consequences of climate change, what happens if they do not, and what can be done about it. Seen especially from the Bangladeshi perspective ahead of the UN's Copenhagen conference, this is as 'real' as security studies get.

I hope the articles published in this edition will give a clear perspective on many of these issues.

Major General ANM Muniruzzaman, ndc, psc (Retd.)
Editor

Summaries

Nepal: Terai-Based Militancy and Its Transnational Implications

Nishchal N. Pandey

Nepal's transformation from a monarchy through a transitional democracy confronting a Maoist insurrection to a popular democracy which initially brought the Maoists themselves to power has been remarkable political evolution. However, the end of revolutionary conflict has not brought peace. In fact, ethno-political dynamics, stimulated by recent developments, now threaten stability in Nepal's Terai plains north of the open Indo-Nepal borders. Nepalese nationalists may point fingers southward and blame their giant neighbour for the country's many ills, but unless Kathmandu's new pluralist dispensation becomes inclusive and truly representative, and co-opts Terai's political forces, the status quo could once again be faced with violence.

Taliban on the March: Threat Assessment and Security Implications for the Region

Safdar Sial

Since 1996, the Taliban militancy has been proliferating into both sides of Pakistan-Afghanistan border at strategic, operational and tactical levels. Taliban are not only propagating their own version of Islam through diversified tactics but also expanding and consolidating their areas of influence. At the same time they are maneuvering small [local] militant groups and individuals in pursuit of their agenda. Neither the Afghan war has yet been won against them nor the Pakistani government has been able to encumber their growth and consolidation in its tribal and frontier regions. Meanwhile the Taliban groups have multiplied, expanded and set trends for other militant groups to follow the suit inflating the risk matrix for the entire region. Having links with some *jihadist* groups and even *al-Qaeda*, on ideological and operational level, Taliban offer a bleak security scenario for the entire region, particularly Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran, China, India and Central Asian States.

Pragmatism within Dogma: The Hidden Strategy of Global Jihad*Hrishiraj Bhattacharjee*

Since *al-Qaeda's* attacks on Washington and New York on 11 September 2001, radical Islamist militancy has been at the forefront of international security discourse. Much of the analyses have sought to grapple with the disparate, diverse and apparently even random acts of violence mounted against 'soft' targets. Few observers of the 'Global Jihad' and practitioners of 'the global war on terrorism' appear to have discerned a coherent strategy informing the myriad acts of 'terror.' However, examining the commentary of radical Islam's early proponents, and extending its logic to the current conflict, especially the written submission made by the alleged planner of the '9/11' attacks, it is possible to establish a train of logic between thought and action. Recognising and acknowledging such linkages would be essential to confronting the challenge meaningfully.

The Security Dimensions of Climate Change*Obayedul Hoque Patwary*

Climate change is increasingly recognised as a major human security issue that presents serious global threats. Extreme weather phenomena such as floods, droughts, heat waves and cyclones, experienced in different parts of our globe, are among the far-reaching consequences of climate change, giving us a bitter foretaste of what worse may come in the near future. Climate change is particularly complex and it affects many aspects of international politics, economics, migration, human rights, development, trade, health and environmental systems and can act as a stressor making situations of instability, conflict and humanitarian crises more likely and severe. Dramatic environmental change undeniably places the infrastructure of all countries to the test. But, it presents an ever greater threat to developing countries that lack the means, the know-how and the capacity to effectively deal with these phenomena. Bangladesh is recognised worldwide as one of the countries most vulnerable to the impacts of global warming and climate change. The country has a history of extreme climatic events claiming millions of lives and destroying past development gains. Resource and effort of government and people are quickly drained addressing the impact of one event when another hazard strikes. Impacts of global warming and climate change thus have the potential to challenge our development efforts, human security and the future. This paper examines such negative effects of climate change on the national and international security and recommends that to address the negative consequences of climate change a multifaceted approach needs to be taken both at the national and international level.

President George W Bush and Beginnings of the War on Terror*James Veitch*

The 'global war on terrorism' phenomenon combined an inter-linked evolution of US policy and rhetoric in describing and addressing radical Islam. The Bush Administration refined its normative semantics to manage perceptions, identifying Islamist radicals as 'evil' without acknowledging its real-life purpose and strategy. By using biblical, even apocalyptic, language, Bush transformed a US vs. radical Islamist conflict into a 'global war' against 'global *Jihad*.' That escalation, stimulating local threats on a planetary scale, engulfed many lands in conflict. The ideological content of Bush's 'global war' was rooted in a 1979 conference in Jerusalem and the crystallisation of a US-led campaign to effect changes in the Middle-East. The '*Jihad*' grew as a response, and an attempt to drain America's substance in imperial over-stretch. Afghanistan may determine the victors.

Nepal: Terai-Based Militancy and Its Transnational Implications

*Nishchal N. Pandey**

Nepal has gone through spectacular transformation in the past 3 years. Some of it has been positive change for the sake of peace, democracy and development such as the end of the decade-long people's war, peaceful transition from a monarchy to a republic, and a great leap forward from an old, feudal set-up to the world's youngest republic. The decision of the Maoist leadership to abandon the armed insurrection and embrace competitive multi-party democratic system based on free and fair elections was the first step towards the resolution of a decade of horrid violence and destruction that saw the taking of 13 thousand precious lives. It was certainly not an easy undertaking on the part of Comrade Prachanda to assuage his battle-hardened commanders to lock up weapons in UN cantonment sites while at the same time request the people for votes. The ability of the Nepalese political leaders to set aside differences between 2007 and 2008 and hold elections for the country's first Constituent Assembly on April 10, 2008 was another landmark event in the history of the country. It was held in a free and fair manner and the international community too endorsed its results. And the unexpected triumph of the CPN (Maoist) party emerging as the largest political outfit in the elections and the formation of a government headed by Prachanda was not only a unique exercise in South Asia in which a former guerrilla leader assumed the highest executive office of the state but also an exemplary case of a spirit of accommodation and adjustment exhibited by various organs of the state — the army, police, bureaucracy, business community, civil society and the rival political parties. This was none to match with any other country in South Asia torn by years of civil war and polarized by extreme viewpoints and opposing political ideologies.

The most urgent task of holding elections to the constituent assembly may have been completed but the drafting of the new Constitution will be another

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major leap. "Within two years the new Constitution needs to be drafted and ratified. The issues associated with it are, addressing of justified demands of various sections, ethnic groups and communities, the issue of federalism, state restructuring, and inclusive state."¹ As per the schedule agreed by the Constituent Assembly, M.P.s representing various political parties have begun to go to the villages in the hope of collecting views and suggestions from the general public on what type of a Constitution we should frame for ourselves. Taking advantage of the fluid situation, numerous groups have begun demanding different sets of demands from the state. In the meantime, therefore, ensuring peace and security, controlling inflation, implementing concrete programs for socio-economic transformation and ending impunity must be given adequate priority because the people desire to see swift resolution of their daily grievances such as load shedding and scarcity of petroleum products. Although the peace process is going on smoothly, there are already emerging several fault-lines regarding which a more rational assessment needs to be done. Some of it is an outcome of the transition phase; others are more endemic and cover a wide area from law and order situation to the demand of numerous federal units from the erstwhile unitary and centralised state structure.

In fact, ever since the culmination of the second people's movement in April 2006, issues of federalism, devolution of power to the local bodies, questions relating to ethnicity, language and religion, problems pertaining to social exclusion of certain caste groups in the government, business and other sectors of public life gained maximum prominence. The people of the Terai² who have had strong resentment towards the manner in which the Kathmandu centric elite has dealt with their problems, this time eschewed their unique disposition of being patient and tolerant and started to organise themselves. Fanned by radical elements in groups of Madhesis, and certain groups in the hills, it has now come to the point where the interim Constitution itself has already accepted that a new Nepal will be a 'federal republic'. But some parties especially the extreme leftist and rightist ones are yet to accept federalism as having been demanded by the general people during the course of the people's movement in 2006. They see this as a conspiracy to baffle the electorate, push the infant republic into disorder and chaos, yet achieve nothing more than

¹ Nepal, Madhav Kumar. 2008. Epoch-Making Change and Bright Prospects *The New Era*, July-Sep. p. 3.

² The Terai is the southern plains from east to west running along the Indo-Nepal border. It is the main agricultural and industrial area of the country and much of the essential supplies from India comes through the Terai to Kathmandu and other main cities. The word 'Madhes' is also interchangeably used to denote the Terai.

sincerely implemented decentralisation or devolution of authority. The Terai today is not only harbouring many outfits that are heavily armed; some have even vowed to carve out a new sovereign state of the Madhes but it has now become the epicentre of all these groups and armed gangs vying to outdo one another in the desperate attempt to secure vote banks. It must also not be overlooked that there are some political parties that are representing their respective constituencies in the parliament and are demanding only a single autonomous state of the Madhes.

This paper shall delve into the historic evolution of the Terai movement, issues of concern to the Madhesi communities and the likely consequence for the entire region particularly to North India if the issue remains un-addressed or unsettled even after the promulgation of the new Constitution.

I. EVOLUTION

The Nepali state which was founded by King Prithvi Narayan Shah (1723 A.D.-1775 A.D.) bringing together 22-24 different principalities has been centrally focused, tightly controlled and integrated so as to encourage a single feeling of 'Nepaliness' all along its modern history. Since the country had 145 languages and dialects together with nearly 150 ethnic and caste groups, the leaders for the sake of national security desired to bring together the citizenry under a single cultural, religious and linguistic structure so as to politically and culturally unite the nation. King Prithvi — a warrior King of 'Gorkha' district, used political skill, acumen and sheer force to annex several princely states in the vicinity.³ He captured Kathmandu from Malla Kings in 1769 A.D. and turned it into the capital of the country. The Nepal Army which came to being after the country was unified became dominated by Gurungs, Rais, Limbus and Magars who are known the world over for their extraordinary bravery and courage [but have not yet] reached the position of the Chief of the Army Staff. Interestingly, not only in the Army, Police and the Armed Police but also in the Gurkha regiments within the British and the Indian Armies, the people of the Madhes have not been represented. This was primarily because they were never regarded as a 'combatant' race. During the party-less Panchayat system, a few selected people from the *dalit*, janjati, Madhesi and Muslim communities were particularly promoted to showcase the country as a multi-ethnic mosaic of different ethnicities and religions and to depict to all communities that every citizen is equal and anyone could shine and prosper

³ One of the several recommendations by the Nepal Army to the Constitution Drafting Committee of the Constituent Assembly submitted on Feb. 13, 2009 states that the new Constitution should regard King Prithvi Narayan Shah the Great as the Founder of the Nation.

according to one's ability and education. However, cracks began to appear in the centralised system of governance after the political change of 1990 but they were more in the nature of political devolution, decentralisation, additional power to the district and village development committees, more budget for district development, etc. A stronger current of state re-structuring became apparent after the Maoists [during the course of their war] declared that they would carve out various federal units on the basis of ethnicity. After the successful culmination of the second people's movement of April 2006, this issue gained prominence in the political and academic discourse of the country.

II. ETHNIC COMPOSITION

The word 'Madhesh' means mid-country which in the context of the southern plains of Nepal, is extended upto Vidhyachal hills in the south and Siwalik ranges in the north. There were many kingdoms in between such as Mithila, Kashi, Tirhut and Awadh.⁴ King Janak and his daughter-Goddess Sita of the legendary Hindu epic Ramayana were from Janakpur in the Madhesh as was Gautam Buddha who was born in Lumbini in Kapilvastu district. It occupies 23 percent of the land area and holds 48.5 percent of the total population of the country. More than 74 percent of the paddy cultivation of the country is in the Terai whereas 24 out of 75 are Terai districts. According to an American scholar Fredrick Gaige, "75 percent of land revenue, 8 percent of forest resource, 93 percent of excise duty and 70 percent of customs duty of the Nepal government come from the Terai." It is also the main industrial belt and the transit corridor of the country to the nearest seaport but only 18 percent of the total development budget is allocated to the Terai districts. Without the Terai-transit, major cities of Nepal such as Kathmandu and Pokhara would be starved of almost all major daily essentials although a second road link to Tibet through *Syafrubesi-Rasuagadhi* could to some extent ease the problem after it comes into operation. Major river systems of Koshi, Bagmati, Kamala, Rapti, Bakaiya and Narayani bifurcate from the Terai into Northern India occasionally producing devastating floods. Hinduism and Islam are the two prominent religions of the area and so close is the relationship of the Terai people with people of Uttar Pradesh and Bihar that thousands are married across the border while tens of thousand cross the border on a daily basis for their everyday works.

The anthropology of subtropical-based ethnic groups of the Terai region has lately become a passionate topic for discussion. While the hill people opine that a sizeable portion of the total population living in the Terai have come

⁴ Rakesh, Ram Dayal. 2008 *Murder of Madhesh*, Kathmandu: Safari Nepal Publishers. p. 1.

from North India, Madhesi leaders strongly contest such arguments. They say that it is precisely because of these types of prejudices that the ruling privileged hill people have had towards their fellow countrymen in the Terai that the southern plain is in today embroiled in a deadly conflict. But still, there is no dearth of analysts that question the rationale behind the government's decision to haphazardly distribute over a million citizenship certificates in 2006-2007 to Terai people without properly investigating their country of birth and citizenship of parents. They feel that this exercise was orchestrated as part of a grand design to make the Madhesis a majority community in the country thereby impacting on political, administrative and other systems within the country. Madhesi leaders claim that this is incorrect and they are in fact the "dharti putra" (sons of the soil) of the entire Madhes and the first problem that faced a Madhesi was identity and citizenship. "The dress and language of the Madhesi too differs from that of other Nepalis, which sets them apart and subjects them to discrimination," they opine.

Whatever maybe the rationalization, Brahmins and Rajputs thickly reside in the Terai and are influential in their community. Tharus on the other hand are the largest and oldest ethnic group usually found living in close proximity to densely forested regions. They are the chief caste groups in the Madhes, follow the Hindu religion and their practices are similar to many typical Aryan traditions. Danwars, Majhis and Darais are akin to Tharus, physically and racially. Nevertheless, they speak their own language, which is of Sanskrit origin. Rajbansi is another dominant ethnic group of far eastern Terai areas of Jhapa and Morang districts. Although they follow both Hindu and Islamic religions, they have their own local practices and are traditional farmers. Sattars are similar to Santhals of Bihar. Likewise, Bodos, Dhangars (with their origin in Madhya Pradesh), Dhimals, Muslims also reside in the Terai in fairly large numbers.

The Muslims have migrated from Northern India and from neighbouring Bangladesh. They speak Urdu and their social practices correspond with the Islamic religion. Altogether four districts of Terai namely Banke, Kapilbastu, Parsa and Rautahat with over fifty percent of Muslim population can be termed as Muslim-majority districts. In five districts namely, Bara, Mahottari, Dhanusha, Siraha and Sunsari, Muslims are the second religious majority. There are altogether 17 Muslim members in the current Constituent Assembly. The Muslim community in the country have been demanding better representation in the mainstream politics, bureaucracy and policy making levels, a permanent Madrasa board through Constitution, regulations for a permanent Haj committee and ensuring adequate security for Muslims among other things.⁵

⁵ Maharajan, Laxmi. 2009. Muslims Miffed at govt. for ignoring identity, *The Himalayan Times*, Feb. 16.

Past migration histories suggest the Terai to have been a melting pot specifically the urban centres such as Biratnagar, Birgunj, Rajbiraj, Lahan and Nepalgunj. Eradication of malaria, clearing of jungles, construction of the East-West Highway along the southern foot of the hills, and land settlement programmes initiated by King Mahendra contributed to a massive movement of population from the hills into the Terai, resulting in a large increase in the area devoted to agriculture. Not only did more and more hill people start to settle in the Madhes but at the same time Indians in the neighbouring bordering villages also began to enter. Today it has become difficult to indicate which community is "indigenous" and "non-indigenous" except perhaps the Tharus who have serious trouble in being associated with the term 'Madhesi' as they regard themselves as indigenous.

III. THE CONFLICT

Academic explanations of ethnic conflict(s) generally fall into one of three schools of thought: primordialist, instrumentalist or constructivist. According to Primordialists, ethnic groups and nationalities exist because there are traditions of belief or biological features and specific territorial location [therefore] they use their cultural groups as constituencies in their competition for power or resources. Instrumentalists view ethnicity and race as instrumental identities, organised as a means to particular ends whereas constructivists stress the importance of the socially constructed nature of ethnic groups, drawing on Benedict Anderson's concept of the imagined community. However, these empirical puzzles are most of the time difficult to explain which is why some ethnic disputes escalate to violence and skid along to decades of senseless war. Often ethnic trouble is also fuelled by a feeling of national superiority of the majority which leads to discrimination of the minorities. In order to gain politically from this feeling of being "left-out," politicians usually try to take advantage through identity politics. It has happened in neighbouring India where political parties have used schisms between Hindus and Muslims, upper castes and lower castes, dalits and untouchables, Yadavs and Baniyas, etc. for securing vote banks. Nepal in general and the Terai in particular could not have remained unaffected by this trend in the Northern Indian states of Uttar Pradesh and Bihar.

Our leadership should have been more alert to thwart possible dangers emanating from ethnicity, caste and language and the hill-Terai divide rather than pointing fingers at the monarchy in the aftermath of the second People's Movement. Had they done that, the country would not have witnessed so much turmoil in the Terai.

It was no big surprise therefore that when the eight political parties promulgated the Interim Constitution on Dec. 16, 2006, it almost sporadically instigated a series of protests across the country. Several episodes of burning of copies of the Interim Constitution were reported across the country; dozens of Madhesi activists were arrested mainly because the Madhesi people believed that this was a Constitution “handed over” to them without proper consultations. Since the Nepali Congress and the CPN (UML) only consulted the Maoists who were just about to shun the decade of insurgency, the Madhesi People’s Rights Forum (MPRF) launched its protest by stating that the Constitution failed to address the demands of the Madhesi community. Both factions of the Jantantrik Terai Mukti Morcha (JTMM) said that the Constitution was prepared by the “hill people and did not address the issues raised by the people of the Terai.” Today it is widely believed by Madhesi leaders that a situation of bloodshed arose from some major missteps in the transition process in 2006-2007. The hastily promulgated interim constitution did not fully reflect the aspirations of the Terai people (including the Tharus) nor the grievances of Janajati, Dalit, women, and other traditionally marginalised communities which is why we had to repeatedly go on amending the interim Constitution.

Through a sequence of intermittent campaigning and sporadic incidents of violence, the Terai agitation soon converted into a full-fledged confrontation between the state and the Terai parties. The nation began to witness a dramatic increase in the number of armed and unarmed political parties advocating the cause of the Madhesi people. The main reason for this striking increase in armed and underground movements was a deadly nexus established between organised gangs in Northern U.P. and Bihar with their counterparts in neighbouring Terai in order to set-up various armed political outfits in the prosperous industrial belt of the Birgunj-Biratnagar corridor, for obvious reasons of making money through extortion, looting and abduction.

Emulating the armed movement of the MJF, which essentially is a legitimate political party, at least a dozen armed outfits along with their breakaway groups surfaced in the Terai. Most prominent of these were:

1. Janatantrik Terai Mukti Morcha (JTMM) led by Jaya Krishna Goit (JTMM-G) later by Rajan Mukti,
2. Nagendra Kumar Paswan a.k.a. Jwala Singh (JTMM-J),
3. JTMM — Bisfot Singh faction,
4. Madheshi Rashtriya Mukti Morcha (Madheshi National Liberation Front),
5. Madheshi Mukti (Liberation) Tigers,
6. Terai Cobra,

7. LTTE
8. Terai Baagi
9. Terai Army
10. Madhesi Virus Killers Party
11. Joint Democratic Liberation Front
12. Royal Defence Army.⁶

Hence, initially launched to create 'Madhes' as a province within the overall sovereign jurisdiction of Nepal, gradually the aggression and brutality associated with the agitation began to transform into a separatist movement with some groups openly calling for a separate state. Jwala Singh, the coordinator of Janatantrik Terai Mukti Morcha (JTMM—Singh faction), said that his party demands a separate, independent Terai. Although the two factions of the Nepal Sadbhawana Party (NSP) and the Madhesi Janadhikar Forum (MJF) contested the CA polls, Jwala Singh is still underground and together with the Goit Group is regarded to be most lethal forces in the existing terai imbroglio. Taking his cue, outfits are formed and factions are carved out virtually on a monthly basis. The latest in the series is the soubriquet adaptation of the CPN (Maoist) party formed by breakaway Maoist leader Matrika Yadav who dedicates himself to the woes of the Terai people. Yadav had visited Beijing before splitting the Maoist party. Similarly, Jay Krishna Goit of the Terai Mukti Morcha announced in January 2008 that his party had united with the Pawan Giri-led United Jantantrik Terai Mukti Morcha.⁷ Not all parties are engaged in the conflict. The MJF is an important partner of the current ruling coalition government with its leader Upendra Yadav as the nation's Foreign Minister⁸ while the Terai Madhes Loktantrik Party and the two factions of the Sadhvawana Parties are also powerful components of the opposition.

The Terai problem therefore has several dimensions. Starting as an identity-based social movement against two centuries of hill people's domination, the Madhesis have since polarised into two camps: a left-leaning militant secessionist movement and a right-of-centre federalist movement. While the factions within the militant front are politically less significant and their demands are

⁶ Pradhan, Prashant Kumar. 2007. Turmoil in the Terai, South Asia Intelligence Review Vol. 6 No. 4, Aug. 6, 2007 <http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/sair/Archives/6_4.htm> (accessed on Jan. 6, 2009).

⁷ *Nepal Weekly*. 2009. Mission Madhes. Feb. 9. p. 29.

⁸ Minister of Water Resources Bijaya Kumar Gachheddar, a Tharu, is also representing the MJF Party in the current coalition government.

detached from the spectrum of possible resolutions, the federalist front is politically impossible to ignore.⁹

In fact, the lid over the Pandora's box has already been lifted. Not only the Madhesi, Limbus in the eastern hills want their own state; Tharus, who are spread across the Terai, want their own state; Madhesi, Magars and Tamangs also want their own state; Newars want theirs — actually, any sizeable ethnic group wants its own state. All this is happening because they were told it was possible, they were told it was their right and they were told there was a conspiracy to deny them their right, their self-rule.¹⁰ Without a broad political understanding and proper homework it is highly probable that the federal system will turn out to be a fireball for the Nepali polity. Worse, the nation is yet to fully understand various types of federal models that are prevailing around the world. While it may be true that the Westminster model despite repeated experiments has failed in the Nepali context, we are not sure whether the American, German, French, Indian or the Sri Lankan model that is best suited for our situation.

IV. A CASE STUDY OF THREE GRUESOME MASS MURDERS

The conflict in the Terai has thrived not only because of the oft-repeated “genuine grievances” of the Madhesi populace but also due to the inept handling of the issue by the leadership in Kathmandu. There has neither been a holistic review of the implementable policies that the state can pursue in the interim period nor a directional approach to address the problem in the long-term. The state has not tried to obtain recommendations from the civil society, academia, human rights organisations and the media to ensure that the Madhesi issue is well represented in the new Constitution. Fearing a backlash from the Terai, it occasionally states that the nation will adopt a federal structure. But fearing the ‘One Madhes — One Province’ arrangement will split the nation, it immediately retracts from giving too much weight to the Madhesi demands. Madhesi parties, mainly the MJF, wanted almost all the caste groups residing in the Madhes to be called ‘Madhesi’ but other parties, primarily the NC, UML, and the Maoists, desiring to cut into the vote bank of the Terai parties, have supported the agitation by the Tharus who do not wish to be lumped up in the concoction of Madhesi. Same with the question of Muslims who also do

⁹ Prasai, Sagar. 2009. In Nepal: Holding Constituent Assembly elections Attempt no. 3, <<http://asiafoundation.org/in-asia/2008/02/20/in-nepal-holding-constituent-assembly-elections-attempt-3/>>, (accessed on Feb. 4, 2009).

¹⁰ Dhakal, Ameet. 2009. Rebooting Politics, *My Republica*, www.myrepublica.com/portal/?action=news_details&news_id=1945. (accessed on Feb. 14, 2009)

not want to be called 'Madhesi'. Such a haphazard style of functioning has led to some parties demanding the 'right to self-determination,' which has been denounced by almost all sections of the society including the army and the Supreme Court. On the other hand, it could give rise to dirty caste and religion-based politics of hatred, which could have a long-lasting effect on Nepal's peace, tranquility and political stability.

Even the mainstream parties in addition to the Terai parties themselves are unclear of what they want in the new Constitution, which can ensure that the Madhesis are given equal opportunities by the state. An example of this is the demand for more Madhesis in the Nepal Army. When the Army advertised for recruitment for its Sabuj Battalion with the strength of 850 personnel, the number of Madhesi applicants was much less than expected. Currently in NA statistics, they are seemingly mixed with Brahmins of the Hills and constitute only 6.26 percent of the total army's strength. The cause for this lesser degree of inclusion seems to be the lack of interest on the part of Madhesi communities to join military services. There is, for instance, almost no representation of Madhesis in the British or Indian Gurkhas.¹¹

The main cause behind this lack of trust between Madhesi parties and the other mainstream parties was also the result of three ill-famed clashes and episodes of mass slaughter in Lahan, Gaur and Kapilvastu just before the elections to the Constituent Assembly. These massacres were horrendous crimes committed by miscreants that staggered the nation and ignited the already volatile security situation in the Madhes. Yet, despite judicial commissions, the perpetrators were not arrested. The Home Minister, who remained a by-stander in all these three gruesome cases of genocide, did not even bother to resign setting off a dangerous precedent of impunity in the Nepali polity.

Below is a brief review of these incidents as they were instrumental in widening the divide between Kathmandu and the Madhesi people.

Protesting against the newly promulgated Interim Constitution which fell far too short of addressing the demands of the Madhesis, the MPRF set ablaze government offices in Lahan of Siraha district on Jan. 20, 2007. Infuriated locals burnt down the government offices and district office of the CPN (Maoist) in Lahan while cadres of the MPRF clashed with Maoist cadres. Two days later, the police opened fire at a mob and two were killed. A meeting of top leaders of the SPA-M in Kathmandu decided to form a high-level probe commission to investigate violent activities in the Terai districts. However, the passion of regionalism and federalism had gone beyond the fear of Maoist guerrillas,

¹¹ State of Inclusiveness in Nepal Army, <www.nepalarmy.mil.np/inclusiveness.php>, Nepal Army website (accessed on Feb. 12, 2009).

which in itself was a clear break from the past when people used to be scared of the Maoists. The news of district offices of the Maoist party being burnt down and Madhesi cadres colliding with the battle-hardened Maoists had spread across Terai districts and this in turn encouraged more young Madhesis to come to the streets. Following the Lahan incident, Maoist and MJF cadres clashed also in Bhairahawa and Nepalgunj. Furthermore, two more protestors were killed when clashes ensued between policemen and protestors in Katahari bazaar of Biratnagar. Situation in Rautahat had gone out of control and media houses and journalists were also attacked in Birgunj. Curfews were clamped for days in major towns such as Biratnagar, Birgunj, Janakpur, Rautahat and Rajbiraj. In order to confound the terai crisis and blame the “reactionary forces” for “instigating” the trouble, the government arrested Former Ministers of the royal cabinet Kamal Thapa and Badri Mandal on Jan. 30th but nobody (which included the international community) in reality believed that pro-palace forces were behind this violence. PM Koirala in a message to the nation on January 31st promised to look into the demands of a federal set-up but the MPRF said that it was not satisfactory. The NSP-A said that the PM’s address did not address the Madhesis people’s demand of the resignation of Home Minister Krishna Sitaula for his excessive use of force to quell the agitation. Amnesty International too had urged enquiry into the unlawful killings in the Terai. Finally, on February 7th, Koirala and the leaders of the seven other political parties agreed to delineate electoral constituencies based on population and geography in the Terai (in essence it meant that more constituencies would be allotted to the Terai) and hold elections based on proportional representation. At the same time, the Interim Parliament passed a government-sponsored bill aimed at amending the interim statute by a two-third majority. In the 329-member house, 278 members voted for the amendment.¹² The violent demonstrations had caused the death of 24 people including an Indian national.

However, the Maoists were not at all pleased to see the expansion of power base by Madhesi parties in the Terai. A more dastardly confrontation between the MJF and the Maoist party seemed inevitable because the Maoists had seen this sudden upsurge of Terai emotion having been “sponsored” by an external hand to corrode their support base. That is why it did not come as a surprise when they clashed in Gaur of Rautahat district on March 21st 2007. The incident was a result of these two political groups wanting to have meetings at the same place at the same time but nobody had ever imagined that this small overlap of two programmes would result in such a huge human casualty. The MPRF announced a meeting to be held in Gaur at 11:00a.m. and publicized the meeting

¹² People’s Daily online <http://english.people.com.cn/200703/09/eng20070309_356101.html> (accessed on March 17, 2007).

over loud speakers. Another group, Madhesi Mukti Morcha (MMM), affiliated to the Maoists, also decided to hold a public meeting although the Maoist claim that they had set the programme much before the MPRF. There was no real intervention on the part of the police to separate the parties and to ensure that the meetings were held peacefully, in separate places. They soon came to dismantling of the stage of one group by the other and shots were fired at MMM cadres. Altogether 29 people were killed in the incident, which clearly could have been avoided. "Understandably, the horrendous slaughter of 29 persons in Gaur by lathis, strangulation, and gunshot wounds, among other means, was universally and very rightly condemned both at home and abroad. While the official version of that terrible afternoon's tryst with mass murder will hopefully be brought out, it in the interregnum raised a welter of knotty issues besides birthed a bunch of political conundrums and contradictions."¹³

The third incident, which generated a separate series of bloodbath, was the cold-blooded murder of local Muslim leader Mohit Khan, triggering rioting, and mayhem from Sep. 16-21, 2007 in Kapilvastu.¹⁴ It was neither an "one-off" episode nor an unmanageable incident for the police and the armed police force. Such incidents, as described above, had been happening at regular intervals for the past year yet the nonchalant government and the anemic Home Ministry showed the highest order of ineptitude by being a by-stander at yet another deadly massacre in less than six months.

Altogether 14 were killed¹⁵ at least 300 were injured and over five thousand people were displaced following this incident which can easily be termed as the biggest communal violence till date in the country's history. The fact that it took place in the same district of the birthplace of Lord Gautam Buddha was enough to cast a long shadow over the security situation of the country. Khan was a local Muslim landowner who was a Nepali Congress cadre and a former member of the vigilante group set-up by the (R) NA during the years of the insurgency to counter Maoist offensive in the Terai. Within an hour of the news, homes belonging to people from the hills were gutted and businesses of hill people were attacked and burnt in Chandrauta and Krishnanagar. As a retaliation, Muslim owned shops and buses/trucks were set ablaze close to the Mahendra Highway. Eyewitness reports stated that altogether 300 homes and 100 vehicles were set fire by mobs. Properties worth a billion rupees were

¹³ Josse, M.R. 2007. "Gaur Massacre: Issues, Contradictions and Conundrums Galore," <<http://madhesi.wordpress.com/2007/03/30/gaur-massacre-issues-contradictions-and-conundrums-galore/>> (accessed on March 30, 2008).

¹⁴ Kapilvastu is the birthplace of Lord Gautam Buddha and is also a sensitive area close to the Indo-Nepal border.

¹⁵ This figure is given by UN-OHCHR. Some have cited a figure of dead people as high as 28.

destroyed. Following the incident in Kapilvastu, communal riots sparked in Lamahi, Tulsipur and Bhalubang area of Dang district but the state again became a mute spectator in the incident. The Nepal Human Rights Treaty Monitoring Coordination Committee (NHRTMCC) blamed the Home Ministry, local authorities and the police for the human and physical losses in the riots as they failed to act responsibly. Despite of the fact that 300 APF personnel were stationed in Chandrauta battalion, 100 being on regular duty that day, the people had to witness such a hideous crime perpetrated by merciless hooligans and executed with unparalleled precision in a short span of time. Instead of taking action against the architects who acted behind the scenes and the security agencies that proved themselves worthless, the government took solace simply by forming another judicial inquiry and distributing a token compensation for the victims.

V. TRANSNATIONAL IMPLICATIONS

It is certain that the most dangerous fall-out of an enduring conflict in the Terai will be to the border relations between India and Nepal. As an embodiment of the age-old relations, the 1800 km border has been allowed to remain “open” and porous but there is a strong desire at the level of officials in both countries that this border needs to be, at least, in the short-term, strictly controlled or ‘regulated’. Issuance of ID cards is already in the offing to the people living in the bordering areas whereas a passport or a citizenship card has been made mandatory to passengers traveling by air. During regular meetings between senior police officers of both sides, the Nepali side has repeatedly conveyed to India that criminal elements in UP and Bihar have been deliberately trying to disturb the internal harmony of bordering Nepali districts and have even forwarded credible evidence of some of the underground leaders of the armed groups and gangs having been freely moving around in bordering Indian towns.

The then Prime Minister Koirala had once suggested that the Terai problem could be resolved “within minutes” if India were to be serious about resolving it. Since the Madhesi movement draws much of its money and sometimes its muscle from the other side of the border, it could be plausible that India does have a role in an eventual resolution of the problem. But Koirala’s above statement goes beyond a mere ‘influence’ or ‘leverage’ that the government of India may have on some of these outfits to an actual ‘control’ of the entire Terai agitation. Such public pronouncements coming from the head of the government of Nepal and instances of official negotiations between the government and the underground Terai outfits being conducted inside the Indian Embassy in Kathmandu have unnecessarily raised public opinion against India. They have

been manifested during occasions in forms of anti-Hindi demonstrations such as after Vice-President Parmananda Jha took his oath in Hindi language, which was followed by nation-wide protest rallies. Therefore, the likelihood that the rest of Nepal — mainly the hill-people characterising the Terai movement with one that has been blessed by official India is not only perilous to overall Indo-Nepal relations but also carries with it enormous risks of dragging a powerful neighbouring country into what is solely an internal affair of Nepal. Furthermore, one of the powerful underground Madhesi leaders Jay Krishna Goit had on one occasion expressed his willingness to talk to the Nepal government provided the UN monitored the peace process. Similarly, some arms monitors stationed at the office of the United Nations Mission in Nepal (UNMIN) had clandestinely tried to meet with leaders of the Terai armed groups on Indian soil in 2007 irking the Government of India. Any possible overtures by the UN or extra regional powers to try to fish in the muddled rivers of the Terai will certainly have a negative bearing on the security of the Indo-Gangetic plain which has surprisingly remained protected in the last six decades.

The third crucial impact will be on the delicate demographic balance of the Terai and that in turn influencing the ethno-religious and inter-racial relations across the border in North India's volatile politics. There are far more Yadavs and Rajputs or Bhojpuri and Maithili speaking people in North India than in Nepal's Terai. In fact, there are more than 12 million Maithili speakers in India whereas Bhojpuri (with 170 million speakers) is spoken as far as Guyana, Fiji and Suriname. A tendency to lump them together and demands of some Nepali parties with nudges by vested groups to carve out states based on ethnicity or language with the 'right to self-determination' will have more far-reaching impact on India than to any other country in the sub-continent. Furthermore, Tharus and other indigenous communities have already begun to assert their rightful place disapproving the governmental decision to call them 'Madhesis' which means that there will be stronger, more vocal protests from other ethnic groups too against the idea of the formation of a single autonomous state of Madhes. It is said that while the MJF, NSP and the TMLP have a strong hold over Madhes; the same cannot be ascertained about the Tharus or about the hill people that reside in the Terai. In general, the Terai today has already become a hotbed of fanaticism and a cocktail of a bizarre variety of groups with nefarious connections that will directly impact India.

Nepali historians believe that the first Muslims settled in the country in the late 15th century. Kashmiri traders were probably the first Muslims to arrive, followed by Afghans, Persians and even Iraqis. During the Rana regime, a large number of Muslims migrated to the Terai fleeing persecution by the British army during the Sepoy Mutiny in 1857. During the Sepoy Mutiny, Begum

Hazrat, wife of Nawab Wajid Ali Shah of Lucknow also escaped to Kathmandu via Nepalganj and was allowed to take refuge in Nepal. The Muslims have always enjoyed harmony and brotherly relations with the majority Hindus and accordingly maintained a low profile under the Hindu Monarchy. As a result, two huge mosques were allowed to be built in just one-kilometre distance of the Narayanhiti Royal Palace of the world's only Hindu kingdom. But now with the monarchy gone and the nation having been declared a 'secular republic,' there is a growing urge amongst interest groups to politicize various religious faiths and thereby introduce the eternally impulsive problem of Hindus vs. Muslims in a frantic bid to gain politically from it. As a consequence, the Kapilvastu riots took an ugly communal turn as soon as the locals knew that the person killed was a Muslim. It is no secret that Bajrang Dal and Shiva Sena have already made a grand entry into the Terai politics nor is it a surprise that hundreds of *Madrassaas* have sprung up all along the border and as the administration is grappling with the law and order situation, nobody has an iota of information on whether or not extremist brand of Islam has entered into the Terai. Muslims are likewise not happy to be lumped up with other Madhesis. Already, Muslim leaders have started demanding their rightful representation in the Constitution making process, which most certainly is their entitlement. But at a time when a cluttered political transformation is taking place in the country, the Muslim community of the Terai neither should be neglected from the political process nor ignored for possible infiltrations from hardliners from within and outside the country.

VI. CONCLUSION

Nepal has just overcome a decade-long armed conflict, which cost the nation dearly in terms of human and infrastructural destruction. It will be really unfortunate if the nation has to witness another conflict on ethnic, religious or racial lines. Although we have thrown the old Constitution, we are still struggling to draft a new one. Naturally, a lot of challenges still remain. Issues of federalism, sharing of power and resources, questions of political culture and the ethics of coalition politics, accountability and transparency of the bureaucracy, civilian supremacy of the army, sense of discipline in the police are all issues that have suddenly germinated and require a careful but astute handling. The most daunting task is how to handle the grievances of the Terai people. The Terai, which is the main agricultural area, shares the country's open border with the Indian states of Bihar and Uttar Pradesh and therefore is in a very strategic location economically and politically. Moreover, people of this area accounting for 48 percent¹⁶ of the total population share cultural, linguistic and social

¹⁶ 48 percent of the total population of Nepal lives in the Terai but both Madhesis and people of the hills known as Pahadis live in the Terai.

ties with people across the border. They have faced problems of identity and citizenship and have had limited access to government jobs. Apart from the Terai, the demand for a federal structure in the country is also been raised by other ethnic groups such as Gurungs and Magars in the West, Tamangs and Newars in the Centre, Khambu-Rai and Limbus in the East — triggering fears that Nepal will go back to being 22 different tiny principalities.¹⁷

In view of the fact that in some major areas of the Terai, the hill people and not the Madhesis are in the majority, the idea of a single federated Terai becomes politically unviable. While the Madhesi movement leaders understand this, they are holding on to the demand as a bargaining chip. “Due to these persistent problems in the region, some Madhesis are [also] losing faith in peaceful progress and democracy. The Madhesi [youth especially] see the success that the Maoists achieved through violence and want to achieve the same for themselves. Following the Maoists’ lead, they are increasingly turning to violence to bring attention to their problems.”¹⁸ This makes the numerous armed groups that are active in the area so critical to the resolution of the problem. But suppression can never be a solution to any deep-rooted crisis. The Madhesis have taken this as a fight for personal and social dignity and equality and hence there is also an associated emotional component to this problem.¹⁹ Understanding this reality, the Prachanda-led government has not resorted to using the armed police or the army to quell the Terai agitation. In fact, some progress has been made in peacefully resolving the conflict by inviting the armed groups for talks in early October 2008. For instance, on 26 December, the government held talks with the United Janatantrik Terai Mukti Morcha (U-JTMM) and both parties agreed among other things on suspension of armed activities and gradual release of U-JTMM jailed cadres.

The competing relations between ethnic, religious and racial identities in contemporary Nepal at a time of rapid socioeconomic change and in the face of the declining authority and legitimacy of the state has today become the most critical issue. During 104 years of Rana oligarchy and three decades of one-party rule the state had pursued policies — educational, linguistic, religious, developmental, etc. — aimed at constructing a national identity capable of uniting diverse social groups. With the ushering in of multi-party democracy

¹⁷ King Prithvi Narayan Shah united Nepal, which has 60 recognised major ethnic groups, as a single country from 22 different principalities in 1768.

¹⁸ United States Institute of Peace hosted talk program of Minister Rajendra Mahato July 17, 2007, www.usip.org/pubs/usipeace_briefings/2007/0803_violence_nepal.html.

¹⁹ Jha, Bal Krishna, Madhesi Issue: Deep Rooted?, www.scribd.com/doc/4027994/Ethnic-Madhesi-of-Nepal-heading-towards-deep-rooted-crisis. (accessed on Jan. 14, 2009)

in 1990, various elected governments also did not do enough to change the status Quo-ist nature and character of state policy towards the minority. The sudden onslaught of the Maoist rebellion in 1996 altered the course of the country's history altogether. While the politicians both from the mainstream political parties who call themselves 'national' leaders and those belonging to the Terai-based parties must not forget that the territorial integrity and independence of Nepal must be the top most priority at all times, it is the responsibility of the Constituent Assembly to draft an inclusive and a forward looking Constitution by taking into account the genuine demands of the Madhesi people.

Taliban on the March: Threat Assessment and Security Implications for the Region

*Safdar Sial**

Since 1996, Taliban militancy has been proliferating into both sides of Pakistan-Afghanistan border at strategic, operational and tactical levels. Taliban are not only propagating their own version of Islam through diversified tactics but also expanding and consolidating their areas of influence. At the same time they are maneuvering small [local] militant groups and individuals in pursuit of their agenda. Neither the Afghan war has yet been won against them nor the Pakistani government has been able to encumber their growth and consolidation in its tribal and frontier regions. Meanwhile the Taliban groups have multiplied, expanded and set trends for other militant groups to follow suit inflating the risk matrix for the entire region. Having links with some *jihadi* groups and even al-Qaeda, on ideological and operational levels, Taliban offer a bleak security scenario for the entire region, particularly Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran, China, India and Central Asian States.

I. INTRODUCTION

Having surfaced up in Afghanistan as a group named Taliban when they captured Kandahar in 1994, these students of religious seminaries, mostly from refugee camps inside Pakistan, were not totally a nascent phenomenon for the world at that time. Neither were their religio-political mentors a surprise nor their *jihadi* roots were untraceable. They had been a key part of the anti-Soviet *jihadi* in Afghanistan backed by the US and Pakistan. Afghan war had already put many of the students in seminaries along Pak-Afghan border, and some from as far as Karachi, out of place not only geographically between the two countries — Afghanistan and Pakistan — but also psychologically from student-ship to *jihadi*.

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Taliban had emerged with an agenda to restore peace and provide justice to the people of Afghanistan in accordance with Islamic law (*Shariah*) when Afghanistan was embroiled in ethnic chaos after the Soviet withdrawal. Sick with war, the people of Afghanistan did not have many options to choose between to be able to live in peace and tranquility. Ethnically being Pashtun and belonging to religious seminaries, Taliban did not take much time to win support of their ethnic community in Afghanistan, mostly along Pak-Afghan border areas.

During the Russian invasion of Afghanistan, mujahideen were encouraged to establish their base camps in these bordering areas. Abdullah Azzam had then established his Maktab ul-Khidmet (Services Bureau) in Peshawar and Osama's Masida tul-Ansar was located in Kurram Agency in Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). Centers of Ittehad-e-Islami, Afghanistan, were situated close to Jaji Cantonment of Alikhel, around 10km from Pakistani border. Hizb-e-Islami, Jamiat-e-Islami and Hizb-e-Islami (Khalis) also established training centers in this area. The Hizb ul-Mujahideen (HuM) militants from Miranshah, headquarters of North Waziristan Agency in FATA, used to cross Ghulam Shah checkpoint to enter Afghanistan. They used to report at Chochi, one of the training camps established by Jalaluddin Haqqani.¹

Religious seminaries played a key role in recruitments and training of mujahideen. This trend continued after disintegration of the Soviet Union and students from religious seminaries particularly in Pakistani tribal areas and the frontier province kept adding to Taliban's strength. Osama bin Laden had donated a lot of funds for this purpose whereas Jalaluddin Haqqani and Fazl ur-Rehman Khalil's Harkat ul-Mujahideen took the responsibility to train the new recruits from Pakistan on short-term basis.²

When Taliban felt after US attack on Afghanistan that they could no more survive the US heavy air strikes, most of them concentrated on the Pakistani bordering areas in a hope to get refuge and base camps there to continue *jihād*. After noticing this danger Pakistan constructed 186 regular army posts along the Pak-Afghan border.³ At the same time Pakistani government was trying to convince the tribes on this side of the border not to provide refuge to Taliban and other mujahideen but the tribal people had once again defied state and conformed to ethnic and religious traditions.

The Pakistani government could not control the strengthening and expanding network of Taliban in FATA and NWFP in spite of its continuous efforts,

¹ M. Amir Rana, M. Bukhari, *Arabs in Afghan Jihad*, (Lahore: Nigarshat Publishers, 2007), p.15.

² M. Amir Rana, R. Gunaratna, *Al-Qaeda Fights Back: Inside Pakistani Tribal Areas*, 2nd Edition (Islamabad: PIPS, 2008), p.51.

³ M. Amir Rana, R. Gunaratna et.al., p.57.

sometimes through peace deals and at other times (or at the same time) through security operations. Haqqani Madrasa, base camp of Jalaluddin Haqqani, in Miranshah inside Pakistan was sealed in November 2001 just after the US attacks on Afghanistan but Haqqani network is still operational and has remained a prime target of the cross-border US Drone attacks for his continued manpower support to Afghan Taliban. The Taliban groups have multiplied in Pakistan over a span of 7 years. More than 40 Taliban groups from tribal areas and frontier province got united under leadership of Baitullah Mehsud in December 2007 with an agenda to liberate Afghanistan, target Pakistani security forces and pursue 'Talibanization.' Having close links with al-Qaeda, this group, named Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), has proved very brutal towards local tribesmen, political leaders and Pakistani forces. The TTP has even targeted the Taliban and other groups that did not join it and/or are against making attacks inside Pakistan and against Pakistani security forces. In response another major Taliban alliance, Muqami Tehreek-e-Taliban or Waziris Alliance, came into existence in June 2008. Comprising 14 Taliban groups, this group is being led by Maulvi Nazir and Commander Gul Bahadur.

Pakistani Taliban have consolidated their control over the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and are now extending their influence towards the settled districts of the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP). More than 60 Taliban groups are operating in FATA and North West Frontier Province.⁴ The TTP leader Baitullah Mehsud, whose leadership qualities were once questioned by the supreme Taliban leadership,⁵ has recently not only won the confidence of Mullah Omar, but also emerged as a unanimous leader of the majority of Taliban groups in Pakistan. His opponents — both outside and inside Taliban circles — fear his increasing influence and are too weak to oppose him. Even the political agents, Maliks and tribal elders in Pakistani tribal elders cannot afford to deny his authority in North and South Waziristan. The same situation is prevailing in other agencies of FATA, where Baitullah Mehsud's allies are enjoying the same powers.

At the same time Afghan Taliban have increased their attacks and expanded areas of their influence inside Afghanistan, particularly in south and east —

⁴ 40 Taliban groups were initially part of the TTP alliance, which has now expanded. As many as 14 Taliban groups are in Waziri Alliance. There are many other small Taliban groups in NWFP's settled districts including Karak, Lakki Marwat, Bannu, Kohat, Peshawar, Mardan Dera Ismail Khan, Nowshera, and Dir etc.

⁵ After the assassination of Taliban leader Nek Muhammad in 2004, Baitullah took charge as operational commander, but the Taliban supreme council replaced him with Abdullah Mehsud. For details, see *Al-Qaeda Fights Back: Inside Pakistani Tribal Areas*, by Muhammad Amir Rana, Rohan Gunaratna. Baitullah himself was recently killed in a drone attack, and was succeeded by a young deputy, Hakimullah Mehsud.

Pashtun dominated areas. Britain's top military commander, Brigadier Mark Carleton-Smith, sees any clear victory in Afghanistan as impossible. He says that the "Britons should prepare for a possible deal with the Taliban." US General, David Petraeus, also does not see an end to the war. He says, "One should be prepared for a long drawn out war against terrorism in Afghanistan."⁶ Indeed since 2006 Taliban have become much active on operational front in both the countries, Afghanistan and Pakistan. They are on offensive now.

II. TALIBAN'S SUPPORT BASE: PASHTUN RELIGIOUS AND ETHNIC ETHOS

People living along the Durand Line on the Pakistani side have always remained vulnerable to the effects of events in Afghanistan, as people on both sides of the line share the same ethnicity and religion.⁷ Pashtun tribes on both sides of the border mostly share a common religious sect, Sunni or *Hanafi* Islam.

Ethnically, Pashtuns constitute the majority of population of Afghanistan. They are Pashtu speaking people of southeastern Afghanistan and northwestern Pakistan. FATA's seven tribal agencies — Khyber, Kurram, Orakzai, Mohmand, Bajaur, and North and South Waziristan — are populated by just over 3 million tribesmen, adding to the twenty-eight million Pashtuns who live in Pakistan and the fifteen million in Afghanistan. The tribes on both sides of the border intermarry, trade, feud, and celebrate with one another. They all adhere to *Pashtunwali*, the tribal code of honor and behaviour.⁸

Several Pashtun tribes are known to have moved from Afghanistan to present Pakistan between the 13th and 16th century.⁹ Living on both sides [of the present Durand Line], they have kept their way of life and tribal system intact over the centuries in spite of the pressures from the empires of India or Central Asia.¹⁰ In Afghanistan and Pakistan where tribal law is still final in tribal life the political borders have assumed little significance for the people of the same tribes living on opposite sides of these borders.

The Afghan state recognizable today arose from the Pashtun tribes at a historical juncture when the Moghuls in India, the Safavids in Iran, and the Uzbek Kingdom in Central Asia were all in decline due to political turmoil

⁶ *Pajhwok*, Oct. 9, 2008.

⁷ Shinwari N. Ahmed, *Understanding Fata*, 2008, p.40.

⁸ Rashid Ahmed, *Descent into Chaos*, (London: Penguin Group, 2008), p.268.

⁹ J.M. Gohari, *The Taliban: Ascent to Power*, (Oxford University Press, 2001), p.118.

¹⁰ Azmat Hayat Khan, *The Durand Line — Its Geo-Strategic Importance*, (Area Study Center, University of Peshawar, 2005), p.23.

and civil war. At that time words Afghan and Pashtun were interchangeable, and the Pashtun were seen the only true Afghans. In 1747, all the [Ghilzai Pashtun] tribes held a nine-day Loya Jirga, or grand meeting, in Kandahar, ultimately choosing a general, Ahmed Shah Abdali, to become their king. Ahmed Shah, who changed his last name and that of his dynasty to Durrani, became the father of the nation. The Durrani moved the capital from Kandahar to Kabul in 1772 and conquered northern Afghanistan, incorporating other ethnic groups into Afghan nation. Disputes and rivalries between the Ghilzais and the Durrani, and between Pashtuns and non-Pashtuns were to continue for the next two centuries.¹¹

The present day cross-border support is not the first case where we see Pashtuns on Pakistani side of the border going to help their Pashtun brethren in Afghanistan. They shared the same religious and ethnic ethos against British and Central Asian empires. Then Nadir Khan was supported by Pashtun tribes across Durand Line in his fight against Habibullah Kalakani, Bachai Saqao in 1929. There is also historical evidence that Waziristan has got a special place in Pashtun community uniting and joining their 'Afghan brethren' in Afghanistan throughout the history.

It was again the same religious and ethnic ethos, which pushed the Pashtun on both sides of the border to fight side by side against Soviets in Afghanistan. Assuming that Marxism and secularism place Islamic traditional values and precepts in jeopardy, Pashtuns across the Pak-Afghan border took it to themselves to fight for the cause of Islam. Gaining its start from northern areas of Afghanistan, *jihad* against Soviets became a widespread movement soon. Afghanistan's Pashtun groups were vehemently supported by their Pashtun brethren in Pakistan.

The Taliban's initial success across border also rested mainly on these two basic ingredients of support: Pashtun ethnic and religious ethos. Being Pashtun they had convenience of language, Pashtun human force, *Hanafi* Islam, fundamentalist sympathizers, and well established financial and educational institutions already at hand.¹²

In addition to the popular perceptions of the Taliban as the religious movement driven by the zeal of Islamic fundamentalism, the ethnic undertones of the movement cannot be dismissed as irrelevant to the analysis of its social support base. For the ethnic minorities, the Taliban was both a symbol of Islamic conservatism as well as a reflection of Pashtun ethnic chauvinism that

¹¹ R. Ahmed et.al., p.7-8.

¹² Rais R. Bakhsh, *Recovering the Frontier State — War, Ethnicity, and State in Afghanistan*, (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2008), p.3, 45.

aimed at recapturing political power and reaching its dominance.¹³ This belief is amplified by the reports to the effect that in taking over Mazar-e-Sharif, the Taliban evidently showed a sectarian twist.¹⁴ Hazara and Shia community did not feel at home in Afghanistan during Taliban rule. Hundreds of thousands of people were internally displaced or fled the country to become refugees as a result of Taliban's ethnic policy. Thousands of people were reportedly held for periods of up to several months on account of their ethnicity. Among these were around 2,000 Tajik and Hazara men rounded up from their homes in Kabul and held in various jails, including Pul-e-Charkhi Prison in Kabul.¹⁵ Ethnic rivalries between Pashtun and non-Pashtun that had lain dormant during the war against Soviets now erupted after withdrawal of Soviets.¹⁶ And Taliban had become a new symbol of Pashtuns' ethnic and religious ethos.

III. CROSS-BORDER FRONTIERS OF TALIBAN

Post-Soviet Afghanistan was a worst example of destruction when it underwent a civil war for five years between 1992 and 1997. The Taliban emerged as a direct consequence of this civil war and anarchy where warlords were trying to establish their own fiefdoms across the country. Frustrated young men who had fought against the Soviets and then returned to madrassas in Pakistan to resume their religious studies or to their villages in Afghanistan gathered around their elders demanding action. Under the leadership of Mullah Omer they chalked out a minimum agenda: to restore peace, disarm the population, enforce *Shariah*, or Islamic law, and defend Islam in Afghanistan. Taliban soon consolidated their power into a successful military force, seizing Kandahar in the winter of 1994 and then rapidly spreading north and west, capturing Herat in 1995 and Kabul in 1996.¹⁷

This encouraged an influx of foreign Islamic militants from Arab and Central Asian Countries into Afghanistan, and Taliban's Pakistani fellows and supporters already knew no borders. The support of the religious groups was not totally confined to the *Deobandis* or major factions of the JUI and went beyond these narrow dividing lines. Most of the [Pakistani] religious groups and parties, usually those that had roots in the madrasa networks, extended full support to the Taliban, from their very rise to their control of Kabul and territories beyond the Hindokush mountains, when they confronted their

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Gohari et.al, p.103.

¹⁵ Ibid, p.106.

¹⁶ R. Ahmed et.al., p.12.

¹⁷ Ibid, p.13.

ethnic rivals in the north of the country. The support ranged from food stuffs to money and young fighters who were motivated to fight against the fellow Muslims belonging to ethnic minorities of Afghanistan believing they were fulfilling a religious responsibility of *jihad* or holy war against the "infidels." Thousands of Arabs, along with Chechens and Uzbeks, were also part of Taliban support base.¹⁸

Taliban's initially set agenda was glasnosted by their political and religious mentors. They were increasingly coming under the influence of global *jihadist* al-Qaeda, which had strong desire to keep Taliban isolated from world and dependent on it, and financial support was used by al-Qaeda as a tactic for this purpose. Between 1996 and 2001, al-Qaeda had trained an estimated 30,000 militants from around the world in Afghanistan.¹⁹

Many of the Taliban fighters had interpersonal and institutional links with some, if not all, Pakistani sectarian terrorists who had refuge in their country. They had a mutual support system and strategic ties that were forged during the anti-Soviet resistance movement and during their common training in some of the madrassas in Pakistan. A common religious ethos, socialization in the madrassas, an identical worldview, and similar approach to social and political issues in their respective societies helped forge the ties that have survived even after the ouster of the Taliban from power.²⁰

After consolidating their position in Afghanistan Taliban tried to impose their code of life according to their own interpretation of Islam. Taliban religious militia shut down more than 100 private schools on June 16, 1998. These schools were educating thousands of girls in defiance of the Taliban's ban on education of girls.²¹ Judicial floggings and amputations were carried out. Women were physically restricted to their homes under the Taliban edicts which continued to ban women from seeking employment, education and leaving home unaccompanied by a male relative. In July 1997 alone, hundreds of men traveling from Kabul to Kandahar had been punished in accordance with Islamic law for trimming or shaving their beards. The same tactics of Afghan Taliban for imposing "Islamic code of life" were to shift later to other side of border in Pakistani tribal areas and frontier province with the emergence of their fellow Pakistani Taliban.

And this did not take much time to happen. After fall of Taliban regime in Kabul, they had no other option than either to disperse to far-flung areas or move

¹⁸ Rais R. Bakhsh et.al., p.73.

¹⁹ R. Ahmed et.al., p.16.

²⁰ Rais R. Bakhsh et.al., p.72-73.

²¹ Gohari et.al., p.99.

to their support bases inside Pakistan. For two long years, from January 2002 until the spring of 2004, the Taliban, al-Qaeda and Central Asian militants continued pouring inside Pakistani tribal areas, mostly in South Waziristan. Meanwhile Pakistani intelligence agencies had come to believe that twin assassination attempts on Musharraf in 2003 had been planned from South Waziristan. In March 2004 Pakistan army launched security operation and according to official sources 46 soldiers lost their lives, while 63 militants were killed and another 166 captured.²² The Wazir militants emerged as heroes, and their leader Nek Mohammad became an icon. He had fought with the Taliban in Afghanistan and then made his mark by helping al-Qaeda leaders escape from Tora Bora. A few weeks later he provided an escort for Mullah Dadullah, who arrived from Quetta to reorganize the Taliban in South Waziristan. Pakistan signed an agreement with militants in April 2004 at Shakai pardoning their leaders and giving foreign militants a week to register them with the Political Agent.

It was after 2004 that Pakistan sent eighty thousand troops and Frontier Corps personnel — paramilitary force known as FC — into South Waziristan. The militants started to move to North Waziristan, a tribal agency inhabited by Mehsud tribes. The new young leaders like Abdullah Mehsud and Baitullah Mehsud had by then emerged who led various groups of Pakistani Taliban and became key allies of Afghan Taliban and al-Qaeda.

In South and North Waziristan, the Pakistani Taliban in an effort to re-establish the Taliban regime that existed in Afghanistan before the US attack used multiple tactics for managing local support and operational capabilities. The Pakistani Taliban progressively occupied one agency after another, moving from South and North Waziristan to Bajaur and Mohmand. Each army attack led them to find new territory to occupy and spread their ideology.

Another agreement with Taliban militants was made on September 5, 2006 in North Waziristan. Although agreed in the new deal by militants, Pakistan had no means to challenge or punish the Taliban if they continue their attacks across the border, which they did. The other prime target of the Taliban became the Pakistani security forces. FATA had until now become center of Taliban and militancy, providing training and human resource for the insurgency in Afghanistan and expanding Talibanization to the North West Frontier Province (NWFP).

IV. PAKISTANI TALIBAN: A REPLICAN OF AFGHAN TALIBAN

The Taliban rule in Afghanistan had strong appeal for their fellow madrassas students, militants and supporters on the Pakistani side of the border. Their

²²R. Ahmed et.al., p.271.

copycat effect in Pakistan had started just 2 years after Taliban held control of Kabul. Mullah Muhammad Rahim formed the first Tehreek-e-Taliban in Orakzai Agency in 1998 on the structure of Taliban in Afghanistan.²³ Instantly after its inception, the Tehreek put a ban on TV, VCR and music in the agency. On 13 December 1998 its *Shariah* court executed publicly a person Khayal Ghaffar, accused of a murder. The leaders of Tehreek-e-Taliban had been successful in taking the movement to 18 tribes in Orakzai Agency and some semi-tribal areas as well.²⁴

But until 2001 Taliban on both sides of border focused much on Afghanistan where they had their centre of "Islamic caliphate." The Afghan Taliban had strong support bases in Pakistani tribal areas, which provided them with human resource in their fight, first against non-Pashtun warlords and then the US. If one looks at the composition of the major Pakistani Taliban groups in FATA, it is clear that most of the Taliban leaders, including Nek Mohammad, Abdullah Mehsud, Baitullah Mehsud, Maulvi Faqir, Gul Bahadur, Mullah Nazir, among others, had been affiliated with the Afghan Taliban even before the September 11 attacks.

Situation started to change after 2001, when Kabul was no more Taliban's headquarters. Afghan Taliban remnants slipping into the Pakistani tribal areas had logistic support bases set up in the form of *madrassas*, training camps and Islamic charity missions. They were also able to count on sympathies from the local Pashtun populations. To maintain control in these areas, they exploited this sympathy wave and distributed large sums of money to establish their networks. When the Pakistani government deployed the military into the region to stop their infiltration, al-Qaeda and the Taliban supreme council encouraged the Pakistani Taliban, who had a long affiliation with them, to establish their militias.²⁵

Their local support base and inter-group nexus later helped Pakistani Taliban penetrate their movement into the masses and establish separate regional/local Taliban cells, thus reducing the organizational burden and creating strategic problems for the Pakistani military in launching operations where they are forced to target their "own" people. Secondly, they encouraged different tribes to form their own Taliban militias. Initially, the Pakistani Taliban groups were mostly from the Wazir sub-tribes and because of the Wazir's domination on militias, other tribes were reluctant to join the Taliban

²³ M. Amir Rana, *Gateway to Terrorism*, (London: New Millennium Publication, 2003), p.169.

²⁴ *Monthly Newslines*, Karachi, January 1999.

²⁵ Interview with Maulvi Nazir by Jamsheed Baghwan, *Daily Express*, Peshawar, May 13, 2007.

ranks.²⁶ But now we can see more than one Taliban groups even in one tribal agency.

Until 2004, the main focus of the Pakistani Taliban was on protecting foreign militants, recruitment for the war in Afghanistan, training, and securing their position against security operations. Baitullah Mehsud began enforcing Taliban-brand *Shariah* in South Waziristan in 2004. He punished criminals to make him popular among common tribesmen. When he first went into agreement with the government on February 22, 2005 he had received assurances that he would be allowed to enforce *Shariah* in the area in exchange for not sending his militants to Afghanistan.²⁷ Although he did not abide by the agreement, it helped the Pakistani Taliban move forward to establish their writ. Other Taliban fighters followed the footsteps of Mehsud and formulated a four-point strategy to gain control over an area. First, they took steps against the criminals and started collecting taxes through donations to speed up their operations. Secondly, they killed or forced out influential tribal elders, whom they knew could challenge their authority. Thirdly, they created a parallel judicial system as a dispute resolution mechanism dispensing quick and decisive justice.²⁸ Only in Bajaur Agency, one Taliban court had registered 1,400 cases until August 2008 and decided 1,000 out of them.²⁹ Fourthly, they organized their administration on a non-tribal basis; they appointed their trusted men,³⁰ who may not necessarily belong to local tribes.³¹

Pakistani Taliban's strategy to impose their 'ideology' and to build up parallel judicial and security systems eroded the traditional concept of collective responsibility, which adversely affected the political administration. Taliban weakened the contact between political agents, who are administrative heads of seven tribal agencies representing Governor NWFP, and tribal people by threatening and killing the Maliks. More than 600 Maliks have been killed

²⁶ For details see *Al-Qaeda Fights Back: Inside Pakistani Tribal Areas*, by Muhammad Amir Rana and Rohan Gunaratna, Chapter 4.

²⁷ *Dawn*, February 22, 2005.

²⁸ In August 2008, Baitullah Mehsud reorganized the Taliban judicial system and brought all the courts under one "supreme court" and appointed Mohammad Rais Mehsud as the Chief Justice. (*Dawn*, August 17, 2008.)

²⁹ Yusaf Ali and Javed Afridi, "People throng Shariat Court to get disputes resolved," *The News*, Peshawar, August 4, 2008.

³⁰ Khalid Aziz, *The News*, Islamabad, June 1, 2008.

³¹ Taliban have representations from all tribes of the area. They use tribal identity as pride and motivating the people but in administrative structure avoid giving it value as they consider it against teaching of Islam. The same was case in Afghanistan during Taliban rule where they preferred to appoint the religious clergy in administrative hierarchy.

until now, and many others have fled the tribal areas. Other actors, who could create any ideological or tactical challenge for Taliban, were treated harshly, especially non-governmental organisations, and formal and modern educational institutions. Today, these Taliban groups have imposed a ban on NGOs, have targeted CD shops and attacked schools, especially the female institutions.

All of these efforts allowed the Taliban to maintain influence in the tribal areas. Their major strategic win that made them the major player in the area, however, came after a tactical change in their operations, when they began kidnapping security and state officials. Although suicide attacks on security forces played a role in demoralising the security forces, the kidnapping strategy elevated the Taliban into a position to negotiate with the government on their own terms and to foster the release of arrested militants in exchange. Independent sources estimate that the Taliban kidnapped more than 1,000 security force personnel and state officials during 2007, and in return more than 500 militants were released. Kidnappings are a major factor behind the ongoing peace talks between the government and the Taliban.

Baitullah Mehsud-led Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) has also provided shelter to small groups. The TTP has imposed conditions on all affiliated groups to contribute 50% of their income (through 'taxes' and donations) to a major "jihad fund." The fund is used to sustain Taliban activities in the tribal areas and in Afghanistan.³² These small groups, which are mostly operating in Mohmand, Orakzai, Tank, Bannu and other settled areas, are getting involved in criminal activities, especially ransom and taxes on transport and trade to achieve their financial targets.

V. THREATS AND SECURITY IMPLICATIONS

Taliban in Pakistan and Afghanistan today pose the greatest threat, not only for the both countries but the whole region. Already struggling to get stability, security and peace, Afghanistan cannot afford to sink further into war, and for a long period. Pakistan too cannot afford volatile security situation to come out of its diversified crises. But at present these desires seem just fallacious, and ground realities are indicating something else. Neither the NATO and US forces have been able to dilute the threat of Taliban and nor the Afghan Army and Afghan Police have been capable enough to secure the law and order situation in their country. The social capacities in Afghanistan, nonetheless,

³²NWFP Governor Owais Ahmed Ghani claims that Baitullah is spending around Rs. 3 billion annually on procuring weapons, equipment, vehicles, treating wounded militants and keeping families of killed militants fed. (*Daily Times*, May 30, 2008)

are decaying on daily basis, making more space for Taliban militants. The situation in Pakistan has become even more disturbing where Taliban have been able to grow, expand and consolidate. They have successfully multiplied their human resources, strengthened their infrastructure, deterred the people and demoralised the Pakistani security forces across the tribal belt and frontier province.

Rising Taliban threat in both countries can be analyzed at three levels; strategic, operational and tactical. Be it Pakistan or Afghanistan, Taliban have been resolute enough to pursue their strategy of propaganda and ideological propagation. They have well-defined targets in both the countries in pursuance of imposition of their "Islamic code of life. And they are trying to widen their ideological sphere by convincing the people in the name of religion and ethnicity, offering temptations and deterring them from standing with 'enemy.' They are not willing to tolerate their self-perceived 'ideological enemies' which can be put into two broad categories: first, people following and supporting "un-Islamic practices," and secondly "infidels and friends of infidels." The former category includes a wide range of people and activities such as girls' education, women's movement and employment, music and video [shops], shaving [and shavers] of beards, mobile phone shops, net cafes, NGOs and other Western concerns etc. But these are not the only things. They themselves define what is un-Islamic and punish the "culprits" on the spot. Besides pamphlets, leaflets, letters and phone calls they have FM radios and other outlets to propagate their ideology and threaten the people. The latter category is also very specific and includes the US and West, and their allies, be it Pakistani and Afghan security forces or local/tribal people.³³

Taliban on both sides of border have remained very active on propaganda and ideological front throughout these past 3-4 years. Tens of thousands of tapes and DVDs produced by the Taliban media outlets *Omat* (Nation) Productions and *Manbaul-Jihad* (Source of Jihad) were sold for a few pennies in the bazaars of Pakistan and Afghanistan. Meanwhile, starting from 2007, 151 audio and videotapes have been released by Osama and other al-Qaeda leaders until now.³⁴ In just 2006 the Afghan Taliban killed 85 teachers and students and burned down 187 schools, while another 350 more schools were shut down in southern Afghanistan because of Taliban threats.³⁵ As many as

³³ Pro-government tribal elders and groups, government officials, foreigners, and even tribal people (termed as 'US spies') are some examples of such 'enemies.'

³⁴ Bergen Peter, Katherine Tiedemann, *The Washington Post*, February 15, 2009. The complete data is available at New America Foundation website: http://newamerica.net/publications/articles/2009/obamas_war_10845 (retrieved on February 16, 2009).

³⁵ R. Ahmed et.al., p.363.

111 girls schools, 2 boys schools and 6 schools of co-education were targeted by Taliban in NWFP in Pakistan during 2008 mostly in Swat, Kohat, Peshawar and Dir. About one dozen schools were also targeted in total in Mohmand, Bajaur, Orakzai and Khyber agencies in FATA. Taliban destroyed more than 100 music, barber and mobile shops in NWFP and FATA during 2008.³⁶

At the same time Taliban have become active operationally in Afghanistan and Pakistan, particularly since 2006. The counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan and the security operations in Pakistan have failed to deter them. Taliban's recruitment, training and deployment facilities remain intact in both the countries.

During 2002 and 2005, the Taliban consolidated them in four provinces in the southern Afghanistan. This was the time when Quetta link was not being monitored properly and the focus was more on Pakistani tribal areas. Over several days, starting on May 18, 2006, the Taliban launched attacks in four provinces, involving up to 1,000 fighters, storming towns just a twenty-five minute drive from Kandahar city. Dadullah, the overall Taliban commander in the south, claimed he had control of twenty districts in the south and 12,000 Taliban under arms.³⁷ They had by then started to establish a parallel government in south. The absence of justice, security and Pashtun affinity helped Taliban challenge the writ of state and get public support there.

Since 2006, to be particular, the suicide and conventional attacks by the Afghan Taliban have been rife and with extended targets including key political figures. The Afghan police remained a hot target for Taliban during 2007; some 900 policemen were killed.³⁸ Meanwhile US military deaths started to increase in and after 2005 and 468 such deaths were reported during these four years (2005-08) whereas US military deaths were 149 from 2002 to 2004.³⁹

There was also a huge increase in the Taliban's use of IEDs, which rose from 530 in 2005 to 1,297 in 2006, a strategy which took NATO totally by surprise.⁴⁰ In another report these IED attacks have been reported as 1931 and 2615 in 2006 and 2007 respectively.⁴¹

There is plenty of evidence to show that the Taliban has regrouped and reorganized as a viable guerilla force in Afghanistan. By 2006 potential suicide

³⁶ "Pakistan Security Report 2008" by Pak Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS), (Islamabad: PIPS, 2009).

³⁷ R. Ahmed et.al., p.359.

³⁸ Ibid, p.367

³⁹ P. Bergen, T. Katherine et.al.

⁴⁰ R. Ahmed, p.367.

⁴¹ P. Bergen, T. Katherine et.al.

bombers traveling from Europe and North Africa to join al-Qaeda operations in Iraq were increasingly being directed to Afghanistan. French intelligence monitored a new route for militants from North Africa that ended up in Peshawar.⁴² This is evident in the fact that from 2001 to 2005 there were only 23 suicide attacks reported in Afghanistan which increased manifold in and after 2006; there were 123 suicide attacks in 2006, 140 in 2007 and 84 in 2008 (see Chart 1).⁴³ In case of NWFP and FATA in Pakistan, suicide attacks increased in and after 2007. There were reported in total 42 and 48 suicide attacks inside these two regions during 2007 and 2008 respectively.⁴⁴




Chart 1: Suicide Attacks in Afghanistan

The Afghan Taliban brought the war into heart of Western policymaking process when a group of suicide attackers stormed into the Serena Hotel in Kabul on January 14, 2008, and killed six people, including a Norwegian journalist.

Such tactical successes emboldened the insurgency, and further cowered the population, who were in awe of the Taliban.⁴⁵ Taliban insurgency has indeed increased significantly in Afghanistan not only on southern but central and northern fronts also. This is increasing the human and material cost for the US and NATO forces.

Taliban have also been successful in creating and enhancing the security threat for the Afghan security forces and state institutions to be present and

⁴² R. Ahmed et.al., p.282.

⁴³ P. Bergen, T. Katherine et.al.

⁴⁴ The statistics are based on Pak Institute for Peace Studies' (PIPS) annual security reports for 2007 and 2008.

⁴⁵ R. Ahmed et.al., p.398.

work in Pashtun areas. The expanding Taliban offensive and fragility of Karzai government to provide peace to and win support of the people of Afghanistan is adding to security deterioration in Afghanistan, which, coupled with civilian casualties in counterinsurgency attacks, is expanding the risk matrix where Taliban can poise them very well strategically and tactically.

Casualties of the civilians have caught the United States and its coalition partners in Afghanistan in a dilemma. On the one hand, they want to win Afghan population's sympathies, and, on the other, they cannot help but bomb the militant insurgent forces and their hideouts. The bombings cause more and more civilian casualties leading to an increased hatred and feeling of vengeance among the general public. In fact there were in total 4,991 civilian fatalities reported from 2006 to 2008.⁴⁶ The way the US approaches the Afghan problem and the events taking place in the country show that the war may continue for much longer time than one would like to see.⁴⁷ According to a report by the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), "children in Afghanistan suffer more than in any other country in the world from violence, war and poverty, and sometimes become suicide bombers."⁴⁸

The overall casualty figures have also increased in recent past in both countries, being much more in Pakistan. In a comparison of casualties in Pakistan and Afghanistan during a period of six months, August 2008 to January 2009, it was observed that in total 5,408 people were killed and 5,383 injured in Pakistani tribal areas and NWFP whereas 2,529 people were killed and 1,193 injured in Afghanistan during the same period (see Chart 2).⁴⁹

Meanwhile Pakistani Taliban's militancy, which was confined to South and North Waziristan and Bajaur till 2006, has gradually spread to all seven tribal agencies of FATA, and NWFP's settled districts of Bannu, Kohat, Karak, Dera Ismail Khan, Dir, Lakki Marwat, Swat and Tank. As the year 2008 drew to a close, frequent Taliban attacks had spread to NWFP's capital Peshawar as well as to Charsadda, Shabqadar and Mardan.⁵⁰ In Swat, government's writ exists no more. And more dangerous is mushroom growth of Taliban groups

⁴⁶ P. Bergen, T. Katherine et.al.

⁴⁷ Adil Zareef, "The time for peace is now," *Dawn*, July 28, 2008.

⁴⁸ *The Frontier Post*, Peshawar, July 06, 2008.

⁴⁹ Statistics and information on Afghanistan are based on *Pajhwok* reports using the newspaper's archives available at www.pajhwok.com. Casualties in Pakistan's tribal areas and NWFP have been calculated by using the database and archives of the Pak Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS), Islamabad. The casualties include those of militants, civilians and the security forces' personnel in terrorist and counter-terrorist attacks/clashes.

⁵⁰ "Pakistan Security Report 2008" by Pak Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS), (Islamabad: PIPS, 2009).




Chart 2: Total Casualties (August 2008 to January 2009)

in settled districts of NWFP. Every group is mostly independent in operation, making it difficult for government to identify and target it. Kohat and Swat are vivid examples of this. At the same time Taliban are getting increasingly involved in sectarian clashes in Kurram, Hangu, and Dera Ismail Khan. Their old *jihadi* associates, Sipah-e-Sahaba and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, are part of their sectarian related violence.

Nonetheless, Pakistani Taliban has started to disrupt the NATO supply lines to Afghanistan going through Pakistan. Repeated attacks on parking terminals of companies transporting supplies to NATO forces in Afghanistan in the militancy-plagued suburbs of Peshawar, the provincial capital, and in the adjacent tribal belt in 2008 hinted at a change of tactics by the militants. Sporadic attacks on trucks and trawlers supplying fuel, food and equipments etc. to coalition forces in Afghanistan via the historic Khyber Pass in Khyber Agency had been occurring for many years, but the first two weeks of December 2008 witnessed organised attacks on the parking terminals in Peshawar in which scores of trawlers, other vehicles and supplies were torched.⁵¹ In the last three or four months of 2008, the TTP militants established their base near Jamrud and after an armed clash with the Amr Bil Maroof militants group ended the latter's practice of extorting money in exchange for protection from the contractor of the and Tribal Areas in 2008 supplies. The TTP militants are stated to be behind most of the attacks targeting NATO supplies now.⁵²

Pakistani Taliban groups are providing opportunities to foreign and other terrorist groups in FATA and NWFP to expand their influences, base areas

⁵¹ There were 19 such attacks just in December 2008. (P. Bergen, T. Katherine)

⁵² "Pakistan Security Report 2008" by Pak Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS), (Islamabad: PIPS, 2009).

and training facilities across northern Pakistan. Mehsud was in regular contact with al-Qaeda, which increasingly seemed to be giving strategic direction to the Pakistani Taliban movement.⁵³ Meanwhile the Central Asian, Arab and Chinese Islamic militants present in Pakistani tribal areas are a permanent security threat not only for Pakistan but also their own governments. A Pakistan-based militant group Jundullah, established on the pattern of Iranian Jundullah, has also maintained close links with al-Qaeda and Taliban. A prominent Jundullah member, Dr Arshad Waheed, was killed by US air strike in Wana on March 16, 2008.⁵⁴

The Chinese have time and again expressed their concern over presence of Chinese Muslim separatists in Pakistani tribal areas. Since the beginning of the war in Afghanistan in 2001, Chinese officials have at various times estimated that between 500 and 1,000 Uyghurs were fighting with the Taliban.⁵⁵ Three hundred Uyghur Muslims from China's western province of Xinjiang were captured in Afghanistan fighting with Taliban forces, and hundreds more Chinese Muslim separatists remained hidden in Afghanistan and Pakistan.⁵⁶

The East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM) and Tahir Yuldesheve's Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) have been associated with Afghan and Pakistani Taliban one way or the other since the Soviet-Afghan war. Although IMU was a Uzbekistan-based militant group but in Afghanistan, during Taliban regime, it was combined with Chechen, Tajik, Turkmen, Uyghurs and Burmese groups because of their similar face features and food habits. Taliban were very conscious about Central Asian groups because of their ethnic and cultural bonds with Taliban's opponent the Northern Alliance. To keep them loyal and monitor their activities, Taliban had put all these groups under one formation and restricted them not to use their group identities. After 9/11 when these groups infiltrated into Pakistani tribal areas, the same formation remained intact and they chose Tahir Yuldesheve as their head. Since October 2007, there has been a growing resentment against Uzbeks and other Central Asian militants, including Uyghurs, in the area of Mirali in North Waziristan Agency (NWA). It seems that the Central Asian militants (Uzbeks, Uyghurs, Tajik and Chechens) are trying to find new sanctuaries following their falling reputation with the North Waziristan tribes. The fact that they are attempting to move further north (Malakand, Bajaur, Mohmand and Dara Adamkhel), points

⁵³ R. Ahmed et.al., p.386.

⁵⁴ Pak Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS) database.

⁵⁵ Elisabeth Rosenthal, *New York Times*, January 22, 2002.

⁵⁶ Erik Eckholm, *New York Times*, May 28, 2002.

to the fact that they want to remain closer to the Central Asian and Xinjiang borders.⁵⁷

VI. CONCLUSION

It has been about 8 years since war against Taliban was launched in Afghanistan. The number and intensity of Taliban attacks, including suicide attacks, is increasing in both countries. The number of civilian casualties in Taliban attacks and 'war on terror' attacks is rife since 2006 on both sides of border. As counter-terrorism strategies evolve, Taliban are also changing their targets and tactics. A defensive war they started in 2001 has gradually transformed into brutal offenses. The Afghan Taliban still remains a security threat for Afghanistan with its *Shura* still alive. They have increased their areas of influence in Afghanistan. Taliban leaders including Mullah Omer are still active across Pak-Afghan border not only in FATA but also Balochistan in Pakistan.

The transnational influence of Taliban will go on expanding with expanded war in Pak-Afghan border areas. Taliban's growing strength and weakening writs of states on both sides of the border do not augur well for future of the region. The militancy, which has been bleeding Pakistan and Afghanistan for several years, has full potential to spread across the region.

⁵⁷ Author's interview with Muhammad Amir Rana, Director Pak Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS), Islamabad, January 2009.

Pragmatism within Dogma: The Hidden Strategy of Global *Jihad*

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The problem with the word terrorism is that most people think they know what it is but few can adequately define it.¹ The United Nations is yet to accept an official definition of terrorism. A 1988 study counted 109 definitions of terrorism that covered a total of 22 different definitional elements.² Terrorism expert Walter Laqueur also has counted over 100 definitions and concluded that the 'only general characteristic generally agreed upon is that terrorism involves violence and the threat of violence.'³ I do not believe that the definitional problem, which has hindered research on terrorism for many decades, can be resolved through my contribution. Nevertheless, strictly for the purpose of this analysis, I would like to describe terrorism as the deliberate creation of a sense of fear, by a non-state actor, usually by the use or threat of use of symbolic acts of physical violence, to influence the political behaviour of a given target group.⁴

Keeping the above definition of terrorism as a general reference, this article seeks to analyse the relation between the political ends and the military means of a particular brand of terrorism — the Global *Jihad* and then try to answer

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¹ Peter R. Neumann and M.L.R. Smith, *Strategic Terrorism: The Framework and its Fallacies*; The Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 28, No. 4, 571-595, August 2005. (<http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01402390500300923>, accessed on June 22, 2009)

² Record, Jeffrey; *Bounding the Global War on Terrorism*; Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College, December 2003. (www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB207.pdf, accessed on June 22, 2009).

³ Walter Laqueur, *The New Terrorism: Fanaticism and the Arms of Mass Destruction*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1999, p. 6.

⁴ Neumann and Smith et.al., (2005).

whether this can be termed as strategy. There are mainly two reasons for my prejudice towards this particular flavour of terrorism:

1. Global *Jihad* is relatively easier to define than terrorism in general.
2. Its unfortunate association with the second largest religion of the world, a religion of the majority of people in more than 40 countries, makes it all the more important to analyse the strategic paradigm of Global *Jihad*.

And of course, after the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, this is certainly the most talked about form of terrorism in the present world.

This essay approaches by defining the theoretical frameworks of strategy and Global *Jihad*. Then it analyses the goals of Global *Jihad* (whether it is religious or political or something else) and looks into the various acts of violence conducted in its name, with a view to finding any logical relation that might exist between these violent acts and the ultimate goal(s) of the movement. The discussions here will be restricted in trying to understand the actions of the top *jihadi* leaders and planners and not the acts of some indoctrinated islamists who blow themselves up, because, as in conventional military strategy — where we discuss the actions of Generals and political leaders; if the strategic aspects of Global *Jihad* are to be found, the only way is to look at it from the macro level.

I. WHAT IS STRATEGY?

The origin of the word strategy lies in the Greek word *strategos* which means 'art of the general'. Clausewitz defined strategy as 'the employment of battle to gain the object of the war.'⁵ Although, this definition of Clausewitz fits quite well into the warfare till the end of 19th century, it fails to incorporate the various choices of targets and military forces that a strategist had to take into account in the 20th century. In this regard, the definition by Liddell Hart was much more contemporary — 'the art of distributing and applying military means to fulfil ends of policy.'⁶ This definition of strategy is, however, a legacy of the Cold War. It is more useful in explaining Cold War concepts like containment, massive retaliation, mutual assured destruction etc. But when it comes to the post-Cold War scenario, with a prevalence of low-intensity conflicts in the form of terrorism, ethnic conflicts, civil wars etc, the definition by Liddell

⁵ Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*; Book II, Chapter I, translation by J.J. Graham (London, 1873). (www.clausewitz.com/CWZHOME/VomKriege2/ONWARTOC2.HTML, accessed on June 22, 2009)

⁶ B.H. Liddell Hart (1968), *Strategy: The Indirect Approach*; (London: Faber & Faber) pp.334.

Hart seems to have outlived its utility in the 21st century. For example the US strategy on low intensity conflicts (LIC) recognises that

... indirect, rather than direct, applications of US military power are the most appropriate and cost-effective ways to achieve national goals in a LIC environment. The principal US military instrument in LIC is security assistance in the form of training, equipment, services and combat support. When LIC threatens friends and allies, the aim of security assistance is to ensure that their military institutions can provide security for their citizens and government. ... The United States will also employ combat operations in exceptional circumstances when it cannot protect its national interests by other means.⁷

So what can be observed is that the acceptable definition of strategy changes with time or surroundings.

With regards to the contemporary warfare of the post-Cold War era, the best definition seems to have been provided by Dr. John Stone. According to him strategy is something which is created as the interface between the 'cause — effect' relationship of force capabilities and political goals, which involves the optimum use of force as a 'cause' in order to achieve the desired political 'effect' within the guidelines of broader political compulsions.⁸ A good strategist follows a top-down approach, i.e., while designing his strategy; he starts with the political objectives and then moves down, trying to link them with the force capabilities available. Political objective is the essence of strategy and for any approach to be considered as a strategy, it must be guided by politics. This essay would analyze the strategy of Global *Jihad* on the framework of this theory.

II. WHAT IS GLOBAL JIHAD?

Jihad is an Arabic word with the literal meaning of 'striving' or 'determined effort' or 'struggle.' To Muslims, the importance of *jihad* is rooted in the Quran's command to struggle in the path of God and in the example of Prophet Mohammed and his early Companions — these are fundamental of Muslim belief and practice.⁹ *Jihad* is a concept with multiple meanings and Islamic

⁷ For details see *Fundamentals of Low Intensity Conflict*, GlobalSecurity.org (www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/army/fm/100-20/10020ch1.htm#s_9, accessed on June 22, 2009).

⁸ Dr John Stone is a senior lecturer at the Department of War Studies, King's College London. The author had the opportunity of attending Dr John Stone's lectures on strategy while pursuing his Masters degree from the same department.

⁹ John L. Esposito (2002); *Unholy War: Terror in the name of Islam*; New York: Oxford University Press, p.27.

scholars and jurists have argued over the exact definition of *jihad* throughout Islamic history. It appears frequently in the *Quran* as the idiomatic expression '*al-jihad fi sabil Allah*' (striving in the way of God). Its meanings are highly contextual and can be broadly classified into two types — the lesser *jihad* (against injustice) and the greater *jihad* (directed against evil in oneself).¹⁰ It does not necessarily mean 'holy war' as is so often said. Indeed one can have the *jihad* of the heart, of the pen, of the tongue, of the sword and so on.¹¹

In the late 20th and 21st century, however, one particular usage of *jihad* has gained remarkable currency. It is used by resistance, liberation and terrorist groups alike to legitimate their cause and actions and also motivate their followers; in other words, it is used to justify violence in the name of Islam. Perhaps, the most radical contemporary definition of *jihad* has been given by Mohammed al-Massari, a British based Saudi Arabian dissident, when he wrote in 2002 'The only true definition of *jihad* is fighting for the sake of Allah ... True believers will never be deflected from this task. ... The highest *jihad* is having your blood spilled.'¹²

Global *Jihad* can be defined as an international Islamist movement which advocates use of violence to bring the *ummah* (global community of Muslim believers) under a single ideal Islamic state or the Caliphate¹³ and revive it to its historic apex of Islamic power. To revive the Caliphate is to remerge political and religious power under one authority following the overthrow of secular or religiously impure governments and the withdrawal of foreign, corrupting influences from the region. The Saudi born Islamist Osama Bin Laden can be regarded as the chief mentor and his organization al-Qaeda as the most important entity of this movement. Besides al-Qaeda, groups embracing Global *Jihad* ideology include: Jemaah Islamiya, Jamma'at al-Tawid wa'al *Jihad*, Al-Jihad, Al Tawhid, Abu Sayyaf Group, Moro Islamic Liberation Front, Armed Islamic Group, Salafist Group for Call and Combat, Salafia *Jihadia*, Asbat

¹⁰ Douglas E. Streusand, *What Does Jihad Mean?* The Middle East Quarterly, September 1997, Vol. IV, No. 3. (www.meforum.org/article/357 accessed on June 22, 2009)

¹¹ Jason Burke (2004); *Al-Qaeda: The True Story of Radical Islam*; I.B. Tauris, p.31.

¹² Lesi Korovavala; *Counter Terrorism and the Law*; Attorney General's Conference, Warwick Hotel, Coral Coast, 3-4 December, 2004. (<http://documents.ag.gov.fj/terrorism-korovavala.pdf> accessed on June 22, 2009).

¹³ A Caliphate is considered to be the ideal Islamic form of government representing the political unity and leadership of the Islamic world. Islam does not recognize difference of people based on language, ethnicity etc and this caliphate was the binding force which brought all the Muslims of the world under a single umbrella, right from the days of Prophet Mohammed till its abolishment in 1924 by the Turkish nationals.

al-Ansar, Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, Islamic Army of Aden, Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group, and the Tunisian Combatant Group.¹⁴

In the modern context of radical Islam, various extremist groups have termed their activities as *jihād*, e.g., the Afghan *mujahideen* waged *jihād* against the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, later the Taliban and the Northern Alliance undertook *jihād* against one another, Islamists in Kashmir, Bangladesh, Bosnia, Chechnya, Xinjiang, Pakistan, southern Philippines have all termed their various violent activities as *jihād*. But in terms of their objective, tactics or strategy, those were internal or irredentist in nature and were termed by the *jihadis* themselves as *jihād* against the Near Enemy. What differentiates the Global *Jihād* from its localized counterpart is its concept of the primary enemy — the Western nations in general and the United States in particular, sometimes referred to as the Far Enemy. And it is their unique world view that differentiates these Global *Jihadis* from others:

- They consider the various western backed governments in the Islamic world as anti-Islamic and identify *jihād* as the only way to remove such apostate regimes.
- There is a clash of civilization between the West, headed by USA and the Islamic world, where the former wants to corrupt the later by spreading its materialistic culture and thus, maintain its hegemony. According to *Jihād* strategist Abu Musab al-Suri, the Muslim world has been suffering a prolonged aggressive assault from the West in the form of Second and Third campaigns of Crusade.¹⁵
- Since Islam is under attack, violence by Muslims in its defence is the only solution. Peaceful coexistence with the West is a dangerous illusion.

Having said all these, one thing must be emphasized is that the boundary between global and local *jihād* is not very clearly defined and at various occasions they overlap with one another. In fact, Osama bin Laden's al-Qaeda is the lone truly global *jihadi* outfit. The various other groups which are allies of

¹⁴ Blake D. Ward; *Osama's Wake: The Second Generation of Al-Qaeda*; The Counterproliferation Papers, Future Warfare Series No. 32, USAF Counterproliferation Centre, August 2005. (<http://stinet.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA446171&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf> accessed on June 22, 2009)

¹⁵ Al-Suri is a global *jihād* strategist. He fought in Afghanistan and had close link with various *jihadi* outfits of Middle-East. According to him the second crusade began with Napoleon's occupation of Egypt in 1798 and ended with the collapse of Arab nationalism in the 1970s. The third crusade began in 1990s and continues till date. For details see Sarah E. Zabel; *The Military Strategy of Global Jihad*; Strategic Studies Institute of the US Army War College, October 2007. (www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB809.pdf accessed on June 22, 2009)

al-Qaeda in the global *jihad* movement have all got various local targets to accomplish. Such groups are part of the global *jihad* movement only in the sense that they believe the US to be the enemy of Islam and they want to overthrow their local rulers or governments in order to establish a true Islamic state based on Shariaa which they eventually want to bring under an Islamic Caliphate.

III. JIHAD IN 20TH CENTURY: BACKGROUND OF GLOBAL JIHAD

The intellectual rationale underpinning modern day *jihad* is based on a collection of violent Islamic thoughts called Qutbism. Qutbism is not a structured body of thought from any single person (despite its name), source, time or sect, rather it is a fusion of puritanical and intolerant Islamic orientations that include elements from both Sunni and Shia sects of Islam combined with broader Islamist goals and methodologies.¹⁶ Qutbism integrates the Islamist teachings of Abu Ala Maududi and Hassan al-Banna with the arguments of Sayyid Qutb to justify armed *jihad* in the advance of Islam and other violent methods employed by modern day Islamic fundamentalists. It is structured on a common foundation of puritan Islamist orientations such as Wahhabism and Salafism.¹⁷ These orientations share several traits and beliefs:

- Muslims must return to 'pure Islam' as practised during the time of the Prophet and the four 'rightly guided caliphs.'
- 'Pure Islam' can be attained only through the literal and strict interpretation of the *Quran* and the *Hadith*.
- Muslims should individually interpret the original sources without being dependent on the scholars. *Quran*, interpreted from a historical and contextual perspective is a corruption and the majority of Islamic history and classical jurisprudential tradition is a mere sophistry.¹⁸

Based on this foundation Maududi, al-Banna and Qutb built the intellectual framework for Qutbism and hence, the contemporary *jihad*.

Abu Ala Maududi was a 'contemporary Islamic revivalist thinker' and founder of the Jamaat-e-Islami political party in Pakistan. Maududi is credited with setting the tone for transnational *jihad* by linking *jihad* to the establish-

¹⁶ Dale C. Eikmeier, *Qutbism: An Ideology of Islamic-Fascism*, Parameters, Spring 2007, Vol. XXXVII, pp.85-97. (www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/07spring/eikmeier.pdf accessed on June 22, 2009)

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ El-Fadl, Khaled Abou, *Islam and the Theology of Power*, Middle East Report 221, Winter 2001. (www.merip.org/mer/mer221/221_abu_el_fadl.html accessed on June 22, 2009)

ment of God's reign on earth. He believed tolerance of non-Muslim rule and non-Islamic concepts and systems was an insult to God. Therefore, the only way Muslims might practice pure Islam and assume their rightful place in the world is through the establishment of Islamic states, where Islam rules independent of non-Islamic influences. These Islamic states would eventually spread Islam across the globe and establish God's reign.¹⁹ Maududi argued the only practical way to accomplish Islamic rule is through *jihad*. He wrote:

Islam is a revolutionary ideology which seeks to alter the social order of the entire world ... "Muslims" is the title of that "International Revolutionary Party" organized by Islam to carry out its revolutionary programme. "*Jihad*" refers to that revolutionary struggle ... which the Islamic Nation/Party brings into play in order to achieve this objective.²⁰

Jihad was thus the strategy, in fact the only strategy, which can guarantee the success of this revolutionary programme called Islam.

Hassan al-Banna (1905-1949), founder of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, believed that the Muslim world can revive its past glory and counter the Western domination through following a 'pure Islam.'²¹ And in Banna's brand of pure Islam, *jihad* against unbelievers was described as an obligation of all Muslims, because *jihad* was not just a tool to defend Muslim lands but it is a means to safeguard the mission of spreading Islam.²² Apart from the religious doctrines, al-Banna's greatest contribution to the Islamic fundamentalist movement was the creation of the Muslim Brotherhood itself, as for the first time an organizational approach towards mass radicalization of Muslims were undertaken. The Brotherhood was the first transnational fundamentalist Islamic organization which spread its ideology of puritan Islam in most parts of the Islamic world and eventually laid ground for the rise of various Islamic militant groups like Hamas, Islamic *Jihad*, Gamaat Islamiyah etc.²³ And it was from the foundation of Muslim Brotherhood that Sayyid Qutb was able to spread his revolutionary doctrine.

¹⁹ Eikmeier et.al., (2007).

²⁰ Sayyid Abul A'la Mawdudi, *Jihad in Islam*, originally written in 1936. Translated by Khurshid Ahmad (UKIM Dawah Centre, 1995). (www.ukim.org/dawah/jihad.pdf accessed on June 22, 2009)

²¹ Perspectives on World History and Current Events (PWHCE) profile of Hasan al-Banna. (www.pwhce.org/banna.html accessed on June 22, 2009)

²² Hasan Al-Banna, *Jihad*. (www.youngmuslims.ca/online_library/books/jihad/ accessed on June 22, 2009)

²³ Ziad Munson, *Islamic Mobilization: Social Movement Theory and the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood*, *The Sociological Quarterly* (2001), Vol. 42, No. 4, pp.487-510. (www.lehigh.edu/~zim2/p487.pdf accessed on June 22, 2009)

The Egyptian Sayyid Qutb (1906-1966) is considered as the chief ideologue of the Global *Jihad* movement and also its greatest martyr.²⁴ Unlike Maududi and al-Banna, Qutb was not an Islamic scholar and neither did he have any formal religious education. He began his career as a poet and literary critic, writing about social and political matters from a secular viewpoint.²⁵ He was in fact sent on an Egyptian government scholarship to the United States to study the American education system. It is in the USA where he developed contempt for the American culture and formulated his vision of bipolar conflict between Islam and the United States. On returning from the United States he joined the Muslim Brotherhood and became one of its leading spokesmen. Qutb is most famous for formulating the militant brand of Islam where indiscriminate use of force for the sake of the religion was interpreted as *jihad* and hence a religious duty. According to him the entire world was in a state of *jahiliyyah* (pre-Islamic ignorance) where men were being worshipped instead of God and men made laws were being implemented instead of God's laws.²⁶ As a solution he wrote that every true Muslim should wage offensive *jihad* 'to abolish all injustice from the earth, to bring people to the worship of God alone, and to bring them out of servitude to others into the servants of the Lord.'²⁷ His ideology was revolutionary in the sense that he was able to create a loop hole in the Quranic prohibition of killing any fellow Muslim. For this Qutb used an Islamic concept called *takfir* (excommunication of apostates). The obvious use of this concept was to declare secular rulers, officials or organizations, or any Muslims that opposed the Islamist agenda a *takfir*, thereby justifying assassinations and attacks against them. Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman, who was later convicted in the 1993 World Trade Centre attack, invoked Qutb's *takfirist* writings during his trial for the assassination of President Anwar Sadat.²⁸ In spite of all his revolutionary concepts, however, Qutb had a serious handicap — he was neither a formal Islamic scholar nor a specialist in Islamic jurisprudence (ulema) and to make his writings acceptable to the ordinary people he thus needed to establish his religious authority. He employed an ingenious yet populist method. Qutb argued that the traditional Islamic scholars

²⁴ Fawaz A. Gerges, (2005); *The Far Enemy: Why Jihad Went Global*; New York: Cambridge University Press, p.4.

²⁵ The Wahhabi Myth, *Who was Sayyid Qutb?* (www.thewahhabimyth.com/qutb.htm accessed on June 22, 2009)

²⁶ Qutb, Sayyid(a), *The Right to Judge*. (<http://islamworld.net/docs/justice.html> accessed on June 22, 2009)

²⁷ Qutb, Sayyid(b), *Milestone*; USA: SIME journal, 2005. (<http://majalla.org/books/2005/qutb-milestone.pdf> accessed on June 22, 2009) p.50.

²⁸ Eikmeier et.al., (2007).

had lost their religious relevance as they were themselves engulfed with *jahiliyyah*. Qutb's writings increasingly emphasized the importance of direct engagement by individual believers with the truth of the shaariah, bypassing the mediating influence of the established canon as transmitted by religious authorities — a mode of religious knowledge production which Qutb understood to have been tainted by centuries of un-Islamic innovation.²⁹

In summary, the ideology preached by Qutb allowed any Muslim to use force against anyone or anything he considered was coming in the path of the revolutionary march of Islam; even if the opponent is a Muslim, he can be declared an apostate and if required be killed and for that no religious sanction from any traditional Islamic scholar is required. No wonder most of the modern day *jihadists* 'cite Sayyid Qutb repeatedly and consider themselves his intellectual descendants'³⁰ because in the writings of Qutb they find religious justifications for all their acts of violence and terror and interestingly, alike Qutb none of the top *jihadi* leaders of the present day — bin Laden, al-Zawahiri, al-Zarqawi, al-Suri et.al. are religious scholars. Although the scholars of Al-Azhar University of Cairo declared Qutb a deviant after his death, this made him and his writings even more popular in the eyes of the people.

These writings and teachings of Maududi, al-Banna and above all Sayyid Qutb inspired a generation of Muslims and throughout the 1970s and 80s there was a wave of Islamic fundamentalist movements that swept through countries like Egypt, Sudan, Iran, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Malaysia et.al. The causes of this resurgence were different in different countries, but they had one thing in common — a loss of identity among the Muslims in those countries, which they believed was due to the blind following of the West.³¹ These movements were the strongest in the Arab world where radical Salafi preachers forwarded their message of purifying Islam from the Western contamination that caused corruption and stagnation in Arab countries. They blamed Arab states for the Palestinian fiasco, the 1967 defeat and the rise to power of Israel. These radical preachers pointed out the reluctance on the part of the Arab rulers to denounce the West for backing Israel and claimed that Arab regimes had departed from the will of God. No loyalty was due to states that had forged alliances with the backers of Israel. These radical messages were revolutionary and uncompro-

²⁹ Mandaville, Peter, *Global Political Islam*, Routledge Publications (New York, 2007), p.79.

³⁰ McCants, William, *Problems with the Arabic Name Game*, 2006, Combating Terrorism Centre at West Point, United States Military Academy. (www.teachingterror.net/Msgs/Problems%20with%20the%20Arabic%20Name%20Game.pdf accessed on June 22, 2009)

³¹ John L. Esposito (2002); *Unholy War: Terror in the name of Islam*; New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 82-83.

mising; whoever followed it came into direct confrontation with the state and its laws.³² Under these circumstances the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in 1979 and this was considered no less than a direct attack on Islam itself. Leading mainstream religious figures in Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Pakistan and elsewhere issued *fatwas* (religious edicts) calling on Muslims to join their Afghan coreligionists in resisting Soviet aggression.³³ Heeding to these calls tens of thousands of Muslims volunteers as well as fundamentalists from most of the Muslim countries travelled to Afghanistan to fight against the infidel invaders. These foreign fighters were collectively referred to as the Arab-Afghans. This Afghan *jihad* had an overall radicalizing impact on the Arab-Afghans by virtue of getting indoctrinated in puritan Islamic concepts of *Salafi-Wahhabism* and *takfir*.³⁴ And when the Soviets were finally forced to withdraw from Afghanistan, this was interpreted as a victory of Islam brought by the singular efforts of the *jihadis*.³⁵ The experience of this *jihad* brought together radicals from all over the world and its success made them believe on their capabilities, which eventually lead them into waging more radicalized efforts not just to defend Muslims against oppression, but to destroy western influence believed to be responsible for their sufferings. This was when the concept of an international Islamic resistance movement against the West in the form of global *jihad* was contemplated.

IV. LONG-TERM AND SHORT-TERM POLITICAL GOALS OF GLOBAL *JIHAD*

For the Global *Jihadis*, the political goal is paramount; the establishment of the Caliphate. According to Ayman al-Zawahiri, *jihadis* should not lose sight of this goal, as without securing the caliphate, their actions 'will mean nothing more than repeated disturbances.'³⁶

³² Napoleoni, Loretta, *Insurgent Iraq: Al Zarqawi and the New Generation*, Seven Stories Press (New York, 2005), p.20.

³³ Gerges (2005), p.81-82.

³⁴ The two leading individuals behind these camps, Abdullah Azzam and Rasoul Sayaf were both hardcore *Wahhabis*. Azzam was also highly influenced by the writings of Sayyid Qutb and hence, was himself a *takfiri*. The foreign volunteers listened to their speeches in these camps. They were also influenced by the various experienced Arab *jihadis* who also stayed in these same camps and most of whom like Azzam were followers of Qutb.

³⁵ Ayman Al-Zawahiri, *The Importance of Afghanistan for the Islamist Revolution*; January 2002; published in *Anti-American Terrorism and the Middle East: A Documentary Reader*; edited by Bary Rubin and Judith Colp Rubin, Oxford University Press, May 2004.

³⁶ The *Daily Telegraph*, August 1, 2005; Fanatics around the world dream if the Caliph's return; Anton La Guardia. (<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2005/08/01/wislam101.xml&page=3> accessed on June 22, 2009).

However, the failure of various localized *jihads* in the 1970s and 80s have made the *jihadis* modify their tactics and hence their immediate political target, to achieve their ultimate goal. This is because in the 21st century, the United States stands as a guarantor of world order in the form of rule of man. Most of the nations of the Islamic world, whom the *jihadis* claim to be corrupt and apostate, are supported by United States in one form or other. And it is this far enemy, which has to be dealt with first in order to win against the near enemy or the Muslim regimes.³⁷ So, when the World Islamic Front headed by Osama Bin Laden issued a *fatwa* to wage *Jihad against Jews and Crusaders*, it said:

The ruling to kill the Americans and their allies—civilians and military—is an individual duty for every Muslim who can do it in any country in which it is possible to do it ... in order for [the American] armies to move out of all the lands of Islam, defeated and unable to threaten any Muslim.³⁸

Obviously, this *fatwa* was issued not because the *jihadis* hated American way of life or democracy, but they felt this would help them to achieve their political goal. So making the USA and its allies incapable of interfering with the Islamic world is the short-term political objective of the Global *Jihad* movement. Once this 'far enemy' is neutralized, the *jihadis* believe that the near enemies can be very easily dealt with. By formulating such a subordinate political objective which is vulnerable to force, the Global *Jihadis* have displayed their political pragmatism, reemphasized the importance of politics to the entire movement and hence, provided some evidence of their strategic thinking.

V. FORCE CAPABILITIES OF *JIHADIS* AND HOW THOSE ARE USED

The operational level strategy for neutralizing the United States combines active and passive components. Active attacks use military strikes to directly target US interests at home and abroad in an attempt to influence US policy. In addition to the material damage caused, these attacks tear away the illusion of American invincibility.³⁹ The *jihadis* believe that the incursion of the Muslim world by US and its allies should be countered with an 'eternal armed struggle' in the form of various terrorist attacks on Western interests at home and abroad.

From the very beginning they have assumed that their organizations will be very fragmented. According to global *jihad* strategist Abu-Mus'ab al-Suri,

³⁷ Gerges et.al., (2005), p.1.

³⁸ World Islamic Front Statement; *Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders*; February 23, 1998. (www.fas.org/irp/world/para/docs/980223-fatwa.htm accessed on June 22, 2009).

³⁹ Zabel et.al., (2007).

in the post-Cold War context of enhanced international anti-terrorism cooperation and progressive elimination of terrorist sanctuaries and safe havens, *jihadi* warfare should be concentrated around other forms, namely the '*jihad* of individual terrorism' practiced by self-contained autonomous cells in combination with *jihadi* participation on 'Open Fronts' wherever such fronts are possible. In al-Suri's parlance, these 'Open Fronts' refers to conflict areas with an overt presence of *mujahideen*, permanent bases, open battle lines, or guerrilla war from those fixed positions. Given the difficulty of opening such fronts, al-Suri concludes that 'the *jihad* of individual terrorism' becomes, in reality, the only option for most *jihadis*.⁴⁰ The main idea is to make the Muslim world a bleeding wound to Western interests by attacking its business, tourism, political and military engagements through 'individual *jihad*.'

But what political goals can these attacks, which can at best be termed as symbolic acts of violence, achieve in reality. Because, militarily speaking, even the greatest acts of violence, like the attack on US embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam, the bombing of USS Cole or even the attacks of September 11, 2001, can not be considered as the first move towards making the USA defenceless and thus, these attacks seem not to fit in the Clausewitzian concept of making your enemy defenceless in order to win the war. This is where that the passive component of the Global *Jihad* strategy comes into play. Economic prosperity is the source of all US power and it is this strength that the *jihadis* want to exploit. They want to follow Clausewitzian concept of attacking the enemy's 'centre of gravity,'⁴¹ which in the case of America is its economy. Abu-Ubayd al-Qurashi, a *jihad* leader, wrote in 2002:

American economy is the American centre of gravity ... the Disunited States of America are a mixture of nationalities, ethnic groups, and races united only by the 'American dream,' or, to put it more correctly, worship of the dollar. ... Furthermore, the entire American war effort is based on pumping enormous wealth at all times, money being, as has been said, the sinew of war.⁴²

Thus the Global *Jihad* movement wants to wage an economic warfare against the United States by forcing it into what could be termed imperial overstretch, where the burdens of commanding the affairs of distant lands begins to weaken the government and the economy; in the words of Osama Bin

⁴⁰ Lia, Brynjar; *Al-Suri's Doctrines for Decentralized Jihadi Training - Part 1*; Terrorism Monitor, Vol. 5, Issue 1 (January 18, 2007). (www.jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2370236 accessed on June 22, 2009).

⁴¹ Clausewitz, **Book 6**, Chapter 27 (Online Version).

⁴² Scheuer, Michael (2004); *Imperial Hubris: Why the West is loosing the War on terror*; Brassey's Inc, p.101.

Laden — it is the strategy of ‘bleeding America to the point of bankruptcy.’⁴³ And the false pride of American invincibility and power will act as force multipliers. Another *jihad* strategist Abu Bakr Naji wrote:

When a state submits — whatever the extent of its ability — to the illusion of the deceptive power and behaves on this basis, that is when its downfall begins. It is just as the American author Paul Kennedy says: ‘If America expands the use of its military power and strategically extends more than necessary, this will lead to its downfall.’⁴⁴

In this regard, the 9/11 attack on New York and Washington can be considered as a highly strategic move by the *jihadis*.

First, they wanted to perform a spectacular attack, although mostly of symbolic nature, on the American mainland and destroy the illusion of American invincibility as well as create a sense of insecurity in the minds of American people. The targets were handpicked for their symbolic significances — the World Trade Centre as a symbol of US economic superiority, Pentagon for its military might and the Capitol or the White House as symbols of the American Republic itself (the United Airlines Flight 93 that crashed at Shanksville, Pennsylvania was originally planned to be crashed on the Capitol or the White House).⁴⁵ 9/11 thus served as a highly successful propaganda mission for the *jihadis*.

Secondly, they wanted to cause a large damage to the US economy. Although Osama Bin Laden claims that the economic losses of 9/11 goes over US\$1 trillion, various experts have calculated this figure to be something between 200-300 billion US dollars,⁴⁶ which is a very significant amount nonetheless. The long term impact on the economy in the form of job losses, increased expenditure on maintaining security etc was also very damaging.

Thirdly, the *jihadis* anticipated a military response from the US and that was exactly what they wanted the US to do — to drag the US into a war in Afghanistan. According to Bin Laden:

A campaign against Afghanistan will impose great long-term economic burdens, leading to ... economic collapse, which will force America ...

⁴³ CNN, November 1, 2004; *Bin Laden: Goal is to bankrupt U.S.* (www.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/meast/11/01/binladen.tape/ accessed on June 22, 2009).

⁴⁴ Abu Bakr Naji; *The Management of Savagery: The Most Critical Stage Through Which the Umma will Pass*; translated by William McCants, John M. Olins Institute of Strategic Studies, Harvard University, May 2006. www.wcfia.harvard.edu/olin/images/Management%20of%20Savagery%20-%202005-23-2006.pdf accessed on June 22, 2009), p.7.

⁴⁵ See *9/11 Commission Report*, Chapter 1 — ‘We Have Some Planes’ (http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/report/911Report_Ch1.htm accessed on 22nd June, 2009).

⁴⁶ Robert Looney; *Economic Costs to the United States Stemming from the 9/11 Attacks*; Strategic Insight, Vol. I, Issue 6 (August 2002). (www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/aug02/homeland.asp accessed on June 22, 2009).

to resort to the former Soviet Union's only option: withdrawal from Afghanistan, disintegration, and contraction.⁴⁷

Apart from the economic losses, this war would also expose US troops to a hostile territory where they would be sucked up in a war of attrition—something like Vietnam and which is going to be hugely unpopular with the American people and will eventually force the US government to change its policy towards the Muslim nations. At the same time, this US invasion of Afghanistan can be projected as an attack on Islam, as the Soviet invasion was projected two decades back and so the support for the Global *Jihad* would increase in the Muslim world. Al-Qaeda security chief Sayf al-Adel writes:

Our main objective ... was to deal a strike to the head of the snake at home to smash its arrogance. ... The second objective of this strike was the emergence of a new virtuous leadership for this world. ... Third, our ultimate objective of these painful strikes against the head of the serpent was to prompt it to come out of its hole. This would make it easier for us to deal consecutive blows to undermine it and tear it apart. It would foster our credibility in front of our nation and the beleaguered people of the world.⁴⁸

Since 2002, the various attacks carried out by the *jihadis* are characterized not by their location but by the identity of the victims killed; the victims were all citizens from 18 of the 20 countries that Bin Laden has cited as supporting the American invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq.⁴⁹ After the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the consequent chaos and instability that resulted there, the *jihadis* changed their strategy to suit the changing surroundings. In December 2003 the Norwegian Intelligence discovered a *Jihadi* strategic document titled *Jihadi Iraq: Hopes and Dangers*. The main thesis proposed in that document was that the USA can not be coerced to leave Iraq by military means alone, but the Islamist resistance can succeed if it makes the occupation of Iraq as costly as possible, in economic terms, for the United States.⁵⁰ This acceptance on the part of the *jihadis* reflects their pragmatism in very clear terms, as well as their strategic approach towards their political goal. The document recommends

⁴⁷ Alan Cullison; *Inside Al-Qaeda's Hard Drive*; Atlantic Monthly, September 2004. (www.theatlantic.com/doc/print/200409/cullison accessed on June 22, 2009).

⁴⁸ Zabel et.al., (2007).

⁴⁹ *The New York Times*, July 9, 2005; *Al-Qaeda's Smart Bombs*; Robert A. Pape. (www.nytimes.com/2005/07/09/opinion/09pape.html accessed on June 22, 2009).

⁵⁰ Brynjar Lia and Hegghammer (2004a), Thomas; *FFI Explains the Al-Qaeda Document*; Norwegian Defence Research Establishment, March 2004. (www.mil.no/felles/ffi/start/article.jhtml?articleID=71589 accessed on June 22, 2009)

limiting the number of American allies present in Iraq, because America must not be allowed to share the cost of occupation with a wide coalition of countries. If the *mujahideen* can force US allies to withdraw from Iraq then America will be left to cover the expenses on her own, which she cannot sustain for very long. The intermediary strategic goal is therefore to make one or two of the US allies leave the coalition, because this will cause others to follow suit and the dominos will start falling.⁵¹ This document then points out the weakest link amongst the US allies as Spain, because public opposition to the war in Spain was tremendous. The document further proposes:

It is necessary to make utmost use of the upcoming general election in Spain in March next year [2004] ... We think that the Spanish government could not tolerate more than two, maximum three, blows, after which it will have to withdraw as a result of popular pressure. If its troops still remain in Iraq after these blows, then the victory of the Socialist Party is almost secured, and the withdrawal of the Spanish forces will be on its electoral program.⁵²

The subsequent bombings of Madrid on 11 March 2004, the coming to power of the opposition Socialist Party in the election three days later and finally, the withdrawal of Spanish force from Iraq within the next two months does indeed signify the strategic genius of the *jihadi* planners.

After Spain, the next target of *jihadis* was UK. So we witnessed the 7 July, 2005 attacks on the London underground. And they hope that a few more of such attacks will also compel Britain to stop supporting US in its global war on terror and eventually the US would be left to fight alone, which the US can not sustain a prolonged period of time and so will be forced to withdraw their forces from Iraq and Afghanistan — where the coveted Islamic Caliphate could be recreated.

VI. CONCLUSION

There is a general idea in the West that 'Islamic Terrorism' is nihilist and irrational, and attempting to understand its logic would be futile.⁵³ For example, after the attacks of September 11, Bruce Cummings wrote:

The attacks on Sept. 11 ... had no rational military purpose ... and lacked the essential relationship between violent means and political ends that, as Clausewitz taught us, must govern any act of war. In its

⁵¹ Ibid.

⁵² International Herald Tribune, July 12, 2005; *Al Qaeda's Strategy*; Robert A. Pape. (www.iht.com/articles/2005/07/11/opinion/edpape.php?page=1 accessed on June 22, 2009).

⁵³ Smith and Neuman et.al., (2005).

utter recklessness and indifference to consequences ... Sept. 11 was an apolitical act.⁵⁴

What we have seen in this essay is that the attacks of September 11, 2001 in particular and Global *Jihad* in general are not apolitical acts to say the least. The problem here is not with the analysis, rather with the viewpoint. If the strategic aspects of this movement need to be analyzed, we need to fit ourselves in the shoes of the leaders of this movement and then try to analyze the whole thing. The godfather of Global *Jihad* Sayyid Qutb wrote in his book *Milestone*:

The Islamic *Jihad* has no relationship to modern warfare, either in its causes or in the way in which it is conducted. The causes of Islamic *Jihad* should be sought in the very nature of Islam and its role in the world.⁵⁵

So, to say the least, *jihad* was never supposed to be a conventional warfare and trying to analyze its strategy using conventional means-costs-ends conception would certainly end up in wrong conclusions. The greatest strength of the Global *Jihad* movement is its ideology, which describes itself as a conflict between two mutually exclusive universes of cognition. On the one hand we have the rationalist, logic-based, life-savouring post-enlightenment vision of the human condition which produces a materialistic, non-spiritualist worldview. The West and the USA at the core of it, could be described as the heartland of this belief system, although most parts of the planet appear to have embraced this particular framework for interpreting the world and the human locus in that world. On the other hand, we have (a particular set, or even sects) of believers who reject the rationalist, empiricist, logic-based explanation of the human experience and devoutly subscribe to the 'revealed' and 'sacred' belief system (some from the former camp would call it superstitions) which maintains the pre-eminence of the creator and the purpose of the 'transient' present as a test of piety and devotion of the fallible mortal so that post-mortem paradise (or hell, depending) can be attained. The two schools belong to mutually exclusive universes and that mutual exclusivity makes meaningful conversation almost impossible. There is no room for compromise and the engagement is therefore like a duel unto the death. It's a zero-sum game. This is especially true because while the former universe is built around a value of the individual (life, limb, property, freedom of thought and action, pursuit of happiness), the latter negates individual categories. Life on earth is not eternal and is a transitional stage — so, its loss means little to the *mujahideen*.

⁵⁴ Bruce Cummings; *Pearl Harbor a bad analogy for September 11 attacks*; December 12, 2007. (www.asahi.com/english/asianet/column/eng_011207.html accessed on June 22, 2009)

⁵⁵ Qutb(b) et.al., p.51.

Security arrangements built on the belief that nobody would like to give up their lives for their beliefs are just inadequate to meet the *jihadist* challenge because the *mujahid* does not value earthly life (his own or that of others). This is why the challenge is difficult to crack. Hence, even after seven years of the 'Global War on Terror' against Global *Jihad*, it is still functioning and in fact, its area of operation seems to have increased. The rhetoric employed by top *jihadi* leaders are intentionally designed to instigate hatred, religious fanaticism and calls for all out indiscriminate attacks on the West, because this is the only way through which they can prove their ideological commitment — which is so essential for generating new recruits, funds and above all to maintain their legitimacy in the eyes of their supporters. In the words of Abdullah Azzam, one of the founding fathers of Global *Jihad*, '*Jihad* and the Rifle alone: No negotiations, no conference, no dialogues'⁵⁶ This radical dogma inspires thousands of young men from all over the Muslim world and encourages them into committing all sorts of spectacular acts with no apparent rational justifications; but what gets obscured behind these acts is the fact that they are just foot soldiers of the global *jihad* — guided by what is a planned approach by the senior echelon of the movement to use their acts of violence to achieve maximum political mileage.

Strategy works by formulating subordinate objectives that are amenable to the use of force, the 'aim in war' being the objective of strategy and if benefits do not outweigh costs of fighting, then war can not be considered a rational instrument of politics,⁵⁷ and hence, strategy is considered to be nonexistent in such a case. This essay proves that the Global *Jihad* has formulated a subordinate political objective in the form of neutralizing American influence in the Islamic world. And force is being used to achieve this subordinate goal. The costs incurred in the form of casualties are not considered to outweigh the overall goal, which is paramount and non-negotiable, and thus, in the view of *jihad* leaders, their war is not an irrational instrument of politics. Every act of violence conducted in the name of Global *Jihad* has got a serious political consideration behind it. To say the least, they are not at all indiscriminate acts of violence. It is nothing but the optimum use of force available to achieve political targets; in other words, it is 'strategy' in its truest form.

⁵⁶ Brynjar Lia and Hegghammer (2004b); *Jihadi Strategic Studies: The Alleged Al-Qaida Policy Study Preceding the Madrid Bombings*; *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, 27:5, 355-375. (<http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10576100490483642> accessed on June 22, 2009)

⁵⁷ Lectures of Dr. Stone.

The Security Dimensions of Climate Change

*Obayedul Hoque Patwary**

I. INTRODUCTION

“Climate change is an all encompassing threat, directly affecting the environment, the economy, health and safety. Many communities face multiple stresses with serious social, political and security implications, both domestically and abroad. Millions of people are uprooted or permanently on the move as a result. Many more millions will follow.”¹

Climate change is increasingly recognised as a major human security issue that poses serious global threats. Extreme weather phenomena such as floods, droughts, heat waves and cyclones, experienced in different parts of our globe, are among the far reaching consequences of climate change, giving us a bitter foretaste of what worse may come in the near future.²

Indeed, climate change is particularly complex and it affects many aspects of international politics, economics, migration, human rights, development, trade, health and environmental systems and can act as a stressor making situations of instability, conflict and humanitarian crises more likely and severe. The interaction between these threats intensifies the challenges for international politics and could have a ‘chain reaction’ with unpredictable consequences.³ Against the backdrop of globalization, unabated climate change is likely to overstretch the capacities of a still insufficient global governance system. According to the GTZ study, ‘climate change can heighten existing social and

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¹ Kofi A. Annan in “Climate Change: The Anatomy of a Silent Crisis,” Human Impact Report of Global Humanitarian Forum, 2009, p.ii.

² Thanos Dokos et.al., “Climate Change: Addressing the Impact on Human Security” (Policy Paper, Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy and Hellenic Ministry of Foreign Affairs, November 2008), p.7.

³ Ibid, p.12.

political tensions or can lead to new ones. State institutions already overstretched will come under additional pressure, and will find it increasingly difficult to perform elementary state tasks. Combined with growing environmental stress, this will impact the adaptive capacity of societies adversely and will thus also limit their capacity to engage in peaceful conflict resolution.⁴

Dramatic environmental change undeniably places the infrastructure of all countries to the test. But it poses an ever greater threat to developing countries that lack the means, the know-how and the capacity to effectively deal with these phenomena. Conditions of pre-existing conflict, poverty, weak institutions, food insecurity and spreading diseases will leave such communities unable to meet the challenges of adapting to climate change impacts and will exacerbate existing problems.

Bangladesh is recognised worldwide as one of the countries most vulnerable to the impacts of global warming and climate change. This is due to its unique geographic location, dominance of floodplains, low elevation from the sea, high population density, high levels of poverty, and overwhelming dependence on nature, its resources and services. The country has a history of extreme climatic events claiming millions of lives and destroying past development gains. In a changing climate, the pattern of impacts are eroding our assets, investment and future. This stands for families, communities and the state. Global warming and climate change threaten settlements and the number of people displaced from their land due to riverbank erosion, permanent inundation and sea level rise is increasing rapidly every year. As a result, resource and effort of government and people are quickly drained addressing the impact of one event when another hazard strikes. Impacts of global warming and climate change thus have the potential to challenge our development efforts, human security and the future.⁵

II. UNDERSTANDING CLIMATE CHANGE

Climate change is conceived as any long-term change in the patterns of average weather conditions of a specific region or the earth as a whole. It reflects abnormal variations to the earth's climate and subsequent effects on other parts of the earth, such as ice caps over durations ranging from decades to millions of years. However, according to IPCC climate change refers to a change in the state of the climate that can be identified by changes in the mean and/or the

⁴ GTZ, *Climate Change and Security Challenges for German Development Cooperation*, Eschborn, April 2008, p.7.

⁵ *Climate Change and Bangladesh*, Report of the Department of Environment, Government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh, September 2007, p.1.

variability of its properties, and that persists for an extended period, typically decades or longer. It refers to any change in climate over time, whether due to natural variability or as a result of human activity.⁶ This definition differs from the definition of the United Nations Framework Convention on climate Change (UNFCCC) where climate change refers to a change of climate that is attributed directly or indirectly to human activity that alters the composition of the global atmosphere and that is in addition to natural climate variability observed over comparable time periods.⁷

III. DEFINING SECURITY

The concept of security can be interpreted in different ways. In classical terms, security means the integrity of territorially organised sovereign nation states within the system of international law. According to Morgenthau, 'national security must be defined as integrity of the national territory and its institutions' (Morgenthau, 1960). Thus framed, security is the preservation of nation state integrity in the face of external threats in an anarchic world of states; the task of guaranteeing security is seen as being ultimately a military one. In this context, a more comprehensive definition of security was proposed by Arnold Wolfers. According to him, "Security, in an objective sense, measures the absence of threats to acquired values, in a subjective sense, the absence of fear that such values will be attacked" (Arnold Wolfers, 1962). With the end of the Cold War, it came to be universally recognised that insecurity, instability and violence are brought about not by military aggression alone, but may have complex political, economic, socio-cultural and ecological origins. This led to calls for a re-assessment of security and corresponding policy adjustments. This has clearly been reflected in the Human Development Report of 1993 which stated that the concept of security must change from an exclusive stress on national security to a much greater stress on people's security, from security through armaments to security through human development, from territorial security to food, employment and environmental security (Human Development Report 1993).

IV. THE SECURITY DIMENSIONS OF CLIMATE CHANGE

"We sink or swim together. Climate change can be a threat to peace and stability. There is no part of the globe that can be immune to the security threat."⁸

⁶ www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/syr/ar4-syr.pdf (accessed on 25th August, 2009).

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Rajendra k. Pauchauri in "Climate Change: The Anatomy of a Silent Crisis," Human Impact Report of Global Humanitarian Forum, 2009, p.62.

Climate change is seriously affecting hundreds of millions of people today and in the next twenty years those affected will likely more than double-making it the greatest emerging humanitarian challenge of our time. Events like weather-related disasters, desertification and rising sea levels, exacerbated by climate change, affect individuals and communities around the world. They bring hunger, disease, poverty, and lost livelihoods-reducing economic growth and posing a threat to social and, even, political stability.

Indeed, climate change reduces access to fresh and safe drinking water, negatively affects health and poses a real threat to food security in many countries in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. In some areas where employment and crop choices are limited, decreasing crop yields have led to famines. Desertification and other forms of land degradation have led to migration. Gradual environmental degradation due to climate change has also affected long-term water quality and quantity in some parts of the world, and triggered increases in hunger, insect-borne diseases such as malaria, other health problems such as diarrhea and respiratory illness. It is a contributing factor to poverty, and forces people from their homes, sometimes permanently. Likewise, health outcomes and food insecurity lead to displacement and poverty which might result in competition for scarce resources and strains on mostly already limited government capacity to deal with deteriorating conditions and might ultimately lead to conflict.⁹ The following section assesses such threats of climate change on the various aspects of human security.

Threat to Food Security

“Global environmental change-especially climate change-is capable of changing environmental conditions to the extent that particular countries or global regions face the threat of a significant reduction in agricultural production.”¹⁰

Reduced or constrained agricultural productivity is often mentioned as potentially the most worrisome consequence of climate change which reduces food security-especially in the poorest part of the world where hunger is already an issue. Increased temperatures, decreased rainfall, water shortage and drought reduce yield and livestock health. Desertification eats away the amount of arable land and the quality of soil. In the world oceans, climate change and coral reef destruction reduce fish stock. Such impacts are particularly severe in developing regions such as South Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa and the dry

⁹ www.eird.org/publications/humanimpactreport.pdf (accessed on 11th August, 2009).

¹⁰ IPCC, 2007b cited in German Advisory Council on Global Change, op.cit., p.93.

land belt that stretches across the Sahara and the Middle East.¹¹ However, the impact of climate change on food security can be better conceived from the Figure 1:




Figure 1: Possible Effects of Environmental Change on Agricultural Productivity¹²

As a result, more than 850 million people worldwide are currently under-nourished.¹³ This situation is likely to worsen in future as a result of climate change, as food insecurity in the lower latitude, i.e., in many developing countries, will increase with a temperature rise of just 2°C. This trend will be substantially reinforced by desertification, soil salinization or water scarcity.¹⁴ In South Asia and North Africa, for example, the areas suitable for agriculture are already largely exploited. This may well trigger regional food crisis and further

¹¹ [www.icrisat.cgiar.org/Journal/Special Project/Sp 14.pdf](http://www.icrisat.cgiar.org/Journal/Special%20Project/Sp%2014.pdf) (accessed on 10th August, 2009).

¹² Thomas F. Homer-Dixon, "Environment, Scarcity, and Violence" (Princeton University Press, Princeton and Oxford, 1999), p.82.

¹³ German Advisory Council on Global Change, op.cit., p.2.

¹⁴ Ibid.

undermine the economic performance of weak and unstable states, thereby encouraging or exacerbating destabilisation, the collapse of social systems and violent conflicts. This is obvious from the Figure 2.




Figure 2: Conflict Constellation: Climate-Induced Decline in Food Production: Key Factors and Interactions¹⁵

Water Crisis

“Climate change makes water scarce and unfit for human consumption today and exacerbates unsustainable water use by farming sector in many water scarce regions”¹⁶

¹⁵ Ibid, p.93.

¹⁶ www.eird.org/publications/humanimpactreport.pdf (accessed on 11th August, 2009).

As the climate warms, it changes the nature of global rainfall, evaporation, snow, stream flow and other factors that affect water supply and quality.¹⁷ Chronic shortages of freshwater are likely to threaten food production, reduce sanitation, hinder economic development and damage ecosystems. Because of this, water scarcity and reduced quality pose problems that threaten the very survival of those affected. For example, changes in water quantity and quality directly affect food availability. Too little water decreases food security because it limits the water available for farming which can cause crops to wilt and therefore increased vulnerability of poor rural farmers¹⁸

Climate change exacerbates water quality and availability in regions that are already struggling hardest with water scarcity: Africa, South West Asia, the Middle East and the Mediterranean. In other regions, such as South Asia, climate change increases the variability of water supply, leading to floods during some parts of the year and droughts in others. These problems add to the vulnerability of populations in these regions whose existence is already precarious.¹⁹

Climate induced degradation of freshwater resources can also lead to social destabilization and violence. 1.1 thousand million people are currently without access to safe drinking water.²⁰ This situation could worsen for hundreds of millions of people as climate change alters the variability of precipitation and the quantity of available water. At the same time demand for water is increasing due to the world's growing population and its mounting aspiration. This dynamics triggers distributional conflicts and poses major challenges to water management systems in the countries concerned. However, countries which will suffer the greatest water stress are generally those which already lack the political and institutional framework necessary for the adaptation of water and crisis management systems. This could overstretch the existing conflict resolution mechanisms ultimately leading to destabilisation and violence.²¹ This can be illustrated as of Figure 3.

Increasing Poverty

Climate change compounds existing poverty by destroying livelihoods. Specifically, rising temperatures, changing rainfall patterns, floods, droughts

¹⁷ www.isse.ucar.edu/water_climate/impacts.html (accessed on 13th August, 2009).

¹⁸ www.eird.org/publications/humanimpactreport.pdf (accessed on 11th August, 2009).

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ German Advisory Council on Global Change, op.cit., p.2.

²¹ Ibid.




Figure 3: Conflict Constellation "Climate-Induced Degradation of Freshwater Resources": Key Factors and Interactions²²

and other weather-related disasters destroy crops and weaken or kill livestock. Climate change drives poverty through a vicious circle of reduced crop yield and resulting lower income, which leaves fewer resources for the following year's planting season. About 60 percent of developing nations' workforce, about 1.5 billion people, are employed in agriculture, livestock, fisheries and tourism.²³ Indeed, most of the farmers live on bare minimum production and losing a small amount of their yield pushes them even further into poverty.

More than ten million people have fallen into poverty today because of climate change. The majority of the people suffering from the impacts of climate change are already extremely poor. Currently about 2.6 billion people — two thirds of them women — live in poverty (below \$2 a day) with almost 1 billion

²² Ibid, p.83.

²³ www.eird.org/publications/humanimpactreport.pdf (accessed on 11th August, 2009).

living in extreme poverty (less than \$1 a day). About 12 million additional people are pushed into poverty because of climate change.²⁴

However, the increases in poverty can also destabilise the society. It has been appeared from a study that scarcity-induced loss of livelihood in agricultural societies increases the pool of potential rebel recruits, resulting in a higher conflict risk. Climate related phenomenon, such as more frequent droughts, increased soil degradation, and higher temperatures, may decrease the expected returns of farming compared to joining criminal and insurgent groups.²⁵

Risk to Human Health

“Climate change threatens to slow, halt or reverses progress towards reducing the spread of diseases and aggravates already enormous health problems, especially in the poorest parts of the world.”²⁶

Current weather conditions heavily impact the health of poor people in developing nations, and climate change has a multiplying effect. A changing climate further affects the essential ingredients of maintaining good health: clean air and water, sufficient food and adequate shelter. A warmer and more variable climate leads to higher levels of some air pollutants and increases transmission of diseases through unclean water and contaminated food.²⁷

It compromises agricultural production in some of the least developed countries, and it increases the hazards of weather-related disasters. Therefore global warming, together with the changes in food and water supplies it causes, can indirectly spurs increases in such diseases as malnutrition, diarrhoea, cardiovascular and respiratory diseases, and water borne and insect-transmitted diseases. This is especially worrisome because a massive number of people are already impacted by these diseases — for example upwards of 250 million malaria cases are recorded each year and over 900 million people are hungry today.²⁸

Every year the health of 235 million people is likely to be seriously affected by gradual environmental degradation due to climate change.²⁹ This assumes

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ Mehlum et.al., 2004, cited in Nils Petter Gleditch et.al., “Implication of Climate Change for Armed Conflict” (The Social development Department, The World Bank Group, Feb. 2008).

²⁶ www.eird.org/publications/humanimpactreport.pdf (accessed on 11th August, 2009).

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ www.eird.org/publications/humanimpactreport.pdf (accessed on 11th August, 2009).

²⁹ www.eird.org/publications/humanimpactreport.pdf (accessed on 11th August, 2009).




Figure 4: Impact of Climate Change on Human Health³⁰

Table 1 National Health Impact Assessment of Climate Change³¹

Country	Key Findings
Australia	Increase in heatwave-related deaths; drowning from floods; diarrhoeal disease in indigenous communities; potential change in the geographical range of dengue and malaria; likely increase in environmental refugees from Pacific islands.
Bolivia	Intensification of malaria and leishmaniasis transmission. Indigenous populations may be most affected by increases in infectious diseases.
Bhutan	Loss of life from frequent flash floods; glacier lake outburst floods; landslides; hunger and malnutrition; spread of vector-borne diseases into higher elevations; loss of water resources; risk of water-borne diseases.
Canada	Increase in heatwave-related deaths; increase in air pollution-related diseases; spread of vector- and rodent-borne diseases; increased problems with contamination of both domestic and imported shellfish; increase in allergic disorders; impacts on particular populations in northern Canada.
Finland	Small increase in heat-related mortality; changes in phenological phases and increased risk of allergic disorders; small reduction in winter mortality.
Germany	Observed excess deaths from heatwaves; changing ranges in tickborne encephalitis; impacts on health care.

(Contd.)

³⁰ www.searo.who.int/LinkFiles/Regional_Health_Forum_Volume (accessed on 16th August, 2009) 12_No_1_Climate_change_and_its_impact

³¹ www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/syr/ar4-syr.pdf (accessed on 14th August, 2009).

(Table 1 continued)

Country	Key Findings
India	Increase in communicable diseases. Malaria projected to move to higher latitudes and altitudes in India.
Japan	Increased risk of heat-related emergency visits, Japanese cedar pollen disease patients, food poisoning; and sleep disturbance.
The Netherlands	Increase in heat-related mortality, air pollutants; risk of Lyme disease, food poisoning and allergic disorders.
New Zealand	Increases in enteric infections (food poisoning); changes in some allergic conditions; injuries from more intense floods and storms; a small increase in heat-related deaths.
Panama	Increase of vector-borne and other infectious diseases; health problems due to high ozone levels in urban areas; increase in malnutrition.
Portugal	Increase in heat-related deaths and malaria, food and water-borne diseases, West Nile fever, Lyme disease and Mediterranean spotted fever; a reduction in leishmaniasis risk in some areas.
Spain	Increase in heat-related mortality and air pollutants; potential change of ranges of vector- and rodent-borne diseases.
Tajikistan	Increase in heat-related deaths
Switzerland	Increase of heat-related mortality; changes in zoonoses; increase in cases of tick-borne encephalitis.
United Kingdom	Health impacts of increased flood events; increased risk of heatwave-related mortality; and increased ozone-related exposure

that climate change affects malnutrition, diarrhoea and malaria incidences. Furthermore, within the next year over 300,000 people are expected to die from health problems directly attributable to climate change.³² Malnutrition is the biggest burden in terms of deaths. Climate change is projected to cause over 150,000 deaths annually and almost 45 million people are estimated to be malnourished because of climate change, especially due to reduced food supply and decreased income from agriculture, livestock and fisheries.³³ Climate change-related diarrhoea incidences are projected to amount to over 180 million cases annually, resulting in almost 95,000 fatalities, particularly due to sanitation issues linked to water quality and quantity. Climate change-triggered malaria outbreaks are estimated to affect over 10 million people and kill approximately 55,000.³⁴

³² Ibid.

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ Ibid.

Threat to Development

“The drops in growth and prosperity are likely to be very substantial if climate change continues unabated and causes greatly intensified climate impacts.”³⁵

Climate change slows-and in the worst cases reverses-progress made in fighting poverty and diseases and threatens the long terms sustainability of development progress. However, changes in the climate will amplify the existing challenges posed by tropical geography, a heavy dependence on agriculture, rapid population growth, poverty and a limited capacity to cope with an uncertain climate. Climate change thus can lead to the destruction and devaluation of economic capital as well as the loss of skilled and productive workers through environmentally induced migration and an increase in climate-induced diseases and malnutrition. Furthermore, economic resources which would normally be channeled directly into the production process instead have to be spent on adaptation measures, e.g. preparing for extreme events, or on reconstruction or the delivery of additional health services. Climate change also presents significant challenges to the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). The following figure lists some of the most important areas where climate change may work against reaching these goals.

Table 2 The Impact of Climate Change on MDGs³⁶

MDGs	Threat to MDGs
Goal 1: Eradicate extreme hunger and poverty	<p>More frequent and intense weather-related disasters threaten livelihoods, regional food security is undermined and vulnerability of poor people increases.</p> <p>Water scarcity further aggravates the problem as vast amount of fresh water is required to halt hunger.</p> <p>Without the effects of climate change, about 10 million fewer people would live in poverty today.</p> <p>The number of malnourished is expected to increase due to climate change.</p>
Goal 2: Achieve universal primary education	<p>Loss of livelihoods means more children will be engaged in income earning activities and the displacement and migration of families will make education a low priority.</p> <p>Infrastructure, such as schools are destroyed. For example, in 1998, Hurricane Mitch destroyed one-quarter of all of Honduras' schools.</p>

(Contd.)

³⁵ German Advisory Council on Global Change, op.cit., p.170.

³⁶ www.eird.org/publications/humanimpactreport.pdf (accessed on 11th August, 2009).

(Table 2 continued)

MDGs	Threat to MDGs
Goal 3: Promote gender equality	Women make up two-thirds of world's poor and are more adversely affected by disasters. Additional burdens are placed on women's health as additional work and chores increase stress levels.
Goals 4, 5, and 6: Reduce child mortality, improve maternal health and combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases	Women and children are particularly vulnerable to extreme weather events. For example, 90 percent of victims in the cyclone in Bangladesh in 1991 were women and children. Children and pregnant women are particularly susceptible to vector and water-borne diseases, malnutrition and diarrhoea, all of which are expected to grow due to climate change. About 90 percent of the deaths occur in children under 5.
Goal 7: Ensure environmental sustainability	Climate change causes fundamental alterations in ecosystems, such as losses of coral reefs, for example Climate change has reduced biodiversity. IPCC estimates that 20-30 percent of global species are likely to be at risk of extinction this century. Climate change changes the quality and quantity of natural resources. For example, 20 million people in six countries in West and Central Africa rely on Lake Chad for water, but the lake has shrunk by 95 percent in the last 38 years.
Goal 8: Develop a global partnership for development	Investment in adaptation and mitigation is crucial and requires close cooperation and coordination. The lack of adequate investment for adaptation acts as a significant drag on humanitarian assistance and development.

Increasing Natural Disasters

Another consequence of climate change that has the potential to affect human security relates to natural disasters. Global warming is predicted to increase the frequency and intensity of tropical storms, flash floods, landslides, and wild fires, and substantially alter precipitation patterns in many parts of the world. The 2005 hurricane Katrina demonstrates that climate-related disasters can, and occasionally do, have direct security implications even in developed societies.³⁷

Natural disasters can be categorised as either geological or hydro-meteorological. Almost all of the temporal increase in disaster frequency is accounted for by the hydro-meteorological (or climatic) category. Hence, floods constitute the most prevalent disaster type. More than one-third of the world's landmass and 82% of the world's population live in flood prone

³⁷ Nils Peter Gleditch, et.al., op.cit., p.10.

areas. In 2006, floods accounted for 55% of all registered disasters. Drought is the second most frequent type, threatening about 70% of the world's population.³⁸ Changing precipitation patterns and more extreme weather imply that hydro-meteorological disasters are expected to become more frequent in the future.




Figure 5: Frequency and Severity of Hydro-Meteorological (climatic) Disasters Since 1946³⁹

Migration

“Large numbers of people are already on move, with millions more expected to follow as evidence of climate change mounts”⁴⁰

Changes in local and regional climatic conditions in the form of sea level rise, heat stress, desertification, flooding and drought may severely restrict livelihood options for large groups in developing countries. On the one hand, these changes may directly challenge basic subsistence of already disadvantaged communities in the region, thereby further increasing their vulnerability across social, economic and institutional settings. On the other hand, increasing local vulnerability could potentially trigger large-scale displacement and migration from one region to other in search of new avenues for employment and/or settlement.

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰ www.c40tokyo.jp/en/pdf/session5/di_mallick.pdf (accessed on 17th August, 2009).

The International Organization for migration (IOM) defines climate change migrants as persons or groups of persons who, for compelling reasons of sudden or progressive changes in the environment as a result of climate change adversely affect their lives or living conditions, are obliged to leave their habitual homes, or choose to do so, either temporally or permanently, and who move either within their country or abroad.

However, the climate-induced migration has the potentiality to trigger different kinds of conflict at various levels. Ashok Swain has argued that such migration can generate three kinds of conflict:

- a. State versus state conflict
- b. State versus group conflict
- c. Group versus group conflict




Figure 6: Environmental Destruction, Population Migration and Types of Conflict⁴¹

State versus State Conflict

The reduced production in the agricultural and industrial sectors in the environmentally affected regions might force local small and marginal farmers and labourers to flee their homeland in large numbers in search of other areas for survival. The massive deforestation and loss of fishing habitats can also potentially lead to large scale migration. Furthermore, the predicted sea level rise will worsen the situation undoubtedly. These migrations can transgress inter-state boundaries, culminating in creation of massive cross-border migration.

However, the large-scale trans-border environmental migration has several conflict inducing dimensions between the receiver and sender states. The trans-border environmental migrants pose structural threat to the host country by increasing demands on its scarce resources. Competition with local population over resources leads to conflict with migrants and bring political problem for

⁴¹ Ashok Swain, "The Environmental Trap: The Ganges River Diversion, Bangladeshi Migration and Conflicts in India" (Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University, Sweden, 1996), p.20.

the government of the receiving state. The host country also feels threatened, when the environmental migrants try to enter into the domestic political process and exert pressure on the government. Due to these factors, the receiving state might work for stopping the migration at its border and/or repatriating them from its territory back to the country of origin, which can potentially lead to conflict with the sender state. Moreover, when the environmental migrants due to various reasons indulge themselves in the anti-government activities of the country of their origin, relations between sender and host countries can usually get strained. Sender states might regard the host states with suspicion for giving support to the migrants in their subversive activities, creating negative implication for the regional security.

State versus Group Conflict

The failure of the ecosystem, which supports the rural economy might actuate the villagers to eventually migrate to the nearby urban areas. Such influx of migration into urban areas not only creates various social problems but also brings environmentally affected people in close physical proximity with each other. The local community life might help them to organise against the state authority whom they perceive as the culprit of their misery. In this way, the organized and motivated environmentally displaced people in the cities may bring the struggle to the door step of the state administration. Such situation intensifies the intensity of the conflict in the society and poses threat to the running of a democratically elected regime.

The power and effectiveness of the urban based environmentally displaced people can be judged from the significant role of the environmental migrants in the urban areas in overthrowing the Emperor, Haile Selassie of Ethiopia in 1974. In neighbouring Sudan, drought in countryside resulted in major migration to urban areas and the cities exploded in riots and organised violence, which led to the downfall of President Nimeri in 1985.⁴²

Group versus Group Conflict

Wherever environmental migrants settle, they flood the labour market, add to local demand for food and other basic necessities of life, which put new burdens on the society. The influx of migrants is likely to deplete local food supplies and to drive up food prices. Moreover, migrants can hurt hosts who depend on labouring for all or part of their livelihoods, by reducing their opportunities for work and by driving down wages. The resulting scarcity of

⁴² Ibid, p.24.

the new situation might help to generate strong feeling of nativism among the original inhabitants of the area. Such feeling can help to organize themselves as a group to protect their interests on the notion that they as a people exist only within their own country, while others have other homes to which they can return and that itself can breed native-migrants conflict in the society.

Possible Increase in the Number of Weak and Fragile States

“Climate change triggers and amplifies international security and widening instabilities by overstressing the capacities of states.”⁴³

The impacts of climate change, such as the threat of food crisis, water scarcity, extreme weather events and ensuing migration, will expose many of the weak states to additional pressure to adapt. Weak and fragile states have inadequate capacities to guarantee the core functions of the state, notably the state’s monopoly over the use of force, and therefore already pose a major challenge to the international community. Moreover, the impacts of unabated climate change would hit these countries especially hard, further limiting and eventually overstressing their problem solving capacities.

Undermining the Conditions of Human Rights

Climate change affects the situation of human rights adversely. Food security and access to drinking water could be challenged by the impacts of climate change in affected countries and regions, destruction caused by rising sea levels and extreme weather conditions could put people’s livelihoods at risk, and all this could trigger strong environmentally induced migration. Unabated climate change could threaten natural life support systems, erode human security and thus contribute to the violation of human rights.

V. CLIMATE CHANGE AND SECURITY: THE CASE OF BANGLADESH

Bangladesh is frequently cited as one of the most vulnerable countries to climate change because of its disadvantageous geographic location; flat and low-lying topography; high population density; high levels of poverty; reliance of many livelihoods on climate sensitive sectors, particularly agriculture and fisheries; and inefficient institutional aspects. Many of the anticipated adverse effects of climate change, such as sea level rise, higher temperatures, enhanced monsoon precipitation, and an increase in cyclone intensity, will aggravate the existing stresses that already impede development in Bangladesh, particularly by reducing

⁴³ German Advisory Council on Global Change, op.cit., p.170.

water and food security and damaging essential infrastructure. These impacts could be extremely detrimental to the economy, the environment, national development, and the people of Bangladesh.

According to the Fourth Assessment Report of IPCC (2007) following changes have been observed in climate trends, variability and extreme events in Bangladesh:

- In Bangladesh, average temperature has registered an increasing trend of about 1°C in May and 0.5°C in November during the 14 year period from 1985 to 1998.
- The annual mean rainfall exhibits increasing trends in Bangladesh. Decadal rain anomalies are above long term averages since 1960s.
- Serious and recurring floods have taken place during 2002, 2003, and 2004. Cyclones originating from the Bay of Bengal have been noted to decrease since 1970 but the intensity has increased.
- Frequency of monsoon depressions and cyclones formation in Bay of Bengal has increased.
- Water shortages has been attributed to rapid urbanisation and industrialisation, population growth and inefficient water use, which are aggravated by changing climate and its adverse impacts on demand, supply and water quality.
- Salt water from the Bay of Bengal is reported to have penetrated 100 km or more inland along tributary channels during the dry season.
- The precipitation decline and droughts has resulted in the drying up of wetlands and severe degradation of ecosystems.

However, UNDP has identified Bangladesh as the most vulnerable country in the world to tropical cyclones and the sixth most vulnerable country to floods. This is obvious from the Table 3:

Table 3 Bangladesh-One of the Most Climatic Vulnerable Countries⁴⁴

Most vulnerable countries to floods or cyclones (Deaths/100,000 people exposed to floods or cyclones)

Sl#	Floods	Sl#	Tropical cyclones
1.	Venezuela 4.9	1.	Bangladesh 32.1
2.	Afghanistan 4.3	2.	India 20.2
3.	Pakistan 2.2	3.	Philippines 8.3
4.	China 1.4	4.	Honduras 7.3
5.	India 1.2	5.	Vietnam 5.5
6.	Bangladesh 1.1	6.	China 2.8

⁴⁴ www.undp.org/bcpr (accessed on 17th August, 2009).

The human suffering and cost to development is massive to this country and its people. Between 1991 and 2000, 93 major disasters were recorded in Bangladesh, resulting in nearly 200,000 deaths and causing US\$ 5.9 billion in damages with high losses in agriculture and infrastructure.⁴⁵ Indeed, the impacts of climate change have added significant stress to our physical and environmental resources, our human ability, and economic activities which ultimately threaten the condition of human security. The impact of climate change on the national security of Bangladesh has clearly been manifested through a report of the *New York Times*, published on August 8, 2009:

An exercise last December at the National Defense University, an educational institute that is overseen by the military, explored the potential impact of a destructive flood in Bangladesh that sent hundreds of thousands of refugees streaming into neighboring India, touching off religious conflict, the spread of contagious diseases and vast damage to infrastructure. "It gets real complicated real quickly," said Amanda J. Dory, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy.⁴⁶

Natural Disasters

Bangladesh experiences frequent natural disasters, which cause loss of life, damage to infrastructure and economic assets, and adversely impacts on lives and livelihoods, especially of poor people. Among the various forms of natural disasters, flood is the most frequent one. Indeed, most part of the country lies in the delta of three of the largest rivers in the world — the Brahmaputra, the Ganges and the Meghna. The topography of the country is mostly low and flat. Two-thirds of the country is less than 5 metres above sea level and is susceptible to river and rainwater flooding and, in lower lying coastal areas, to tidal flooding during storms.⁴⁷ In an average year, approximately one quarter of the country is inundated. However, once in every four to five years, there is a severe flood that may cover over 60% of the country and cause loss of life and substantial damage to infrastructure, housing, agriculture and production.⁴⁸

In addition to flood tropical cyclone is also very common to the people of the country. On an average, in every three years, a severe tropical cyclone hits Bangladesh.

These storms generally form in the months just before and after the monsoon and intensify as they move north over the warm water of the Bay of Bengal.

⁴⁵ www.climatechange-cell-bd.org/publications/13ccbd.pdf (accessed on 17th August, 2009).

⁴⁶ *The New York Times*, August 8, 2009.

⁴⁷ www.moef.gov.bd/moef.pdf (accessed on 17th August, 2009).

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*

Table 4 Serious Floods in the Last 25 Years⁴⁹

Event	Impact
1984 flood	Inundated over 50,000 sq.km. estimated damage US\$378 million
1987 flood	Inundated over 50,000 sq.km. estimated damage US\$ 1 billion, 2,055 deaths
1988 flood	Inundated 61% of the country estimated damage US\$ 1.2 billion, more than 45 million homeless, between 2,000-6,500 deaths
1998 flood	Inundated nearly 100,000 sq.km., rendered 30 million people homeless, damaged 500,000 homes, heavy loss to infrastructure, estimated damage US\$ 2.8 billion, 1,100 deaths
2004 flood	Inundation 38%, damage US\$ 6.6 billion, affected nearly 3.8 million people, 700 deaths
2007 flood	Inundated 32,000 sq.km. over 85,000 houses destroyed and almost 1 million damaged, approximately 1.2 million acres of crops destroyed or partially damaged, estimated damage over US\$ 1 billion, 649 deaths

Table 5 Some Devastating Tropical Cyclones Since 1960⁵⁰

Year	Storm surge Height(m)	Wind speed Km/hr	Casualty (people)
1960	5.35	211	10000
1961	7.45	160	11468
1963	4.7	203	11520
1965	6.85	160	19279
1970	7.6	224	500000
1985	3.95	184	11069
1988	3.5	160	5704
1991	6.75	225	150000

They are accompanied by high winds of over 150 kph and can result in storm surges up to seven metres high, resulting in extensive damage to houses and high loss of life to humans and livestock in coastal communities.

Another form of disaster which adversely affects the livelihood pattern of some parts of the country is drought. Droughts in Bangladesh are seasonal and can devastate crops, causing hardship to poor agricultural labourers and others who can not find work. In these areas, *monga* (unemployment leading to seasonal hunger) is often a problem, especially in the months leading up to the November-December rice harvest. If the crop totally fails because of draught, the situation for poor people can become critical. Drought most commonly

⁴⁹ Government of Bangladesh, "National Adaptation Program of Action," Ministry of Environment and Forest, 2005.

⁵⁰ www.iiasa.ac.at/Resesarch/RAV/Presentations/orchid_detailed_research_report_2007.pdf (accessed on 17th August, 2009).

affects the north-western region, which generally has lower rainfall than the rest of the country.

Loss of Agricultural Productivity: A Threat to Food Security

With over 35% of Bangladeshis suffering from malnourishment, the threat of increased hunger from reduction in agricultural production suggests the inclusion of agriculture as one of the major vulnerabilities facing the country. There are some causes for concern about agriculture in Bangladesh. Over the course of the 21st century and beyond, sea level rise will threaten hundreds of thousands if not more than a million hectares of agricultural land. It is estimated that in eastern Bangladesh alone 14,000 tons of grain production would be lost to sea level rise in 2030 and 252,000 tons would be lost by 2075. Threatening the richest and most productive region of the country, sea level rise could have dramatic consequences for the Bangladeshi economy. A recent study estimates that a GDP decrease in the range of 28% to 57% could result from a 1m sea level rise.⁵¹ Increased flooding from glacial melt, more intense monsoons, or more intense cyclones could also adversely affect agriculture in the near term by periodically inundating much agricultural land.

Shortage of Safe Drinking Water

The availability of freshwater will be reduced by increased salinity intrusion into fresh water sources during the low flow conditions. In the coastal regions this is brought about by sea level rise resulting in saline water intrusion in the estuaries and into the groundwater. The effects are exacerbated by greater evaporation of freshwater as temperatures increase, coupled with a greater demand for fresh water in times of water stress.

Sea Level Rise

Bangladesh, one of the world's poorest nations is also the country most vulnerable to sea level rise. Being a low lying deltaic country, Bangladesh will face the serious consequences of sea level rise including permanent inundation of huge land masses along the coast line. Over the last 100 years Bangladesh has warmed up by about 0.5^o and 0.5 m rise of sea level in the Bay of Bengal (BUP 1993). In the South western Khulna region 5.18 mm/year sea level rise is recorded which may reach to 85 cm by 2050. World Bank's study on the impact of Sea level rise in Bangladesh reveals that, 100 cm sea level rise within next 100 years will inundate 15 to 17 percent of country's land area i.e., 22135

⁵¹ www.oecd.org/dataoecd/46/55/21055658.pdf (accessed on 18th August, 2009).

to 26562 square kilometers, which will make 20 million people environmental refugee and a country like Bangladesh might not be able to accommodate such huge uprooted people. Again, 2 degree temperature and 45 cm sea level rise would increase 29 percent risks of flooding of country's low laying areas and may cause permanent inundation of 145 km long coastline.⁵²

It has been estimated that land permanently lost to the sea may amount to 3% and 6% of Bangladesh by the 2030s and 2050s respectively. While if sea level rise reaches the 1 metre mark by 2100 over 10% of Bangladesh lies below this height. For this reason, Bangladesh has been ranked as the 3rd most vulnerable in the world to sea level rise in terms of the number of people and in the top ten in terms of percentage of population living in the low elevation coastal zone. Therefore the threat of the communities being forced away due to the effects of climate change is one of the most severe on earth. Currently almost 40 million live in the coastal areas of Bangladesh but depending on the rate of population growth, by 2080 when the situation begins to get more serious it could be between 51-97 million in this vulnerable area. In year 2050 assuming a sea level rise of 27 cm, around 26 million people will be at a low risk and almost 7 million will be at medium risk of flooding, of which 58% of these people will be from Khulna, Jhalokati, Barisal and Bagerhat districts. In year 2080 assuming a sea level rise of 62 cm, 17 million, 12 million and 14 million people are expected to be at low, medium and high risk respectively, of being permanently flooded by the sea.⁵³

Indeed, Sea level rise could potentially force around 33 million of their land by 2050 and up to 43 million of their land by 2080 (Mohal and Hossain, 2007) and this is only taking into account the direct effect of sea level flooding. If salinity, river gradient reduction, drainage congestion, erosion and other indirect effects of sea level rise are taken into account the almost the entire 51-97 million expected to be living in the coastal zone by 2080, may have to eventually leave their homes.⁵⁴

However, sea level rise will affect food and agricultural production by increasing the intensity of salinity intrusion in the dry season and the depth of flooding in the wet season from tidal fluctuation. Salinity intrusion will decrease agricultural production by degrading soils and reducing availability of fresh water. Furthermore, sea level rise may increase the risk of health

⁵² Md Shamsuddohea et.al., "Climate Change Impact and Disaster Vulnerabilities in the Coastal Areas of Bangladesh" (Coast Trust and Equity and Justice working Group, November 2007).

⁵³ www.churchofscotland.org.uk/councils/worldmission/downloads/climate_change_and_Bangladesh.pdf (accessed on 18th August, 2009).

⁵⁴ Ibid.

hazards by spreading communicable diseases (such as diarrhea) due to lack of pure drinking water. In this way sea level can become a threat to food and other securities that are determining factors for good living conditions.

Table 6 Impacts of the Rise of Sea Level on the Basic Needs of the People of Bangladesh⁵⁵

Basic Needs	Impacts
Food	Rise in sea level would flood agricultural lowlands and deltas in parts of Bangladesh leading to decrease in food production. Only salinity intrusion due to sea level rise will reduce 0.2 million metric tons of rice production
Clothing	Sea level rise will increase poverty. This may affect the buying capacity of necessary clothing particularly of the people from the low-income groups
Housing	In Bangladesh, 29846 sq. km. area of land will be lost and 14.8 million people will be landless by sea level rise (IPCC, 2001a), even with losses of their dwellings.
Health	Extension of the rise of sea level in the coastal areas brings increased salinity. Hence, it also increases the risk of cholera. It will accelerate flood intensity facilitating transmission of diarrheal diseases.
Education	Sea level rise will cause destruction of infrastructures including educational institutes. It may also lead to frequent human migration. This situation is more likely to cause dropout at primary, secondary and tertiary levels.

Territorial Loss

Territorial loss due to river erosion and sea level rise is an acute national problem and one of the major natural hazards. Although erosion does not cause loss of lives, but it cause huge economic loss; makes people asset and rootless. The World Disaster Report 2001 published by IFRCs, reveals that in Bangladesh annually 1 million people displaced and 9 thousand hectares of land inundated by river erosion.

Since long years, erosion has been becoming a regular natural phenomenon along the belts of out reach coastal islands like Bhola, Sandwip, Hatia, Kubdia, which has been turned to massive in the recent years. The major causes of erosion are observed as —

- The Ganges Brahmaputra Meghna (GBM) river system carries immense volume of water silt. During the monsoon, GBM system carries about 1.7 billion tons of silts per year causing severe turbulence the rivers. This results in gradual undercutting of riverbanks leading to erosion.

⁵⁵ A.K. Gain and M.A. Bari, "Effect of Environmental Degradation on National Security of Bangladesh" in *Asia Pacific Journal on Environment and Development*, Vol.14, No.2, December 2007.

- During high tide 30868 cubic metres sea water flows upward through the cannels of Kutubdia, Sandwip and Hatia. Again these channels carry down the upstream fresh waters from 38,896 cubic metres coastal and midland areas of Bangladesh. The immense pressure of the downwards flows, strong tidal circulation etc. results unprecedented erosion of coastal habitats.⁵⁶

By river bank erosion Hatiya has reduced from 1000 sq. km to only 21 sq km over 350 years and Swandip has lost 180 sq km in the last 100 years. Such erosion adversely affect on the ecosystem, navigation, planned agriculture development and drainage system. It has also affect on inland navigational route as of shifting and migration of channels.⁵⁷

During July to September 2004, a research work on river bank erosion has been conducted in Bhola district, which reveals the followings:

- 3332 families lost their houses for river erosion
- Among the homeless families 48.23% families took shelter beside the embankment, 39.89% took shelter on the river bank and, only 3.48% families had their own land to shift their houses
- 21 schools were affected, 7 were abolished completely and 14 were under constant risk of being eroded. There is no available resources like land, construction materials etc to rebuild the school elsewhere in the community.⁵⁸

During last 40 years, Bhola Island has been squeezed to 3400 km from 6400 km in 1960. This mean, Bhola suffered net loss of 3000 km. A huge number of households and commercially important places in Bhola island like Daulatkhan, Mirzakalu, Molongchara, Sarajgonj, Chowmohoni, Tazumiari have completed been eroded within couple of decades. If this pace of erosion continues, it has been apprehending that *Bhola* may disappear completely over next 40 years.⁵⁹

Kutubdia, an outreach island situated in the south-eastern part of the Bay of the Bengal, has been eroding fast due to strong tidal action, as well as by cyclonic action and storm surges. This island, once which was 250 square kilometre in size, lost around its 65 percent during last 100 years⁶⁰

⁵⁶ Shamsuddoha et al, op.cit, p.21-22.

⁵⁷ Ibid, p.22.

⁵⁸ Ibid, p.22-23.

⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁰ Ibid.

Salinity Intrusion

The coastal areas of Bangladesh have already been facing salinity problem which is expected to be exacerbated by climate change and sea level rise, as sea level rise is causing unusual height of tidal water. In dry season, when the flows of upstream water reduce drastically, the saline water goes up to 240 kilometers inside the country. Presently around 31 upazillas of Jessore, Satkhira, Khulna, Narail, Bagerhat and Gopalganj districts are facing severe salinity problem. Agricultural activities as well as cropping intensities in those upazillas have been changing; now farmers can't grow multiple crops in a year.⁶¹

Indeed, the anticipated sea level rise would produce salinity impacts in three fronts: surface water, groundwater and soil. Increased soil salinity due to climate change would significantly reduce food grain production. Even at present, some parts of coastal lands are not being utilised for crop production, mostly due to soil salinity; and this situation would aggravate further under a climate change scenario. However, due to changing climate the ingress of salinity might be increased through following ways:

- Increased sea level will cause water ingress in the rivers.
- Decreasing trend of fresh water flow from the upstream will cause intrusion of saline water.
- Upward pressure of the saline and fresh water interface in the level of underground Aquifer.
- Downward seepage of saline water from surface and salinisation of underground water.
- The pace of evaporation in winter will increase soil salinity.
- Frequency and intensity of tidal surges will increase ingress of saline water.⁶²

The main obstacle to intensification of crop production in the coastal areas is seasonally high content of salts in the root zone of the soil. The salts enter inland through rivers and channels, especially during the later part of the dry (winter) season, when the downstream flow of fresh water becomes very low. During this period, the salinity of the river water increases. The salts enter the soil by flooding with saline river water or by seepage from the rivers, and the salts become concentrated in the surface layers through evaporation. The saline river water may also cause an increase in salinity of the ground water and make it unsuitable for irrigation.

⁶¹ Ibid,p.13.

⁶² Ibid,p.14-15.

Table 7 Salinity Affected Areas in the Coastal and Offshore Regions of Bangladesh⁶³

Description	Total cultivated area(ha)	Saline Area(ha)
Non-saline with very slightly saline	4,25,490	1,15,370 (27%)
Very slightly saline with slightly saline	4,20,420	3,09,190 (73%)
Slightly saline with moderately saline	2,57,270	2,40,220 (93%)
Moderately saline with strongly saline	1,98,890	1,98,890 (100%)

Such concentration of salinity causes unfavorable environment and hydrological situation that restrict the normal crop production throughout the year. However, the impacts of salinity can be depicted as follows:

- Decreases availability/productivity of agricultural land;
- Increased food insecurity as naturally-growing species disappear;
- Serious scarcity of safe drinking water;
- Loss of biodiversity, e.g. decrease in tree species and freshwater fish;
- Creates socioeconomic problems, generally women will be more vulnerable.

Climate-Induced Migration

Forced migration provoked by environmental changes is not a new phenomenon; it is rather a logic consequence of interaction between people and nature. Hence, climate change prospects increase the magnitude of migration caused by environmental influences. Increased river bank erosion, sea level rise and saline water intrusion in the coastal areas are likely to displace thousands of people. It is estimated that if sea level rise is higher than currently expected and coastal polders are not strengthened and/or new ones built, six to eight million people could be displaced by 2050.⁶⁴ Indeed, Bangladesh is particularly vulnerable to the impacts of climate change and is one of the rare countries in which natural hazards are the main cause of migration. There are several factors which push people to migrate from one place to another. These include:

- The principal factor that encourages people to leave their homes in the countryside is the frequent recurrence of natural disasters, which

⁶³ [www.pakbs.org/pjbot/PDFs/38\(5\)/PJB38\(5\)1359.pdf](http://www.pakbs.org/pjbot/PDFs/38(5)/PJB38(5)1359.pdf) (accessed on 19th August, 2009).

⁶⁴ www.moef.gov.bd/moef.pdf (accessed on 17th August, 2009).

undermine agricultural development and cause food crisis. Not only do environmental hazards have negative impact on agricultural production, but, they also cause important internal migration flows, in the most cases pushing people in rural areas to move to the urban centres.

- Bangladesh's vulnerability is mainly due to the mix of high population density and low-lying land. Some estimates predict that by 2050 Bangladesh will have about 15 million environmental refugees.⁶⁵
- One of the major global impacts of climate change will be sea level rise. It is a slow but steady and irreversible process which makes it particularly hard to adapt to. Hence migration seems to be the only adequate response for larger number of the population. The UNDP (2007:100) predicts that 11 percent of the population of the country will be directly threatened by a one meter sea level rise.
- Riverbank erosion is another significant factor which causes migration of the large number of people. It has been revealed from a study that between 1982 and 1992, 730,000 people displaced due to riverbank erosion.⁶⁶

Many of the displaced move inland, which lead to instability as the resettled population competes for already scarce resources with the older inhabitants. Others seek to migrate abroad, which also has the potentiality to heighten political tension not only in South Asia but in Europe and Southeast Asia as well. Indeed, consequences of climate change due to floods, cyclones etc will create increasing ecological or environmental refugees in the country, forming 'ecological marginalization'. Barnett (2003) states that 5.5 million people living on the Ganges delta in Bangladesh who are likely to be forced to relocate with a 45 cm rise in sea level may seek to move inland within Bangladesh, but a significant number may seek to move to neighbouring India and Pakistan and it should be remembered that previous migration of this kind has been a factor in violence in the region.⁶⁷

A study by the Earth Policy Institute (2004) shows the problem more seriously. It says that about 40 million people of Bangladesh out of 144 million will become environmental refugees due to 1-m sea level rise. Robert Kaplan highlighted that different environmental problems including sea level rise will prompt mass migration, and that in turn, might incite group conflicts. There

⁶⁵ www.mpna.ub.uni-muenchen.de/12879/1/climate_change_and_rural_urban_migration_in_Bangladesh.pdf (accessed on 19th August, 2009).

⁶⁶ Ibid.

⁶⁷ A.K. Gain and M.A. Bari, op.cit, p.50.

exists a long term conflict between Bangladesh and India, regarding the distribution of water of the Ganges, influx of refugees and other issues. The victims of the rise of sea level naturally become environmental refugees in India and this may lead to further political tensions. Indeed, Bangladeshi migrants will generate political tension as they traverse the region's many of the contested borders and territories, such as those between China, India, and Pakistan. The combination of deteriorating socio-economic conditions, rise of radical Islamic political groups, and dire environmental insecurity brought on by climate change can lead to a volatile mix with severe regional and potentially global consequences.⁶⁸

Risk to Health Security

Climate change affects human health both directly and indirectly. People are exposed directly to changing weather patterns (temperature, precipitation, sea-level rise and more frequent extreme events) and indirectly through changes in the quality of water, air and food, and changes in ecosystems, agriculture, industry, human settlements and the economy. These direct and indirect exposures can cause death, disability and suffering.

Bangladesh is vulnerable to outbreaks of infectious, waterborne and other types of diseases. Records show that the incidence of malaria increased from 1556 cases in 1971 to 15 375 in 1981, and from 30 282 cases in 1991 to 42 012 in 2004 (WHO, 2006). Other diseases such as diarrhoea and dysentery, etc. are also on the rise especially during the summer months. It has been predicted that the combination of higher temperatures and potential increase in summer precipitation may cause the spread of many infectious diseases. Climate change also brings about additional stresses like dehydration, malnutrition and heat-related morbidity especially among children and the elderly. These problems are thought to be closely interlinked with water supply, sanitation and food production. Climate change has already been linked to land degradation, fresh-water decline, biodiversity loss and ecosystem decline, and stratospheric ozone depletion. Changes in such factors may have a direct or indirect impact on human health as well.

This increase in the incidence of disease also has the potential to present serious threat to the stability of the government. Particularly, if the situation becomes pandemic, the whole system related to health service might be crumbled down due to the limited capacity of the state to respond to such crisis. As a result, it can also influence the political direction of the country. For instance,

⁶⁸ Ibid.

Table 8 Incidence of Some of the Major Climate-Sensitive Diseases Occurring During the Last Few Decades⁶⁹

Diseases	Total cases per period	Period	Average annual cases
Diarrhoea	48302636	1988-2005	2842273
Skin diseases	23697833	1988-1996	2623092
Malaria	1018671	1974-2004	33956
Mental disorders	201881	1988-1996	22431
Dengue	19830	1999-2005	3305

the inability or perceived unwillingness of political leaders to stop the spread of disease or to provide adequate care for the afflicted will undermine support for the government. In countries with functioning democracies, this could lead to the election of new leaders with political agenda radically different from their predecessors. It could also breed greater support for populist candidates whose politics resonate in a society that believes that its economic and social hardships are due to neglect or mismanagement by the government. In countries with weak or non-democratic political foundations, the risk is heightened that this may lead to civil war or a toppling of the government altogether. Under these economic and social circumstances, a country's political direction can change rapidly. Besides, it also has the potential to generate disputes among neighbouring nations over the movement of people. Immigrants or even simply visitors from a country in which there has been a significant disease outbreak may not be welcomed and could be subject to quarantine restrictions. If the policies that underlie such practices are perceived as discriminatory or motivated by factors other than legitimate health concerns, that would severely damage political relations.

Threat to Development

Climate change and its variability have emerged as a serious challenge to development in general and poverty reduction in particular. Over the last three decades since 1973 over 0.17 million hectares (20.4%) of new land has been salt affected.⁷⁰ As per IPCC, average precipitation in Bangladesh is projected to increase in the June-August period by up to 12.5 percent in the 2020s and 20 percent in the 2050s.⁷¹ This trend of climate change will in turn affect the food security and agricultural production from the perspective of temperature

⁶⁹ www.searo.who.int/Link_Files/Regional_Health_Forum_volume_12_No_1_climate_change_and_its_impact (accessed on 19th August, 2009).

⁷⁰ *The Daily Star*, March 15, 2008.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*

variation leading to change in crop sensitive evapo-transpiration, soil moisture and change in hydrological regime as well as salinity intrusion. Besides, climate change is expected to lead to increases in the potential transmission of many infectious diseases. Decreased availability of potable water will be responsible for increased illness and death cases. The impacts of such extreme events on human welfare could be significant. Because, such factors could lead to increased child mortality, reduced maternal health and undermine the nutritional health needed by individuals to attain healthy life for sustained livelihood. Furthermore the cumulative factors will lead to retarding the rate of national economic growth. A recent World Bank Study revealed the fact that about four percent of GDP is eroded by environmental degradation in Bangladesh. Further changes would push the people now living in coastal, flood plains and dry areas to become climate refugees, vulnerable to extreme poverty and hunger. However, climate change also presents serious threat to the infrastructure of the country. Indeed, the diversity and range of infrastructures that may be vulnerable to climate change is enormous. It is making roads, water supplies, sewer systems and buildings more vulnerable and thereby place human health and safety at risk.

Melting of the Himalayan Glaciers: A Growing Danger

The impact of global warming will hit Bangladesh hard. Soaring global temperatures are increasing glacial melt in the Himalayan ranges, swelling the rivers that flow down from the mountains and across the Bangladeshi floodplain, the largest in the world, far beyond their capacity. The expanding volume of water is also causing higher sea levels to push inland. A rise above one metre, which could be reached in this century, means Bangladesh could lose 15 percent to 18 percent of its land area, turning 30 million people into “environmental refugees” by 2050.⁷²

Vulnerability to Ecosystems

One of the likely adverse impacts of climate change is the loss of the Sundarbans which are the coastal mangroves that straddle the coasts of western Bangladesh and neighboring India. The Sundarbans were formed by the deposition of materials from the Ganges, Brahmaputra, and Meghna rivers. If the Sundarbans are lost, the habitat for several valuable species would also be lost. A 45 cm sea level rise would inundate 75% of the Sundarbans, and 67 cm sea level rise could inundate all of the system. Extrapolating from this information,

⁷² www.irinnews.org/report.aspx (accessed on 20th August, 2009).

Smith et.al. (1998) calculated that a 25 cm sea level rise would result in a 40% mangrove loss⁷³

VI. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION

At this juncture of history, it needs to be recognised that environmental crisis has a more pervasive and more political character than any other crisis. For this reason, environmental challenges should be placed at the core of security considerations in a rapidly changing world. However, to address the environmental challenges effectively action should be taken both at the national and international level. The framework of such action has been mentioned below.

National Level

- Increase more budgetary allocation for disaster preparedness and rehabilitation activities.
- Pursue appropriate institutional and legal measures.
- Construction of flood shelter, and information and assistance centre to cope with enhanced recurrent floods in major floodplains.
- Capacity building for integrating climate change in planning, designing of infrastructure, conflict management and landwater zoning for water management institutions.
- Take a consultative approach to the development of national and local policy on climate change and security.
- Training on disaster preparedness involving local institutions/local government.
- Initiate a mass awareness programme to sensitise the public about the impacts of environmental degradation.
- Enhance resilience of urban infrastructure and industries to impacts of climate change including floods and cyclone.
- Climate change and adaptation information dissemination to vulnerable community for emergency preparedness measures and awareness raising on enhanced climatic disasters.
- Focus should be given on the military response to climate security. Hence, military needs to assess the impact of natural calamities and

⁷³ www.europarl.europa.eu/activities/committees/studies/download.do?File=19195 (accessed on 20th August, 2009).

evaluate their capacity to respond to such crisis. In this backdrop, the words of Major General Muniruzzaman, ndc, psc, (Retd) can be cited:

“Climate change induced impacts will pose a serious threat to national and international security. The military will need to prepare, train and be ready to face this threat.”⁷⁴

- Mainstreaming adaptation to climate change into policies and programmes in different sectors (focusing on disaster management, water, agriculture, health and industry).
- Reduction of climate change hazards through coastal afforestation with community participation.
- Development of eco-specific adaptive knowledge (including indigenous knowledge) on adaptation to climate variability to enhance adaptive capacity for future climate change.
- Adopt a regional approach to address climate change and manage migration.

International Level

It has been appeared from different study that the developing countries will be most vulnerable to the effects of climate change. But such countries lack the means, the know-how and the capacity to effectively deal with this problem. For this reason, it has been argued from different quarters that an international initiative is urgently necessary to tackle this wide-ranging problem. Hence, the following initiatives might be fruitful:

- To ensure the constructive participation of the major stakeholders in the process of decision making, a multilateral global order should be formed instead of the current unilateral order.
- With the rise of environmentally induced conflicts and the associated security risks, it has been argued that the United Nation and its various organs should play an active role in managing the ensuing problems. Hence, UN should be reformed accordingly.
- At the international level, a consensus must be reached on quantifying the ultimate objective of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) as set out in its Article 2. To this end, it is necessary to adapt, as an international standard, of a global temperature guard rail limiting the rise in near-surface air temperature to a maximum of 2^o C relative to the pre-industrial value.

⁷⁴Major General Muniruzzaman, ndc, psc, (Rtd), President, Bangladesh Institute of Peace and Security **Studies (BIPSS)**.

- For the second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol, the industrialized countries should adopt ambitious goals of a 30% effective reduction in greenhouse gas emissions by 2020 against the 1990 baseline.
- Preventing the natural carbon stocks of terrestrial ecosystems should be a key goal of future climate protection policy alongside the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions from the use of fossil fuels.
- In development cooperation, path dependencies of emission-intensive technologies should be avoided, and high priority should be granted to the promotion of sustainable energy systems in order to overcome energy poverty. To this end, climate protection must be integrated as a cross-cutting theme into poverty reduction strategies from the outset.
- The G8+5 forum should be utilised for the development of joint targets for the promotion of climate-compatible technologies and products. This group, comprising the world's leading industrial nations and newly industrialising countries, represents the heavyweights in the global political arena and accounts for around two-thirds of global greenhouse gas emissions
- Climate change will hit developing countries especially hard. However, most developing countries lack the skills and capacities to implement effective adaptation measures. Hence, international cooperation should be provided in the following areas:
 - i. To adapt water resource management to the impacts of climate change, international cooperation on the provision of information should be promoted. International cooperation is vital to facilitate developing countries access to current scientific data on the regional impacts of climate change on water availability.
 - ii. Rural development should be strengthened and reoriented. In view of the anticipated drop in agricultural yields, development cooperation should focus to a greater extent on the development of rural regions.
 - iii. The reform of world agricultural markets should be pursued vigorously in order to generate opportunities for market access and production incentives in the developing countries.
 - iv. Development cooperation should develop and implement cross-sectoral strategies for the prevention of disaster risks to a greater extent, focussing especially on emergency planning, adaptation of land-use planning, establishment of clear decision-making structures at an early stage, and the inclusion of disaster prevention in education programmes. Early warning systems should also be embedded in development programmes.

- v. Disaster prevention should be taken into account from the outset in the preparation of Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers and in the major poverty reduction programmes.
- Global information and early warning system must be expanded. Indeed both the gradual changes caused by climate change and the natural disasters which are expected to occur with increasing frequency could destabilize the affected regions, and in extreme cases constitute a major risk factor for national and international security. Global information and early warning systems can therefore do much to mitigate these adverse effects and make a major contribution to conflict and crisis prevention. On the one hand, these systems should provide timely information and warning in advance of extreme events and crises. On the other hand, the system must provide processed data on expected regional climate impacts, especially for developing countries which lack adequate capacities of their own to model and evaluate these data.

Finally, climate change needs to be seen as an opportunity. The scale of the problem at hand, and the urgency with which we must tackle it, is precisely the opportunity to galvanise calls for reform and innovation. We need to question the capacity of the entire system with which we plan to respond to climate change, and the slow and abrupt disasters it causes. Indeed, the unique challenge of climate change requires a unique response which is itself an opportunity for integrating a fragmented international humanitarian and development system. That endeavour should not only enable us to better combat climate change, but also to reap benefits that will ring true for wide ranging humanitarian challenges of today and tomorrow.

President George W Bush and Beginnings of the War on Terror

*James Veitch*¹

I. A WAR BY MANY NAMES

The American led 'War on Terror' went by a variety of names. It had been called 'the War on Terrorism,' the 'Global War on Terror,' the 'Global War on Terrorism,' the Global Struggle against Violent Extremism, the Long War,² and the 'Global Insurgency and Counter Insurgency.'³ More recently, new phrases have appeared, 'stabilisation operations'⁴ and 'overseas contingency operations,'⁵ to name only two. The struggle to find a name that fit the operations had been ongoing throughout the US administration of George W. Bush. Since the elections that brought Barak Obama to the Presidency the language has changed. It is yet unclear how much of the substance of American foreign policy on the Middle East has changed with it. This article will explore the origins of the Bush led war on terror, analyse its connections with Islam and seek to assess the achievements of the initial phase of the war.⁶

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² Used by George Bush in his State of the Union Address 2006. President George W Bush, *State of the Union Address*, 2006, <http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/stateoftheunion/2006/>, accessed on 11 September 2009.

³ Robert M Cassidy, *Counter Insurgency and the Global War on Terror* (Westport: Praeger Security International, 2008), David Kilcullen, "Twenty-Eight Articles: Fundamentals of Company-Level Counterinsurgency" (Washington, D.C.: 2006) www.d-n-i.net/fcs/pdf/kilcullen_28_articles.pdf, accessed on 11 September 2009, David Kilcullen, *The Accidental Guerrilla* (Melbourne: Sage, 2009).

⁴ Mick Ryan, *The Military and Reconstruction Operations* (Viewpoint Essay), December 22, 2007, www.accessmylibrary.com/article-1G1-174282097/military-and-reconstruction-operations.html, accessed on 11 September 2009.

⁵ "Obama Scraps 'Global War on Terror' for 'Overseas Contingency Operation'," *FoxNews.com* 2009, www.foxnews.com/politics/elections/2009/03/25/report-obama-administration-backing-away-global-war-terror/, accessed on 11 September 2009.

⁶ The article will not canvass the war in Afghanistan nor will it discuss the war in Iraq-both need articles of their own. It also will not explore the response of Osama bin Laden to the war on

II. THE SHAPING OF BUSH'S POLITICAL VISION

The story begins at 8:46 am on September 11, 2001, when American Airlines Flight 11 crashed into the North Tower of the World Trade Centre. It was followed by United Airlines Flight 175 that hit the South Tower at 9:03 am. American Airlines Flight 77 crashed into the Pentagon at 9:37 am. United Airlines Flight 93, whose ultimate target was thought to be either the United States capitol or the White House, crashed near Shanksville, Pennsylvania at 10:03 am, after the passengers on board attacked the *hijackers*. 3,017 people died at the crash sites (including 24 presumed dead and 19 *hijackers*); at least 6,291 were injured.

President Bush was at the time of the incident reading to second grade children in a classroom at Emma E. Brooker Elementary School in Sarasota Florida.⁷ Within seconds of the first plane crashing into the North Tower his staff had informed him. He continued to read until news of the second incident was brought to his attention. Bush remembered [sic] thinking at the time, according to Bob Woodward who spoke to the President about these matters, "They have declared war on us and I made up my mind at that moment that we were going to war."⁸ What the President actually meant by his own words was not questioned nor investigated by Woodward.

Bush made a short comment of 'four paragraphs' to television reporters in attendance shortly afterwards at 9.30am before being whisked away to the airport to begin his journey back to the White House. There was a brief meeting of the National Security Council at the air force base in Nebraska at 15.30 en route back, in which he was briefed by the CIA Director who reported the near certain view that Bin Laden and Al-Qaeda⁹ were behind the attacks.¹⁰

Later that day Bush would speak to the Nation and declare that the security services would be going after those behind the crime. He began by saying,

terror-itself an interesting topic connected with this more modest aim-to discuss how America and the West became involved in a war on terror. The discussion does not extend into the Obama administrations policy in relation to Afghanistan.

⁷ For a reconstruction of the President's movements on that day see : Paul Thompson and Allan Wood, *An Interesting Day. President Bush's Movements and Actions 9/11*, History Commons, www.historycommons.org/essay.jsp?article=essayaninterestingday, accessed on 11 September 2001.

⁸ Bob Woodward, *Bush at War* (New York: Simon & Schuster 2002) 15.

⁹ Bin Laden and the development of Al-Qaeda had been followed by the US administration for some years. See: Rohan Gunaratna, *Inside Al-Qaeda* (Carlton: Scribe Publications, 2002), Lawrence Wright, *The Looming Tower: Al-Qaeda and the Road to 9/11* (New York: Alfred Knoff, 2006), Peter Bergen, *The Osama Bin Laden I Know* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2006).

¹⁰ Ibid.

"Thousands of lives were suddenly ended by evil, despicable acts of terror ... Today our nation saw evil—the very worst of human nature—and we responded with the best of America."¹¹ He then went on to say, "I have directed the full resources of our intelligence and law enforcement communities to find those responsible and to bring them to justice. We will make no distinction between the terrorists who committed these acts and those who harbour them."¹²

Out of pastoral concern he spoke to those who were grieving the loss of loved ones, "I pray that they will be comforted by a Power greater than any of us," spoken through the ages in Psalm 23, "Even though I walk through the valley of the shadow of death, I fear no evil for you are with me" ... "None of us," he concluded, "will ever forget this day, yet we go forward to defend freedom and all that is good and just in our world."¹³

It was a dramatic and sombre speech pitched at the level of his vast audience. He spoke as the Commander in Chief using language reminiscent of the famous 'Evil Empire speech' delivered by former President Ronald Reagan on August 6, 1982.¹⁴

From this point onwards Bush's vision takes shape largely in interaction with key members of the National Security Council.¹⁵ In Foreign Affairs matters it was the Vice President whose influence was strongest. His voice was often tempered by Colin Powell the Secretary of State. Donald Rumsfeld, the Secretary of Defence, held strong views as did his assistant Paul Wolfowitz. George Tenet's voice as the CIA Director was always critical to the decision making. Condoleezza Rice as National Security Advisor chaired the group with consummate skill and acted as the go-between with the president when the planning became bogged down. Her role was also critical to the decision making.¹⁶

¹¹ George W. Bush, *9/11, Address to the Nation: A Great People has been Moved to Defend a Great Nation*, 2001, www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/gwbush911adresstothetation.htm, accessed on 11 September 2009.

¹² Ibid.

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Ronald Reagan, *Remarks at the Annual Convention of the National Association of Evangelicals*, 1983, American Rhetoric, www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/ronaldreaganevilempire.htm, accessed on 11 September 2009.

¹⁵ Each of the members of the Council has their own version of events as Woodward's book, *Bush at War* op.cit shows. In addition to these members of the Council Bush received advice from a cross section of experts, colleagues, and friends. Bush rolls out policy in his public addresses that is designed to reassure the American people that he is in command of the situation and that his team is planning the next stage of the response to nine eleven with meticulous care.

¹⁶ Woodward, *Bush at War*. This is as close to an insider's view of events that the observer can obtain. It is based on extensive interviews with the President.

Following a meeting of the National Security Council on September 13, Bush met the press and made a number of remarks that would define the following developments. He declared, "The deliberate and deadly attacks which were carried out yesterday against our country were more than acts of terror ... They were acts of war ... The American people need to know we're facing a different enemy than we have ever faced ... The United States of America will use all our resources to conquer this enemy ... This battle will take time and resolve. But make no mistake about it, we will win ... This will be a monumental struggle of good versus evil, but good will prevail."¹⁷ With these words the President committed America to a long campaign against a new kind of enemy, "one that hides in the shadows ... one who preys on innocent and unsuspecting people, one who tries to hide but," the President promised "they won't be safe forever ..."¹⁸

Speeches in the Senate and Congress made it clear that day that the President had the strong support of legislators to do all within his power to bring the perpetrators of nine-eleven to justice.¹⁹ On September 14 at a multi-faith service in the Washington Cathedral Bush declared, "Just three days removed from these events, Americans do not yet have the distance of history, but our responsibility to history is already clear, to answer these attacks and rid the world of evil. War has been waged against us by stealth and deceit and murder. This nation is peaceful, but fierce when stirred to anger. This conflict was begun on the timing and terms of others; it will end in a way and at an hour of our choosing."²⁰

After the service Bush travelled to New York to see for himself the damage to the Twin Towers and gave an impromptu speech to the workers at the site. He then travelled to Camp David to meet with the National Security Council. Sunday was a dramatic day throughout the United States as millions attended churches and heard addresses about the significance of nine-eleven and thought about the future and the imminent American response.

¹⁷ President George W Bush, *Remarks Following a Meeting with the National Security Team*, September 12, 2001, www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=58058, accessed on 11 September 2009.

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ See in particular the speech of Senator John McCain who amongst other things made this comment: "These were not just crimes, they were acts of war, and have aroused in this great nation a controlled fury and unity of purpose not just to punish but vanquish ... our enemies." Senator John McCain, *Statement Concerning the Terrorist Attack on the World Trade Center*, September 13, 2001, <http://everything2.com/title/Senator+John+McCain%2527s+Statement+Concerning+the+Terrorist+Attack+on+the+World+Trade+Center>, accessed on 11 September 2009.

²⁰ President Bush, *Transcript Prayer Service Remarks: National Day of Prayer and Remembrance for the Victims of the Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001*, September 14, 2001, www.opm.gov/guidance/09-14-01gwb.htm, accessed on 11 September 2009.

That afternoon Bush on his return from Camp David to the White House met the press and after a short comment took questions from reporters. To one reporter he made this comment, "We haven't seen this kind of barbarism in a long period of time. No one could have conceivably imagined suicide bombers burrowing into our society and then emerging all in the same day to fly their aircraft — fly US aircraft into buildings full of innocent people — and show no remorse. This is a new kind of ... evil ... This crusade, this war on terrorism is going to take a while ... Those who harbour the terrorists will be brought to justice. It is time for us to win the first war of the 21st century decisively so that our children and our grandchildren can live peacefully into the 21st century."²¹ These words would come back to haunt him.

Bush's use of the word 'crusade' conjured up images and aroused memories across the world of conflicts centuries old.²² With this, the first major negative reactions to the rhetoric being used by the President and other American leaders began to surface.²³ As one commentator expressed, "President Bush's reference to a "crusade" against terrorism ... [has] raised fears that the terrorist attacks could spark a 'clash of civilizations' between Christians and Muslims sowing fresh winds of hatred and mistrust."²⁴ It was going to be difficult to separate the approaching conflict from on the one hand a clash between Muslim and Christian protagonists and on the other a war against America and her allies and opponents in and from the 'Muslim world'.

²¹ President Bush, *Attack on America: Remarks by the President upon Arrival on the South Lawn of the White House*, September 16, 2001, The Avalon Law Project, Yale Law School, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/sept11/president_015.asp, accessed on 11 September 2009.

²² See for example: Graham Maddox, "The 'Crusade' against Evil: Bush's Fundamentalism," *Australian Journal of Politics and History* 49.3 (2003). However, David Domke and Kevin Coe, *The God Strategy: How Religion Became a Political Weapon in America* (New York: Oxford University Press 2008) pp.3-4 traces the use of the word crusade by Presidents to a speech of Ronald Regan on July 17, 1980. See pages 41-42 for further explanation.

²³ On the use of religion in the speeches of George Bush see: David Domke, *God Willing: Political Fundamentalism in the White House* (New York: Pluto Press, 2004), Ron Suskind, "Faith Certainty and the Presidency of George W. Bush," October 17, 2004: For a critical view of the way religion was used by others in the administration see , Susan Brooks Thistlewaite Sally Steenland, *Good Religion Gone Bad*, May 19, 2009, Center for American Progress, www.americanprogress.org/issues/2009/05/bad_religion.html, accessed on 11 September 2009. An insiders report on a meeting between church leaders and the President see, Jean Bethke Elshtain, *An Extraordinary Discussion* 03 October, 2001, American Rhetoric, www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/prayerwiththepresident.htm, accessed on 11 September 2009.

²⁴ Peter Ford, "Europe Cringes at Bush 'Crusade' against Terrorists," *The Christian Science Monitor* September 19, 2001, www.csmonitor.com/2001/0919/p12s2-woeu.html, accessed on 11 September 2001.

It was also becoming clear that the use of the word 'evil' to describe the attack on the world trade centre and 'evil doers' to describe the attackers was becoming problematic. Here are his words as he arrived back at the White House from Camp David on the Sunday after nine-eleven, "Tomorrow, when you get back to work, work hard like you always have. But we've been warned. We've been warned there are evil people in this world. We've been warned so vividly," Bush said. "And we'll be alert. Your government is alert. The governors and mayors are alert that evil folks still lurk out there. As I said yesterday, people have declared war on America and they have made a terrible mistake." "My administration has a job to do and we're going to do it. We will rid the world of the evil-doers,"²⁵ he said.

But it was not clear who the President meant nor was it clear how he planned to go about the task — that would of course become obvious in the following weeks as Osama bin Laden, the administration of Mullah Omar, the Taliban, and by implication the people of Afghanistan became identified as the 'evil doers'. But initially the use of religious language to describe the enemy caused some confusion. The rhetoric however would change with the pace of planning as the administration moved into its agenda.

Bush followed up with a visit to the Islamic centre of Washington the next day where he again spoke of the terrorists as a small faction within the wider Muslim community. "These acts of violence against innocents violate the fundamental tenets of the Islamic faith ... The face of terror is not the true faith of Islam. That's not what Islam is all about. Islam is peace. These terrorist don't represent peace. They represent evil and war. When we think of Islam we think of a faith that brings peace to a billion people around the world."²⁶

Following a briefing at the Pentagon Bush was asked by reporters if he wanted bin Laden dead, "I want justice," he had replied And then he added — "And there is an old poster out West that says, Wanted: Dead or Alive."²⁷ The phrase was to catch all the headlines but it was in keeping with the comment the previous evening offered on television by Vice President Dick Cheney to the effect that he would, "willingly accept bin Laden's head on a

²⁵ Manuel Perez-Rivas, "Bush Vows to Rid the World of 'Evil Doers,'" *CNN.com* September 16 2001, <http://archives.cnn.com/2001/US/09/16/gen.bush.terrorism/>, accessed on 11 September 2009, op.cit.

²⁶ President George W. Bush, "Islam Is Peace" Says President: Remarks by President George W. Bush at Islamic Center of Washington, D.C., 2001, <http://everything2.com/title/Remarks+by+President+George+W.+Bush+at+Islamic+Center+of+Washington%252C+D.C.>, accessed on 11 September 2009.

²⁷ "Bush: Bin Laden 'Prime Suspect'," *CNN.com* September 17, 2001, <http://archives.cnn.com/2001/US/09/17/bush.powell.terrorism/>, accessed on 11 September 2009.

platter.”²⁸ Bush in his speech made it clear that “Osama bin Laden [was] a prime suspect, and the people who house him, encourage him, provide food, comfort or money are on notice. And the Taliban must take my statement seriously.”²⁹

By the time the President addressed a joint sitting of Congress his administration was a lot clearer about its response to nine-eleven and the strategy it would employ.

He identified the enemy as “a collection of loosely affiliated terrorist organisations known as Al-Qaeda.”³⁰ Its goal he declared is to remake the world and to impose “its radical beliefs on people everywhere.”³¹ He defined a Muslim extremist turned terrorist in this way, “the terrorists practice a fringe form of Islamic extremism that has been rejected by Muslim scholars and the vast majority of Muslim clerics, a fringe movement that perverts the peaceful teachings of Islam.”³² Having made this point enabled him to then say, “The enemy of America is not our many Muslim friends; it is not our many Arab friends. Our enemy is a radical network of terrorists, and every government that supports them. Our war on terror begins with Al-Qaeda, but it does not end there. It will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped, and defeated.”³³

He identified Al-Qaeda as the controlling influence over the Taliban Government of Afghanistan and then delivered with applause an ultimatum to the Taliban. These are his words, “The United States respects the people of Afghanistan — after all, we are currently its largest source of humanitarian aid — but we condemn the Taliban regime. It is not only repressing its own people, it is threatening people everywhere by sponsoring and sheltering and supplying terrorists. By aiding and abetting murder, the Taliban regime is committing murder. And tonight the United States of America makes the following demands on the Taliban, Deliver to United States authorities all of the leaders of Al-Qaeda who hide in your land. Release all foreign nationals, including American citizens you have unjustly imprisoned. Protect foreign

²⁸ Toby Harnden, “Bin Laden is Wanted: Dead or Alive, Says Bush,” *Telegraph.co.uk* 18 September 2001, www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/afghanistan/1340895/Bin-Laden-is-wanted-dead-or-alive-says-Bush.html, accessed on 11 September 2009.

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ President George W Bush, *Transcript of President Bush’s Address to a Joint Session of Congress on Thursday Night, September 20, 2001*, 2001, CNN.com, <http://edition.cnn.com/2001/US/09/20/gen.bush.transcript/>, accessed on 11 September 2001.

³¹ Ibid.

³² Ibid.

³³ Ibid.

journalists, diplomats and aid workers in your country. Close immediately and permanently all terrorist training camps in Afghanistan. And hand over every terrorist and every person and their support structure to appropriate authorities. Give the United States full access to terrorist training camps, so we can make sure they are no longer operating. These demands are not open to negotiation or discussion. The Taliban must act and act immediately. They will hand over the terrorists or they will share in their fate.”³⁴

Bush was in no mood to give the Taliban, and bin Laden anywhere anything less than a clear message: America was at war with radical Islam and with extremist Muslims-everywhere. “Our war begins with Al-Qaeda but it does not end there. It will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped and defeated.”³⁵

He was realistic enough to admit that the campaign that he was launching would not be over quickly but was likely to be lengthy and be “unlike any other we have seen.”³⁶ The President promised that terrorist would be “pursued from place to place until there is no refuge or rest.”³⁷ “We will pursue nations” he declared “that provide aid or safe haven to terrorism. Every nation in every region now has a decision to make: “either you are with us or you are with the terrorists.” From this day forward, any nation that continues to harbour or support terrorism will be regarded by the United States as a hostile regime.”³⁸

With these words, the President launched a ‘war on terror.’ In doing so he also announced a policy that would change the traditional containment principle³⁹ in Foreign Policy to one of pre-emption.⁴⁰

The war was launched to apprehend Osama bin Laden, and to destroy the Muslim extremists of Al-Qaeda who had been using the methods of terror to secure a political advantage in their struggle against the Western world. It was also launched to bring about regime change in Afghanistan—to end Taliban rule and install a replacement leader and democracy.

³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ *Later Applications of Containment: Eisenhower to Reagan*, American Foreign Relations, www.americanforeignrelations.com/A-D/Containment-Later-applications-of-containment-eisenhower-to-reagan.html, accessed on 11 September 2009.

⁴⁰ *Thematic Essay: The History of American Foreign Policy*, <http://encarta.msn.com/encnet/refpages/RefArticle.aspx?refid=461575607&pn=5>, accessed on 11 September 2001.

At the time of 9/11 bin Laden was reputedly the guest of the leader of the Taliban. When challenged the leader of Afghanistan, Mullah Omar refused to surrender Osama to the Americans suggesting that he could be released to the custody of another Islamic State. This was unacceptable to the US. When their ultimatum was not met, the US carried out an attack and an occupation.

On October 7, Bush spoke to America and the world as US and British Forces unleashed a spectacular aerial attack on Afghanistan. Strikingly bin Laden spoke also and the two speeches when placed side by side make for interesting reading.⁴¹

The central thrust of what Bush had to say are contained in the following words, "This military action is a part of our campaign against terrorism, another front in a war that has already been joined through diplomacy, intelligence, the freezing of financial assets and the arrests of known terrorists by law enforcement agents in 38 countries. Today we focus on Afghanistan, but the battle is broader. Every nation has a choice to make. In this conflict, there is no neutral ground. If any government sponsors the outlaws and killers of innocents, they have become outlaws and murderers, themselves. And they will take that lonely path at their own peril."⁴²

America and Britain invaded Afghanistan justifying the action under Security Council resolutions 1368⁴³ and 1373⁴⁴ and the war had began in earnest with the launching of Operation Enduring Freedom.⁴⁵ This operation was initially led by the CIA and special service units with assistance from the Northern Alliance of Afghanistan tribal groups and backed by a substantial use of air power with British forces joining the US in the engagement. Ground force reinforcements were drawn from the US Army, Navy and Air Force and the British Armed Forces.⁴⁶ But to legitimise the action Bush needed to bring other countries into a coalition of the willing.

On November 6 the President rammed home the point when he met the French president, "there is no room for neutrality in the war against terrorism

⁴¹ For a version of the two speeches side by side see: *George W. Bush, Address to the Nation, October 7, 2001: Osama Bin Laden, Videotaped Address, October 7, 2001, 2001*, www.press.uchicago.edu/Misc/Chicago/481921texts.html, accessed on 11 September 2009.

⁴² Ibid.

⁴³ United Nations Security Council, *Resolution 1368*, (2001).

⁴⁴ United Nations Security Council, *Resolution 1373*, (2001).

⁴⁵ For an extensive source of articles relating to the invasion and occupation see: *U.S. Invasion of Afghanistan: Index of Articles Related to U.S. Invasion of Afghanistan*, www.experiencefestival.com/us_invasion_of_afghanistan/articleindex, accessed on 11 September 2009.

⁴⁶ In 2002 special forces for a number of countries joined-these nations included Australia, Canada, Germany, New Zealand and Norway.

and the international coalition against terror will fight this evil until we are rid of it."⁴⁷ He also took the chance to talk about an anthrax attack that had paralysed Capitol Hill as another indication to America and her allies that the terrorists were serious.

Four days later the President addressed the United Nations General Assembly. It was a strongly worded and passionately delivered speech. Amongst other things he said, "In this world, there are good causes and bad causes, and we may disagree on where that line is drawn. Yet, there is no such thing as a good terrorist. No national aspiration, no remembered wrong can ever justify the deliberate murder of the innocent. Any government that rejects this principle, trying to pick and choose its terrorist friends, will know the consequences. We must speak the truth about terror. Let us never tolerate outrageous conspiracy theories concerning the attacks of September the 11th, malicious lies that attempt to shift the blame away from the terrorists themselves, away from the guilty."⁴⁸

He completed his address with these words, "It is our task, the task of this generation, to provide the response to aggression and terror. We have no other choice, because there is no other peace. We did not ask for this mission, yet there is honour in history's call. We have a chance to write the story of our times, a story of courage defeating cruelty and light overcoming darkness. This calling is worthy of any life and worthy of every nation."⁴⁹

By December 6, Mullah Omar had sought a cessation of the conflict but when this was rejected, he and his close followers withdrew the next day from their southern stronghold of Kandahar and disappeared. The Taliban melted into the mountainous areas of Afghanistan and fled into Pakistan.⁵⁰ The occupation forces turned their attention to destroying the Al-Qaeda guerrilla movement.

By December 17, the American and Afghan forces occupied all of the Tora Bora area. Osama bin Laden and his close follower's evaded capture and disappeared into the FATA area of Pakistan.⁵¹

⁴⁷ "Bush Says It is Time for Action," 06 November 2001, <http://archives.cnn.com/2001/US/11/06/ret.bush.coalition/index.html>, accessed on 11 September 2009.

⁴⁸ President George W. Bush, *The Text of President George W. Bush's First Address to the General Assembly of the United Nations in New York City on November 10, 2001*, 2001, www.september11news.com/PresidentBushUN.htm, accessed on 11 September 2009.

⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁰ The Taliban were largely Pashtun and this tribal group spreads across southern Afghanistan in to the FATA region and into Pakistan. See: "The Pashtun Way," Terroristplanet.com, www.terroristplanet.com/pashtun.htm, accessed on 11 September 2009.

⁵¹ *Welcome to Fata*, <http://fata.gov.pk/>, accessed on 11 September 2009.

Within months, the United Nation became involved on the ground in Afghanistan. The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) was established by Security Council resolution 1386, agreed to on December 20⁵² largely as a follow up of a comprehensive set of resolutions namely, 1267 (1999), 1333 (2000), 1363 (July 2001), 1368 (12 September 2001), 1373 (28 September 2001), 1377 (12 November 2001), 1378 (14 November 2001), and 1383⁵³ (6 December 2001).

Having made these agreements and establishing the ISAF to work alongside Operation Enduring Freedom the conflict in Afghanistan did not stop. It continues in spite of the very successful work of International Regional Construction Teams and the trend towards democracy and recent elections. Today there are forty-three countries involved in the NATO/UN Coalition.

Few armies involved in the conflict have either the experience or the expertise to fight successfully in a counter insurgency guerrilla war. The world has changed since nine-eleven. Military commanders have had to rethink strategy. Not surprising there are innovative approaches being trialled in Afghanistan that take account of the knowledge about culture and society that a modern post nine-eleven fighting force requires as an essential part of its tool kit: and this is an outcome of the war on terror. No longer will wars be fought in the class room style of the traditional military academy.⁵⁴

⁵² United Nations Security Council, *UN Resolution 1383*. (2001), United Nations Security Council, *UN Resolution 1386*. (2001).

⁵³ This resolution affirmed the Bonn agreement between various tribal groups in Afghanistan on a range of transitional arrangements to support an International security Force and to establish an interim Government. See for the *Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Re-Establishment of Permanent Government Institutions*. The general backgrounder can be accessed at, *General Backgrounder: From the Bonn Agreement to the 2005 Wolesi Jirga and Provincial Council Elections*, (2005).

⁵⁴ One of the most innovative approaches to counterinsurgency conflict is the Human Terrain System. Its objectives are set out on the Human Terrain Systems website: *Human Terrain System: Overview*, <http://humanterrainsystem.army.mil/overview.html>, accessed on 11 September 2009. The following quotation is copied from the overview: "HTS was designed to meet the military's requirements for socio-cultural knowledge across a spectrum of operations that the U.S. may encounter in today's world. Most importantly, understanding foreign societies can be critical during stabilization, security, transition and reconstruction (SSTR) operations in order to identify flash points, deter war, reduce violence, and promote peaceful economic and social development. In a counterinsurgency — such as the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan — one of the military's objectives is to influence the population through non-lethal means (such as economic development), to support the host nation government and/or to reduce support for insurgent groups (like the Taliban). Thus, the commander and staff must look beyond their traditional military mission focus (enemy, terrain, weather, friendly troops, support, and time available). The local civilian population in the area of conflict — the human terrain — must be considered as a distinct and critical element of the environment." Attention is also drawn to the section on bibliography on this website.

III. A "WAR ON TERROR"

But the war on terror was a war like no other. The 'war on terror' or 'the war against terrorism' was a war against those responsible for nine-eleven. In this case it was an action against the State of Afghanistan that was providing refuge to Osama bin Laden, the leader of Al-Qaeda, the organisation alleged to be behind the plot to destroy the Twin Towers. The phrases 'war on terror' and 'war on terrorism' turned out to be metaphors for a war against Muslim extremists or Muslim militants. All the 9/11 *hijackers* were Muslims and were linked with Al-Qaeda. This movement identified with Osama bin Laden who had been not only an inspirational influence in the conflict between Afghanistan and the Soviet Union, but the leader of a Muslim network engaged in conflicts within the Muslim world. These had spilled over into the Western world when the Twin Towers were attacked. The Muslims involved were in the vanguard of extremists who used fear (terror) on third parties in order to attack the policies of the United States Government that were considered injurious to Muslims world wide, but particularly to Muslims living in the Middle East.

After 9/11, the conflict between Muslim militants and the US administration was to spread into a world-wide phenomenon. It was Bush who extended the conflict when he made the same point in address after address that the US was going after terrorists worldwide. Nowhere is this more graphically expressed than in President Bush's State of the Union address delivered on January 29, 2002.

He began by announcing a victory in Afghanistan: We have "rallied a great coalition," he said, "captured, arrested and rid the world of thousands of terrorists, destroyed Afghanistan's terrorist training camps, saved a people from starvation and freed a country from brutal oppression. The American flag flies again over our embassy in Kabul. Terrorists who once occupied Afghanistan now occupy cells at Guantanamo Bay. And terrorist leaders who urged followers to sacrifice their lives are running for their own. America and Afghanistan are now allies against terror. We will be partners in rebuilding that country."⁵⁵

He then drew on evidence found to justify America's pre-emptive action in occupying Afghanistan: "Our discoveries ... confirmed our worst fears and showed us the true scope of the task ahead. We have seen the depth of our enemies' hatred in videos where they laugh about the loss of innocent life. And the depth of their hatred is equalled by the madness of the destruction they design. We have found diagrams of American nuclear power plants and public water facilities, detailed instructions for making chemical weapons,

⁵⁵ "Bush State of the Union Address," *Cnn.com* January 29 2002, <http://edition.cnn.com/2002/ALLPOLITICS/01/29/bush.speech.txt/>, accessed on 11 September 2001.

surveillance maps of American cities, and thorough descriptions of landmarks in America and throughout the world. What we have found in Afghanistan confirms that, far from ending there, our war against terror is only beginning.”⁵⁶

Bush outlined the reason for America’s action in occupying Afghanistan and widened the scope of the war. “Our ... goal is to prevent regimes that sponsor terror from threatening America or our friends and allies with weapons of mass destruction. Some of these regimes have been pretty quiet since September 11, North Korea ... Iran ... Iraq ... States like these, and their terrorist allies, constitute an axis of evil,⁵⁷ arming to threaten the peace of the world. By seeking weapons of mass destruction, these regimes pose a grave and growing danger. They could provide these arms to terrorists, giving them the means to match their hatred. They could attack our allies or attempt to blackmail the United States. In any of these cases, the price of indifference would be catastrophic.”⁵⁸ And he made this promise: “We will work closely with our coalition to deny terrorists and their state sponsors the materials, technology and expertise to make and deliver weapons of mass destruction.”⁵⁹ With some satisfaction he reported: “Our war on terror is well begun, but it is only begun. This campaign may not be finished on our watch, yet it must be and it will be waged on our watch. We can’t stop short. If we stopped now, leaving terror camps intact and terror states unchecked, our sense of security would be false and temporary. History has called America and our allies to action, and it is both our responsibility and our privilege to fight freedom’s fight.”

When this speech is connected with the previous speeches a very clear outline of what became known as the Bush doctrine emerges. This doctrine drew together the following principles of foreign policy: Pre-emptive military strikes to protect America from possible terrorist attacks on its home soil, the primacy of American military leadership in undertaking such strikes, a new emphasis on America going it alone with out the agreement of the United Nations Security Council and the support of allies, and a determination to spread democracy throughout the world.⁶⁰ A key interpretation of the first principle

⁵⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁷ David Frum, *The Right Man: The Surprise Presidency of George W. Bush, an inside Account* (New York: Random House, 2003).

⁵⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁰ The complete document outlining this strategy was published in the following document: “The National Security Strategy of the United States of America,” (Washington D.C.: 2002) <http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/nsc/nss/2002/index.html>, accessed on 11 September 2009.

is provided by what has been called the Cheney doctrine. "Even if there's just a 1 percent chance of the unimaginable coming due, act as if it is a certainty. It's not about 'our analysis,' as Cheney said. It's about 'our response.' ... Justified or not, fact-based or not, 'our response' is what matters."⁶¹ When applied to the decision to invade Iraq the interpretation worked perfectly — if there was a one percent chance that Saddam Hussein had nuclear weapons and could use them against America or any of her allies then the decision was worth it. It could have worked too to support a decision to prevent Iran from developing a nuclear capacity but by the time the Bush administration began to seriously look at this option its time in office had begun to expire.

IV. WHY DID BUSH DO WHAT HE DID?

When Nine Eleven took place the Bush administration was well placed to launch the 'war on terror.' Bush's team of Cabinet Ministers and senior advisors had at their disposal completed ideological or doctrinal underpinning for the launch of the war on terror.

Until that time in American history there had been no attack against the US on home soil, except for the Japanese attack on Pearl harbour. There had been attacks on American interests and facilities outside the country, particularly in the 1980s and 1990s, but nine-eleven was the first time that mainland America had been attacked and this incident took the US to the point where a decision to respond had to be made. The act of destroying the Twin Towers was a belligerent act, an act of war against the Government and the people of United States. It was an attack on innocent civilians in order to achieve political change. This event called for a response from the United States President whose principle task is to protect the people of the US from harm.

The declaration of the 'war on terror' was the first step in the Bush administration's attempt to stem the tide of terrorism which was perceived to be spreading rapidly and alarmingly. The expansion was so rapid that it was able to reach as far as New York without detection and to inflict damage and casualties before the authorities had the opportunity to intercept and protect US interests and infrastructure.

V. THE IDEOLOGICAL BACKGROUND

The phrase the 'war on terror' or the 'war on terrorism' has been problematic from the first day it was used in the aftermath of the events of nine-eleven.

⁶¹ John Allen Paulos, "Who's Counting: Cheney's One Percent Doctrine: Vice President Said to Feel That if There's a 1 Percent Chance, Then Act," 02 July 2006, <http://abcnews.go.com/Technology/story?id=2120605&page=1>, accessed on 11 September 2009. See the very interesting account of the period covered here in, Ron Suskind, *The One Percent Doctrine* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2006).

The phrase or some version of it had been in use before President Bush introduced it. The origin of the concept of a 'war on terror' can be traced to an international conference held at the Jonathan Institute in Jerusalem in July 1979.

VI. THE JERUSALEM CONFERENCE 1979

This conference was intended, "to focus public attention on the grave threat that international terrorism poses to all democratic societies, to study the real nature of today's terrorism and to propose measures for combating and defeating international terror movements."⁶² Forty one papers were presented covering every aspect of international terrorism as it was then understood. There was no mention of the Muslim world as an entity. The Arab world was mentioned (meaning Palestine) as the Soviet Union was then believed to be the major instigator and financial supporter of international terrorism. However, the call for a strengthened international convention against terrorism and legislation to deal with aviation piracy along with united measures to be taken against states supporting terrorist activities was to become familiar themes in the years that followed.

This conference flagged the 'serious and growing threat' of terrorism' to the people of all states' and to call attention to the reality that terrorism had by then become 'a global problem' that it 'cannot be contained let alone eliminated except by concerted international action'.⁶³ The 'terrorist war' against democratic societies must be met by a corresponding struggle, 'a battle of ideas and a battle of wills' the conference declared.⁶⁴ The closing words to the conference delivered by one of the main speakers noted that 'the issues raised were going to be of increasing importance when we look back ... many years ahead [this conference] will have proved to be a historic milestone in the struggle against terrorism'.⁶⁵

The conference was followed in 1985 by another on the same theme held in Washington. Both conferences taken together provide building blocks to the development of the Bush administration's response much later when facing the aftermath of the events of nine-eleven. These two conferences also connect the importance of the Israeli lobby to the formulation of White House policy against the mounting threat of terrorism. It also highlights the role of Benjamin Netanyahu as a major player in the building an affective Israeli lobby.

⁶² Benjamin Netanyahu, *International Terrorism: Challenge and Response* (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1982).

⁶³ *Ibid*, 361.

⁶⁴ *Ibid*, 6.

⁶⁵ *Ibid*, 360.

From 1979 until 2001 significant groups of influential individuals worked together at a policy level to develop ways of dealing with the rise and spread of terrorism. At first, the aim was to contain the activities of the Soviet Union and its support for the Palestinians and insurgencies aimed at western interests in the Middle East. The Soviet Union was, for example, enticed into Afghanistan where its forces were slowly ground down with disastrous consequences for Afghanistan as well as the Soviets.⁶⁶ After nine years, a withdrawal was effected and the Soviets left with their military in tatters, a defeat that led to the break up of the Soviet Union. The initial deployment began on December 24, 1979. The final withdrawal began on May 15, 1988, and ended on February 15, 1989. This ten-year conflict was to change the course of events in not only Afghanistan but in the Middle East as a whole.

The US support for the Afghan opposition had propelled Islamic guerrilla forces to prominence during this period and the following ten years after the war concluded saw the emergence of insurgencies and terrorist activity aimed at the leaders of selected Islamic States and increasingly American interests in the Muslim world. In US think tanks and in the US administrations of the period increased attention was given to the gradual spread of the kind of warfare described at the 1979 conference.

The involvement of America in this conflict and its support for guerrilla forces like those inspired by or led by figures like Osama bin Laden laid the foundations for events that eventually gave rise to nine-eleven. The picture of international terrorism presented at the Jerusalem Conference had depicted the Soviet Union as the enemy. With the ascendancy of radical Islam, the stage was set to replace the 'Soviet Union' with 'Islam'.

VII. THE STRATEGY FOR AMERICAN DOMINANCE

The attack on the Twin Towers gave the US administration, for the first time, a way to implement the changes in the Middle East that earlier public reports had sketched. In fact, there were members of the Bush administration who had been involved in producing these reports so there was a carry over of well worked out principles into the administration that came to the fore in the aftermath of nine eleven.

Into this ideological mix must go the influence, on the formulation of White House policies, of 'The Committee on the Present Danger' founded in the 1950s and then re-founded in the 1970s before being restructured in

⁶⁶ *The Cia's Intervention in Afghanistan: Interview with Zbigniew Brzezinski, President Jimmy Carter's National Security Adviser, Le Nouvel Observateur, Paris, 15-21 January 1998* [globalresearch.ca, www.globalresearch.ca/articles/BRZ110A.html](http://globalresearch.ca/www.globalresearch.ca/articles/BRZ110A.html), accessed on 11 September 2001.

2004.⁶⁷ The Committee included in its ranks those who would write (released in 1996), the report entitled, *A Clean Break: A New Strategy for Securing the Realm*. This report emphasised the principle of pre-emption rather than retaliation alone and advocated new intellectual foundations for the Israeli government in the formulation of policies in relation to the Palestinians and the wider Middle East.⁶⁸ The second report published by The Project for a New American Century was entitled *Rebuilding America's Defences; Strategy, Forces and Resources for a New Century*⁶⁹ and established the ideological framework for what became known later (with revisions) as the Bush doctrine. The third influential document that established a wider framework for the development of the Bush doctrine was Samuel Huntington thesis about the clash of civilizations and the necessity for America to stay ahead of other nations if it is to maintain its independence and its worldwide influence. He called attention to the critical importance of religion in the clashes of civilization an idea that became 'more cachet' after nine-eleven.⁷⁰

VIII. PRE EMPTIVE PLANNING

Evidence has emerged to suggest that the administration had been planning to deal with Osama bin Laden, Al-Qaeda and the Taliban before nine-eleven. A report emerged in May 2002 that, "President Bush was expected to sign detailed plans for a worldwide war against Al-Qaeda two days before September 11 but did not have the chance before the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington."⁷¹ The document, a formal National Security Presidential Directive, amounted to a "game plan to remove Al-Qaeda from the face of the earth" ... "The plan dealt with all aspects of a war against Al-Qaeda, ranging from diplomatic initiatives to military operations in Afghanistan..."⁷² This was not

⁶⁷ *Committee on the Present Danger*, 2009, www.committeeonthepresentdanger.org/, accessed on 11 September 2009, *Committee on the Present Danger*, www.sourcewatch.org/index.php?title=Committee_on_the_Present_Danger, accessed on 11 September 2009.

⁶⁸ *A Clean Break: A New Strategy for Securing the Realm*, www.israeleconomy.org/strat1.htm, accessed on 11 September 2009.

⁶⁹ Neil Mackay, "Bush Planned Iraq 'Regime Change' before Becoming President," [*Scottish*] *Sunday Herald* 15 September 2002, <http://cryptome.org/rad.htm>, accessed on 11 September 2009.

⁷⁰ See his seminal article published in *Foreign Affairs* in the summer of 1993 entitled *The Clash of Civilizations?* This was later expanded into a book, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order*.1996.

⁷¹ Jim Miklaszewski and Alex Johnson, "U.S. Sought Attack on Al-Qaeda White House Given Plan Days before Sept. 11," *msnbc.com* 16 May 2002, www.msnbc.msn.com/id/4587368, accessed on 11 September 2009.

⁷² *Ibid.*

the only report to emerge. The BBC reported on September 18, 2001 a Pakistani source revealing that the US had been planning attacks against bin Laden and the Taliban before nine-eleven.⁷³ There were other reports to this effect but curiously in the Woodward account of the decision to deal with the Taliban and Al-Qaeda after nine-eleven there is no mention of such planning.⁷⁴

IX. THE INEVITABILITY OF CONFLICT

The Administration had in the circumstances — still unsure of what further terrorist acts might be in the pipeline for mainland United States — no alternative than a swift sharp response. Faced with a stunned nation the President could not have done anything else except react with a military option. It would be very unlikely given the time frame for the attacks on Afghanistan, authorised by the President after nine-eleven, that earlier advanced planning had not been undertaken. However, in taking this military intervention option he and his advisors rose to the bait laid by the group behind the attack. The planners would have calculated that any success would lead to a major reaction. They would have hoped that the reaction to the destruction of the Twin Towers would bring the United States into the Middle East with a military agenda — just as the Soviet Union had been brought into Afghanistan at an earlier time. Hoping, in their eyes, the American reaction would lead to similar consequences.

It is still an open question as to how much damage the planners of the Twin Tower incident thought they could make by crashing planes into the buildings; was the result their good luck or was it good management and planning? There is still controversy in the United States about how the damage, as extensive as it appears, could have been inflicted by the crashes. The technical evidence is far from clear and has given rise to a number of theories — a subject outside the scope of this paper.⁷⁵

⁷³ George Arney, "US 'Planned Attack on Taleban'," *BBC News.com* 18 September 2001, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/1550366.stm, accessed on 11 September 2009.

⁷⁴ Rahul Bedi, "India Joins Anti-Taliban Coalition," *Jane's Intelligence Weekly* 15 March 2001, "The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, Official Government Edition", (2004) www.gpoaccess.gov/911/index.html, Chapters 4, 7 and 8, Julian Borger, "Bush Team 'Agreed Plan to Attack the Taliban the Day before September 11'," *Guardian* 2004, www.guardian.co.uk/world/2004/mar/24/september11.usa2, accessed on 11 September 2009, Arney, "US 'Planned Attack on Taleban'," David Leigh, "Attack and Counter-Attack," *Guardian* September 26 2001, www.guardian.co.uk/Archive/Article/0,4273,4264545,00.html, accessed on 11 September 2009.

⁷⁵ Covered for example by, David Ray Griffin, *The New Pearl Harbour Revisited; 9/11, the Cover-up, and the Expose* (Northampton Massachusetts: Olive Branch Press, 2008).

X. MOTIVES FOR THE ATTACK

There is no clear evidence in the public domain that sheds light on the motivation, planning and hopes of those who planned the event, except for the confessions and admissions of Khalid Sheikh Muhammad, Abu Faraj al-Libi and Ramzi bin Al-Shibh.⁷⁶ As it turns out, none of the accused is Osama bin Laden — the person identified as the reason for the decision to attack Afghanistan. Eventually the spotlight would fall on Khalid Sheikh Muhammad and a small group of Muslim extremists many of whom are now in detention at Guantanamo Bay. They would confess to the attack along with other acts of violence — some through the use of water boarding.⁷⁷ From that document, it is apparent that the perpetrators of nine-eleven acted in retaliation for attacks by American forces in Muslim lands since the ending of World War II.

In a document entitled, “The Islamic response to the Governments Nine Accusations,” filed with the US Government, on March 5, 2009, an explanation for their actions was given by the accused. They wrote, “With regards to these nine accusations that you are putting us on trial for; to us, they are not accusations ... they are badges of honor, which we carry with pride ... Therefore, killing you and fighting you, destroying you and terrorizing you, responding back to your attacks, are all considered to be a great legitimate duty in our religion ...”⁷⁸

Towards the end of the document, the accused wrote, “Who are the real terrorists? Is it us, or is it you? America is the terrorist country number one in the world. Is has nuclear weapons of mass destruction, and the hydrogen bombs, and the biological weapons, and its ocean fleets are around the world,

⁷⁶ “Verbatim Transcript of Combatant Status Review Tribunal Hearing for ISN 10024.” (March 10, 2007) Accessed from www.defenselink.mil/news/transcript_ISN10024.pdf pp.18-26. Transcripts of tribunal hearings for two other high-value detainees are also available. See www.defenselink.mil/news/transcript_ISN10017.pdf and www.defenselink.mil/news/transcript_ISN10013.pdf. The charges against Khalid Sheikh Muhammad and his co conspirators dated April 15, 2008 can be accessed from www.docstoc.com/docs/794040/Ali-Abdul-Aziz-Ali-Referred-May-R.

⁷⁷ Stephen Taylor, “Cheney Vs. Ignatieff on Waterboarding Khalid Sheikh Mohammed,” *Maclean.ca* 2009: see also, <http://www2.macleans.ca/2009/08/30/cheney-vs-ignatieff-on-waterboarding-khalid-sheikh-mohammed/>, accessed on 11 September 2001, “Memorandum for John A. Rizzo Senior Deputy General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency from Office of the Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General: Re: Application of United States Obligations under Article 16 of the Convention against Torture to Certain Techniques That May Be Used in the Interrogation of High Value Al Qaeda Detainees”, www.globalsecurity.org/intell/library/policy/national/olc_050530_bradbury.htm, accessed on 11 September 2009.

⁷⁸ “The Islamic Responses to the Government’s Nine Accusations: United States of America V Khalid Sheikh Muhammad,” (2009).

threatening countries' security and safety and any country that is not subjected to its oppressed will ... We ask to be near to God, we fight you and destroy you and terrorize you. The Jihad in God's cause is a great duty in our religion ..."⁷⁹

The American President considered the destruction of the Twin Towers, however, as an act of war against his country. Bush and his war cabinet considered that America had withstood enough provocation and the time had come for decisive action.⁸⁰ At the time of the response, there had been no thought of asking the question why, except to connect the attacks with the jealousy and resentment of Muslims towards America's wealth, liberty and democracy. The only response to the question of religious motivation has been to say that the extremists and the terrorists have misunderstood the meaning of their own faith.

XI. CONCLUSION

The launching of the 'war on terror' gave the Bush administration and America the opportunity to attempt to carry out changes in the Middle East. These changes had been considered critical to the US self-interest as Republican think tanks through the Clinton era had begun to propose. What stood in the way of realising such plans were the actions of Muslim radicals.

In his closing speech to the Jerusalem conference Lord Chalfont stated, "[the problem is] the will of the west to fight against those things that threaten it. Do we have that will or not"?⁸¹ George Bush in rolling out the 'war on terror' demonstrated he had the will.

To date, following nearly eight years of conflict there have been 1,355 western military deaths⁸² with approximately 4,477 wounded. Afghanistan forces have taken 5,010 casualties. 111 contractors have been killed with an estimated 2,428

⁷⁹ Ibid, 4-6 The record continued: "We have news for you,[the USA] the news is: You will be greatly defeated in Afghanistan and Iraq and that America will fall, politically, militarily, and economically. Your end is very near and your fall will be just as the fall of the towers on the blessed 9/11 day. We will raise from the ruins, God willing. We will leave this imprisonment with our noses raised high in dignity, as the lion emerges from his den. We shall pass over the blades of the sword into the gates of heaven."

⁸⁰ For a time line of the main terrorist attacks involving the USA see: *Timeline of Terror*, <http://library.thinkquest.org/CR0212088/tertime.htm>, accessed on 11 September 2009. For an insightful account of the Bush administration's thinking and planning from Nine-eleven until the attack on Afghanistan see: Woodward, *Bush at War*.

⁸¹ Netanyahu, *International Terrorism: Challenge and Response* 360.

⁸² *Icasualties.Org: Operation Enduring Freedom*, <http://icasualties.org/oef/>, accessed on 11 September 2009, "With 4 U.S. Deaths, Grim Milestone in Afghan War," 2009, www.nytimes.com/2009/08/26/world/asia/26troops.html?_r=2, accessed on 11 September 2009.

wounded. The Taliban and Al-Qaeda have sustained between 22,640 and 23,101 killed with approximately 1,000 captured.⁸³ An estimate of Afghani civilian casualties puts the number between 10,960 and 30,557 out of a population of 33.6 million.⁸⁴ This represents a figure of between 40,000 and 60,000 people that have died so far in the conflict.

Eight years later, it is far from clear if America and her NATO allies can control the country. It is also far from clear for what purpose the war continues in Afghanistan.⁸⁵ On the popular level there is far less enthusiasm for the war now than there was in the highly charged emotional atmosphere in America and around the western world in 2001.⁸⁶ It is too early to assess the success or otherwise of the 'war on terror' launched by President Bush. What is clear is that the 'war on terror' has become a global struggle just as the President envisaged as he rolled out the plans in the months following nine-eleven.

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⁸³ "With 4 U.S. Deaths, Grim Milestone in Afghan War."

⁸⁴ Ibid.

⁸⁵ Chris Hedges, "War without Purpose," *truthdig.com* 2009, www.truthdig.com/report/item/20090720_war_without_purpose/, accessed on 11 September 2009.

⁸⁶ For an interesting recent academic critique, see: Anthony Cormack David Betz, "Iraq, Afghanistan and British Strategy," *Orbis* 53.2 (2009).

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