



Asian Conflicts Reports

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Cross-Border Implications of the Afghan Drawdown

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The first batch of 650 US soldiers left Afghanistan on 15 July 2011, commencing the US drawdown of its ten year operations in that country. However, in view of the fallout of the potential double dip recession in the US and emerging sovereign debt crises across the north Atlantic, the scale and the pace of the planned drawdown may in fact be quicker than anticipated. Although the decision to begin the security transition is conditioned by the improvement of the security environment, the situation on the ground in Afghanistan is still highly volatile, to say the least. This raises disturbing implications for neighboring countries that border the conflict zone, especially Pakistan and China.

That the Afghan National Security Forces are not yet prepared to handle transferred security responsibilities was highlighted in the aftermath of recent US and ISAF-NATO withdrawal from most of the Forward Operating Bases (FoB) located in the Kunar and Nuristan province of Afghanistan. This provided an opportunity to Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM), Jamaat al-Dawa al-Sunnat (JDS) and other transnational terrorist outfits to establish semi-sanctuaries in Afghan areas and to launch a series of cross-border attacks inside Pakistan and the western Chinese state of Xinjiang.

According to Pakistani sources, eight major attacks have been launched from Afghanistan against the Pakistani security forces and civilian targets between June and July 2011. In one such attack, the TTP and JDS – the Afghan ally of Al-Qaeda also known as Salafi Taliban – crossed the border from Kunar province in Afghanistan and attacked police outposts and villages in the Shaltalu area of Pakistani Dir. Dozens of Pakistani policemen were taken hostage during the ensuing fighting and were subsequently executed. The brutal executions were filmed and disseminated publicly through internet and traditional media outlets.

While the TTP claimed the responsibility, the Afghan Taliban led by Mullah Umar disowned and condemned the attacks. So far, the Afghan Taliban's reaction to such raids has been restricted to publically distancing themselves from the violence. The critical question remains; for as to how much longer will they be able to turn a blind eye to transnational terrorist outfits such as the TTP and JDS operating from the territory traditionally claimed by the Afghan insurgents? To date, the TTP's cross border raids into Pakistani areas continue and gather pace. It is likely that these continuing incursions could cause further friction in the already strained relationships between the Pakistani and Afghan governments.

Operating from the newly established sanctuaries in Kunar and Nuristan, terrorist groups are expanding their operations beyond the Wakhan corridor, a narrow strip connecting Pakistan with Afghanistan and China. On 31 July 2011, knife-wielding attackers killed at least nine people in two separate attacks in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region of China. The attacks came two weeks after 20 people were killed in a raid on a police station in Hotan city, on the southern rim of the Taklimakan Desert east of Kashgar. This was the bloodiest violence seen for a year in Xinjiang. China blamed the attacks on the ETIM and claimed that the terrorist elements received training at camps located in the tribal areas of Pakistan. The truth, however, is far more complicated.

In the immediate aftermath of the international intervention in Afghanistan in 2001, a number of international terrorist outfits previously operating within Afghanistan relocated to the tribal areas of Pakistan. The whereabouts of the Uyghur militants of ETIM remained unknown for two years until they arrived in Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) sometime near the end of 2003. Due to the close and special nature of Pakistan's relations with China, the ETIM was a top priority target of Pakistan's initial military strikes in the restive tribal region. Pakistani security forces successfully eliminated Hasan Mahsum, one of the founding members of the group, in South Waziristan on 2 October 2003. The group subsequently become even more ferocious and joined the Pakistani Taliban in their declared war against Pakistani state and society.

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In the aftermath of NATO's withdraw from parts of Kunar and Nuristan, terrorists have established semi-sanctuaries and launched cross-border attacks

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Eight major attacks have recently been launched from Afghanistan into Pakistan, with one attack resulting in the broadcasted execution of dozens of Pakistani policemen

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Operating from the Wakhan corridor, ETIM Uyghur separatists have perpetrated attacks in Chinese Xinjiang, killing at least 30 people



In December 2007, the ETIM became an active part of the newly established TTP umbrella of local, regional and international terrorist outfits. The ETIM fighters were involved with the TTP in the latter's takeover of Swat valley in 2008.

Subsequent military operation by the Pakistan Army dislodged militants, and the majority including the ETIM fighters fled to neighboring Afghanistan. The departure of international forces from Nuristan and Kunar provinces provided the TTP and ETIM an opportunity to reorganize and launch attacks in Pakistan and China respectively.

Such cross-border raids and terrorist attacks launched by the TTP and its Afghan and Central Asian allies are symptoms of a greater ill caused by the aftermath of the ISAF withdrawal from Afghanistan. It appears that a premature departure of international troops from Afghanistan will not only pave the way for resurgence of Islamist movements in Central Asia, but also reverse the successes gained against Al-Qaeda by strengthening its local partners such as the TTP, JDS and other Central Asian terror outfits.

In addition, the beginning of the international withdrawal from Afghanistan has, it appears, proved to be a significant morale booster for the Islamist militant operating in the region. In Jihadi circles in Pakistan, an Urdu verse already widely circulating translates as "*We witnessed the collapse of the Soviets and now it's the US's turn; the day is not far when we will witness India on fire with the flames of Jihad*". This particular piece of Jihadi poetry underlines the expansionist agenda of the TTP, and its allies now shuttling across the border zone between Afghanistan and Pakistan.

With the Afghan National Army still unprepared and poorly-equipped to meet already severe security challenges, the power vacuum created by the withdrawal of coalition forces could very well potentially lead to another Afghan civil war.

A complex interplay of local and international actors in Afghanistan with varying agendas, including a fragile government in the centre, an Army divided on ethnic lines, indigenous insurgent groups like the Afghan Taliban and Hizb-e-Islami, transnational terrorist groups such as the TTP, AQ, IMU and power struggles between regional countries, is likely to encourage a repeat of the post-Soviet crises Afghanistan suffered in the late 1980s. In any such scenario bordering countries, Pakistan especially, will be on the receiving end of increased lawlessness and terrorist violence. Pakistan can ill-afford another civil war in Afghanistan that could produce millions of refugees and provide safe havens to the local and international terrorist groups wrecking havoc in Pakistan's tribal belt and deep into the interior of the country.

The international community has an important role in preventing any such doomsday scenario from unfolding in Afghanistan and ensuring that the US does not repeat the mistakes of 1990 when it pulled its covert operations from Afghanistan in haste, leaving Pakistan isolated and unable to effectively handle the fallout.

Instead, the scale and the pace of the planned drawdown needs to be managed in order to buy more time for a robust stability and peace to be forged in Afghanistan. While the western coalition partners are increasingly realizing the importance of political reconciliation with key elements of the Afghan insurgency, Pakistan must not be pushed towards a loss of leverage with members within the Afghan Taliban likely to take a place at the heart of any new post-coalition government following the departure of interventionist forces. Sustained working relationships with the future power structure in the neighboring country are imperative for Pakistan to deny future safe hideouts and havens to the TTP and other transnational terrorist groups in Afghanistan that are not just a Pakistani challenge but also a global terrorist threat. •

Afghanistan after the NATO Withdrawal

Yukari Ota



President Obama spoke for all of Afghanistan's international partners, not just Americans, when he called for a new focus on "nation-building at home" in his June 2011 speech announcing the military surge's drawdown. To quote: "We are a nation whose strength abroad has been anchored in opportunity for our citizens at home ... Over the last decade, we have spent a trillion dollars on war, at a time of rising debt and hard economic times ... Now, we must invest in America's greatest resource – our people ... America, it is time to focus on nation building here at home." Obama's speech signals the beginning of the end for America's longest war.

The objective of the military campaign in Afghanistan was to destroy al-Qaeda and drive their hosts, the Taliban, from the country. Viewed against this original justification, many would say that the mission has been accomplished. Few if any al-Qaeda operatives remain in Afghanistan, Afghan officials claim that al-Qaeda operatives now prefer to base in the safer and more central location of Yemen. Drone strikes and counter-terrorism raids have captured or killed many senior al-Qaeda leaders. With the death of bin-Laden and the leaders, the organization is in disarray. Given this, political leaders can justify the withdrawal of the NATO troops from Afghanistan. However, NATO-ISAF's gains against the Taliban movement remain fragile and reversible, and ensuring their durability and that of the Afghan government is critical.

But international terrorism is fluid; premature abandonment of Afghanistan could enable it to rise again, destabilizing this critical region and vitiating the gains and sacrifices of the last decade. Before NATO undertakes a substantial troop withdrawal, certain prerequisites must be in place. Namely, Afghanistan needs security forces that can hold and consolidate the gains of NATO's surge and stronger government institutions that can deliver services and justice that will win the Afghan people's confidence in their government and address the root grievances fuelling the insurgency.

While most Afghans express satisfaction at the demise of Osama bin-Laden, they are quick to emphasize that a rapid withdrawal of NATO forces would create a power vacuum, as the Soviet withdrawal in 1989 did, and destabilize the country. While Afghans want to see international forces withdraw so they can re-assert their sovereignty, they also fear abandonment and its consequences. They seek a lasting international commitment to Afghanistan, and international support for strong security forces that will ensure stability and security as NATO forces withdraw.

Most Afghans perceive their army as a strong and reliable institution, though recent attacks by extremists dressed in army uniforms have succeeded in undermining public confidence in the army to some extent. Still, popular (and international) anxieties focus more on the Afghan National Police (ANP), who have a track record of bad behavior in many communities. Unlike the Afghanistan National Army (ANA), which was built from scratch after 2002, when the international community completely demobilized the former Afghanistan National Forces (ANF), the police started off on a bad foot. In many cases, policemen and their officers were simply warlords, militia, or gangsters deputized by the Afghan government and international community based on their supposed opposition to the Taliban and loyalty to the new government. Most policemen recruited in the period from 2002—2006 received no formal training. Pay was extremely limited, and often siphoned off by police commanders. Policemen shook down citizens in order to get paid. With weapons and uniforms, many police acted on old grievances and alienated their neighbors from the government. Many policemen also abused narcotics and engaged in criminal activities. They carried out torture, kidnappings, and robberies. Murderers, drug smugglers, insurgents, and thieves were released from prison by bribing police officials. Meanwhile, innocent persons were wrongly incarcerated and others were kept in prison past the expiration of their sentences. In the absence of a formal justice system, local power-brokers called the shots and communities had no access to impartial judicial protection.

Many Afghans perceived a culture of impunity in which criminals committed crimes and the police did not respond. Warlords have used property destruction, rape, and murder to discourage displaced local people from reclaiming their homes. Human trafficking, especially of under aged women, remains common across the country.

General Stanley McChrystal, former Commander of ISAF, concluded his assessment in 2010 that malfunctioning Afghan government security institutions were comparable to the insurgency itself in posing a serious and potentially fatal threat to the country. Since 2007, the international community has focused on growth and qualitative improvement of the Afghan National Security Forces.

1 A rapid withdrawal of NATO forces would create an Afghan power vacuum, similar to that produced by the Soviets in 1989, fuelling disability in the region

2 Recent attacks by extremists dressed in army uniforms have undermined public confidence in the Afghan army as a strong and reliable institution

3 Malfunctioning Afghan security institutions, the police force in particular, pose a serious threat to national security, comparable to the insurgency



In November 2009, NATO created a new NATO Training Mission Afghanistan (NTM-A) and the United States began to provide resources for a larger, better-trained police and army. The police have grown from 99,000 personnel in March 2010 to 126,000 in May 2011, and will grow to 157,000 by October 2012. The Army has grown from 107,000 to 164,000 during that period and will grow to 195,000 by October 2012.

Bigger security forces are inherently better, in that they “hold” the territory “cleared” by ISAF’s counterinsurgency operations while also receiving more training. Army and Police now receive the same pay – at least US\$165 a month, which is a living wage in Afghanistan, with additional pay for hardship, danger, and re-enlistment. All new policemen now receive training, including literacy training. Marksmanship, literacy, leadership development, and unit cohesion have all improved. Furthermore, Afghan police and soldiers are now “partnered” with ISAF forces in the field, learning by doing with their international partners. Afghans are increasingly leading on planning and execution of military operations.

All of this comes at a price. While Afghanistan contributed US\$382 million (out of US\$1 billion in revenue) to pay for its security forces last year, the force costs between US\$6 and US\$7 billion annually to maintain. International contributions make up the difference, but international resources are finite. Notwithstanding grand predictions of mineral wealth saving the Afghan Government budget, the country’s revenue projections remain grim. As NATO transitions to an Afghan lead on security by 2014, nations will have to maintain a financial commitment to the ANSF if the Afghan forces are to do their job and not resort to the predatory behavior of the past.

Expensive security forces are only part of the solution. Ultimately, even if a US\$6-7 billion annual international commitment to the ANSF would be enough to keep Afghanistan’s insurgents under control, the international community would tire of the expense in time. A peace process that addresses the core grievances that drive the insurgency can diminish the violence and enable a political solution to Afghanistan’s conflict that would be more durable than any military solution. Since 2010, the Afghan government has developed a “Peace and Reintegration Program” with exactly this in mind.

The Program covers the widest network possible in offering talks to almost all segments of the insurgents of Afghan origin. The program is targeting those who are renouncing violence and ties to Taliban and Al-Qaeda, and agreeing to accept the Afghan constitution. In joining the reintegration program, they and their communities benefit from a chance at peace, improved governance, and economic development. International donors have provided over US\$140 million to support these efforts. Through the Program, Afghan government institutions take responsibility for security and the delivery of services to their communities, helping to build confidence in the government and creating the political and psychological conditions to foster an enduring peace. Communities with a history of conflict with the Afghan government will increasingly see the state as a source of development assistance, and will become stakeholders through these efforts.

While transition to an Afghan lead on security and a drawdown of international forces is a goal that NATO member states and Afghans share, the process must be deliberate if we are to avoid a repeat of the “rush for the exits” that characterized international engagement in Afghanistan in 1989. The collapse of Soviet support in 1991 led to the collapse of the Najibullah regime, even after Soviet tactics and Afghan “reconciliation” efforts had set the conditions for regime preservation in the late 1980s. Premature withdrawal of troops and or financial support would have the same effect on today’s Afghan government. No Afghan ruler has remained “sovereign” without international assistance for his army. Many political leaders therefore must accept that Afghanistan, and particularly its expensive security forces, will still require substantial international financial support in order to at least maintain the status quo established by ISAF’s surge, and to improve security.

Over the past decade, many Afghans and international partners have realized that conducting peace in Afghanistan is more complicated than fighting in the war. The Peace and Reintegration Program, by addressing some of the root causes of popular support for the insurgency, can help to ensure a lasting peace – one guaranteed by a valid social contract between Afghans and their government, rather than one imposing by an expensive force of soldiers and policemen. This will not happen overnight. Strategic patience and a measured walk, not rush, toward the exit will alone justify the international sacrifices and ensure Afghans’ rights to a better future.

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Boko Haram: The Evolution of Islamist Extremism in Nigeria

Shanaka Jayasekara & Lise Waldek



On 25 December 2010 a series of bombs in central Jos were claimed by a radical rejectionist group calling itself the *Jama'atu Abi-Sunnah Lidda'Awati Wal Jihad* (People committed to the Prophet's teachings for Propagation and Jihad). In a statement released by the group the bombs and later attacks against buildings in Maiduguri were intended to "avenge atrocities against Muslims in those areas". More recently, on June 16 2011 the Boko Haram (assessed as being the same group responsible for the Jos bombings) carried out a suicide bomb attack in the Nigerian capital of Abuja.

The antecedents of the Boko Haram first emerged in 1995 under the leadership of Abubakah Lawn. There is little reporting on the group until December 2003 when it claimed responsibility for a number of attacks against security officials in Yobe and Borno. Temporarily occupying buildings in Kanamma, members of the group flew flags inscribed with the word 'Afghanistan,' earning the group the moniker Nigerian Taliban. Under the descriptor of the 'Nigerian Taliban' the group carried out further attacks against security forces in Yobe and Borno. An ambush against a police patrol in October 2004 which left 15 officers dead resulted in a heavy-handed police response and the dispersal of the group into Niger, Chad and Maiduguri. It was from these fighters fleeing into Maiduguri that Mohammed Yusuf is thought to have developed the current Boko Haram organization.

In line with previous radical northern Nigerian groups, the Boko Haram (translated as 'western education is sacrilege') rejects all forms of secular authority and seeks to establish a Nigerian state governed entirely by Shari'a law. The group has not been appeased by the re-introduction of Shari'a law into 12 northern Nigerian states, as they perceive those in positions of authority to be marred by corruption and western-style ambitions. Such views are likely to resonate among the wider population who experience daily the endemic corruption found across all of Nigeria.

Recent statements issued by the group have drawn on narratives used by transnational militant Islamists such as al-Qaeda and sought to place their Nigerian Jihad in-line with other 'scenes of jihad' such as Palestine, Iraq and Afghanistan. Although the leader of the al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) has twice offered his "Nigerian brothers" support and training, there is no evidence to suggest the group has any active links or connections to al-Qaeda or any of its associated groups. However, this combination of perceived local and global grievances provides the group a platform on which to seek support, legitimacy and justification above and beyond Nigeria's borders. As a consequence, the group may have longevity beyond that experienced by previous rejectionist groups that have periodically emerged in Northern Nigeria.

There is little comprehensive reporting on the group's founder Mohammed Yusuf. Reporting indicates he was born 29 January 1979 in Girgir, Jakusko area, Yobe, and had four wives and twelve children. Some reports imply Yusuf had received a western-style education up to graduate level, while other sources suggest that following a basic education in Nigeria he completed Qur'anic studies in Niger and Chad. Yusuf was arrested in 2006 and 2008 on charges of incitement to violence and support of terrorism, but on both occasions was released without charge. His arrest on 25 July 2009 sparked four days of violence and culminated in his death whilst in police custody. His death was explained by the Borno State Police Commissioner as the result of a shoot-out during his attempted escape. A number of official bodies, including the Nigerian Bar Association, have claimed that his death was an extrajudicial killing carried out to prevent the release of information concerning support by local political authorities to the group.

In the aftermath of Yusuf's death, leadership of the Boko Haram initially appeared to have been taken on by Mallam Sanni Umaru. Issuing a statement in a Nigerian newspaper as the "acting leader", he pledged to continue the fight to bring about Islamic revolution in Nigeria. There is no further reporting on Umaru, and in a video released July 2010, Abu Muhammed Abubakar bin Muhammad Shekau (Yusuf's deputy) was named as the group's leader. Although reported to have been killed in the July 2009 violence, Shekau has since released a number of statements, including a claim for the December 25 Jos bombings.

Accurate figures on the size, capability and spread of the Boko Haram are hard to ascertain. The group appears to have a degree of support and reach across Borno, Yobe, Bauchi and Plateau states. However, the tendency for attacks carried out by the group to spark outbreaks of violence among the wider population can have a force multiplying affect on perceptions of the size and strength of the group. The ongoing violence in Jos following the December 2010 bombings is a clear indication that whatever their actual physical capability or levels of support are, the group has the ability (intentionally or not) to ferment violent discord in the wider region.

1 The Boko Haram rejects all forms of secular authority and seeks to establish a Nigerian state governed entirely by Shari'a law

2 Led by Muhammad Shekau, the group conducts attacks against security officials and infrastructure, and collects weapons through raids on police stations

3 The Nigerian government alleges that Boko Haram leaders have received al-Qaeda funding and training in Mauritania and Pakistan



The group's main modus operandi has been small-scale attacks against security officials and infrastructure. Raids against police stations and convoys have afforded the group with opportunities to seize small arms weaponry. However, media reporting on the July 2009 violence indicated that the group relied primarily on machetes. The group has also planned and executed targeted assassinations against security and government officials as well as local leaders and imams. The June 2011 suicide bomb attack in Abuja represents a significant development of modus operandi and expertise.

In October 2010, it is alleged that member of the Group killed Bashir Kashara, a prominent Wahabi cleric in Maiduguri who ran a radio program critical of the Group. In March 2011, the Boko Haram claimed the assassination of Imam Ibrahim Ahmed Abdullahi, an Islamic cleric who spoke out against growing sectarian violence in Northeastern Nigeria. Using Hausa scripted posters disseminated in parts of Maiduguri they also claimed responsibility for the assassination of Alhaji Modu Fannami Gubio, a candidate of the All Nigeria People's Party (ANPP) and brother of former Borno State Governor Ali Modu Sheriff.

Operations by Nigerian security forces against the group after the July 2009 attacks discovered a range of explosive materials. The recent bombings in Jos and Abuja imply that the group continues to have access to explosive materials and is able to manufacture and use them to deadly effect.

The Nigerian Government alleged the group has received funding from al-Qaeda affiliates, but no conclusive evidence has been provided. A research report by Dr Abiodun Alao titled Islamic Radicalization and Violence in Nigeria, cites uncorroborated links with wider Islamist movements in the region. The report refers to the indictment in the case of Mohammed Ashafa, which states that Ashafa received training in Mauritania and Niger and undertook covert operations in Nigeria on the instructions of al-Qaeda handlers in Pakistan. The prosecution also states that Ashafa transferred coded messages between al-Qaeda and Boko Haram.

If these charges are found to be accurate they would provide the most direct evidence of communication between the Boko Haram and al-Qaeda. However, the level of communication and type of engagement in this indictment is unclear. While it is possible Ashafa's exploits in Pakistan provided a channel of communication to the Nigerian Group, there are currently no official statements or direct references to the Boko Haram in any al-Qaeda statements.

There have been reports that quote unnamed security sources as saying that Hausa speaking Nigerians have been receiving military training at camps in Burkina Faso and Niger. These reports come amidst claims by the Boko Haram that several members have returned home after receiving training in Somalia.

There is scarce information on the command and control structures of the Boko Haram. Therefore, making an assessment of the human resource capacity and available skills is not possible. The group has demonstrated an incremental progression from isolated shooting incidents to the use of explosive detonation technology. While the structure of the group is unclear there has been a noticeable advancement in skills and technology.

The suicide attack on the National Police Headquarters in Abuja, June 2011 was the first such mission undertaken by the group. Based on media reports, the Boko Haram spokesman has identified the bomber as a Mohammed Manga, a 35 year old married man with five children. According to the spokesman, the bomber travelled overnight from Maiduguri, indicating the group did not have the confidence or capacity to execute the operation from inside Abuja.

It is likely that the group's external support networks are still relatively limited and it remains dependent on its core supporters in the north of Nigeria. However, the decision by the Boko Haram to expand its theatre of operations outside Maiduguri and execute a suicide attack represents both a significant shift in capability and message. It speaks volumes to the Nigerian security establishment who have previously been keen to represent the group as a regional problem rather than a national threat.

The recent attack on the capital of Nigeria is a reminder of the difficulty in containing violence within a specific location in a given country. Despite its potentially small, fractured and highly fluid structure, the Boko Haram's suicide attack in the capital city is a reminder that terror often knows no boundaries and is highly contagious. The deep-rooted ethno-religious problems need to be addressed across all of Nigeria. Solutions are likely to be slow and painful but the issues must be faced before a regional headache becomes a national migraine. •

Mass Murder in Norway: The Challenges of Prevention

Clive Williams



Preventing mass murder, whether politically motivated or not, is a challenge for security intelligence and law enforcement organizations. The tragedy in Norway brings home to us once again the danger presented by that very small percentage of the population who convince themselves that the only way to achieve change or gain revenge is through the killing of lots of innocent people.

Anders Behring Breivik 32, the man arrested in relation to the Norway attacks appears to be a combination of Timothy McVeigh and Martin Bryant in his behavior. McVeigh was responsible for the Oklahoma City bombing in 1995 that killed 168 people. Bryant was responsible for the Port Arthur shooting massacre in Tasmania, Australia in 1996 that resulted in the death of 35 people. McVeigh was executed in 2001, while Bryant is serving 35 life terms.

The challenge for society is in identifying potential mass murderers before they can undertake the act.

There seem to be few childhood parallels between Breivik, McVeigh and Bryant, other than unstable family backgrounds. McVeigh's parents divorced when he was 10. He was the target of bullying at school and took refuge in a fantasy world where he retaliated against the bullies. He later saw the US government as the ultimate bully after the Waco killings. He was an outgoing child who became withdrawn during his adolescence. At high school McVeigh became a skilled hacker and at one point was named "most promising computer programmer", but got poor grades overall. He was introduced to firearms by his grandfather and at one stage wanted to become a gunshop owner. He served in the US military during the 1991 Gulf War and later developed links with right wing extremists.

Bryant was a destructive child, described by teachers as distant from reality and unemotional. He suffered severe bullying at school. In 1977 psychological assessments mention his torturing of animals and teasing of younger children. Bryant had an IQ of 66 which placed him in the bottom 1.17 percent of the Australian population. He had no friends, even in his 20s after he received an inheritance from an eccentric sponsor and his father's superannuation. (Bryant was probably responsible for the deaths of both his sponsor and his father, but there was insufficient evidence to prosecute him.)

Breivik's parents divorced when he was one year old. He was said to be an intelligent student. At age 15 he had a falling out with his father and cut off contact. Ideologically, Breivik has been characterized as a right-wing extremist and Christian fundamentalist. He was highly critical of Muslim immigration into Christian societies, pro-Israel and an admirer of the American Tea Party movement. His interests were hunting and violent conflict-oriented computer games, including *World of Warcraft* and *Modern Warfare 2*.

Both McVeigh and Breivik seem to have developed their extreme right-wings views in adulthood. McVeigh was nearly 27 at the time of his bombing, and Bryant nearly 30 when he undertook the Port Arthur massacre. As noted earlier, Breivik was 32. In adult life all three developed into cold, calculating loners.

La Trobe University researcher Dr Ramon Spaaij says that the main ideological drivers for lone terrorists are white supremacy, Islamism, nationalism/separatism, and anti-abortionism. He notes that four of the five lone wolf terrorists in his case studies were diagnosed with either a personality disorder or obsessive-compulsive disorder. "They were loners with few friends and generally preferred to act alone. Communication with outsiders was largely confined to violent actions and written statements."

In Breivik's 1,517-page manifesto published the day of the attacks - part of which was adapted from the manifesto of the American Unabomber - he writes that Muslims "have transformed my beloved Oslo into a multicultural shithole." He claimed to be part of a shadowy network of latter-day crusader knights modeled on the Knights Templar military order that fought Muslims during the Crusades. It was set up in London in 2002 with cells across Europe. Breivik says he was the youngest of five people at the founding meeting, and attended two follow-up sessions in the Baltic states. Breivik claims the secret society is plotting the takeover of Western Europe by "indigenous Europeans". "A large successful attack every 5-12 years was optimal depending on available forces."

The FBI Behavioral Science Unit has tried to profile mass killers. A mass murderer (like, McVeigh, Bryant and Breivik) is someone who kills a large number of people, typically at the same time or over a relatively short period of time. By contrast, serial killers have a cooling-off period between killings.

1 Identifying potential mass murderers before they can act is an increasingly vital challenge for all states

2 Anders Behring Breivik has been characterized as a right-wing extremist and Christian fundamentalist

3 The main ideological drivers for lone terrorists include white supremacy, Islamism, nationalism/separatism and anti-abortionism



Some characteristics of serial killers include: 90 percent male, intelligent, do poorly at school and work, come from unstable families, abandoned by fathers and brought up by domineering mothers, hate their parents, were abused as children, have been institutionalized and have psychological problems, have attempted suicide, are interested in unusual and sadomasochistic porn, wet their beds past the age of 12, light fires and torture small animals. Few of these seem to apply to mass murderers like Breivik and so far it has not been possible to come up with useful personality indicators to single out potential mass murderers.

Two of the basic ingredients for perpetrators of mass murder are being prepared to die during the attack, and angry or paranoid enough to blame others for their situation. Breivik did not intend to die and surrendered to authorities because he plans to use the trial as a platform to blame the ruling Norwegian Labour Party for the immigration situation in Norway.

Unfortunately, the warning signs for mass murderers are not very specific and could apply to many people in the general population who will never end up being violent towards anyone. Security intelligence analysts and medical practitioners will therefore find it difficult to identify potential mass murderers.

The planned act of mass murder is however usually preceded by a careful and sometimes protracted preparatory phase. In Breivik's case this lasted nine years, with finalization over the past two years. This period could provide security intelligence with some indicators - such as entries on social networking, chat or hate sites, research and reconnaissance activities, and acquisition of the means to undertake the killing.

Breivik was active on the internet, including posting a YouTube clip, because he was keen to get his "nationalist" message out.

One effect of Breivik's actions has been to focus attention on the rise of right-wing extremism and Islamophobia in Western Europe. There are several contributing factors. These include the common ethnic European perception of a threat from Muslim immigration and Islamist extremists, competition for jobs, the relatively high birth rate of Muslim families, growing ethnic nationalism, and the time-gap since right wing Nazi extremism was a problem in Europe.

Indeed, right wing views are increasingly becoming political mainstream in Europe - and even moderate politicians have been moving to the right and away from multiculturalism. Germany's Chancellor Angela Merkel, President Nicolas Sarkozy of France and Prime Minister David Cameron in Britain all recently declared an end to multiculturalism.

In France, the far-right National Front, now led by Marine Le Pen, has surged in opinion polls, with surveys predicting she might make it to next year's presidential runoff. Marine Le Pen has compared Muslims praying in the streets outside overcrowded mosques to the Nazi occupation.

Director of the Norwegian Center against Racism, Kari Helene Partapuoli notes "The Norwegian right-wing groups have always been disorganized, haven't had charismatic leaders or the kind of well-organized groups with financial support that you see in Sweden ... But in the last two or three years our organization and other antifascist networks have warned of an increased temperature of debate and that violent groups had been established."

Norway does not exist in a vacuum. Its right-wing scene is connected to the rest of Europe through internet forums where hate speech proliferates, and Norwegians participate in right-wing demonstrations throughout Europe.

Breivik had access to arms and homemade explosives and knew how to use them. He probably chose Utøya Island because of its isolation and the connection of the young people there to the ruling Labour Party that he blamed for Norway's immigration policies. Had the Norwegian Police not been distracted by the Oslo bombing, and had they responded more quickly to the island, the death toll there could have been much lower. Depending on whether you believe the police or the media, Breivik had between 60 and 90 minutes to massacre his chosen victims.

Future inquiries will no doubt find fault with the police response, but Norway's politicians should bear some responsibility for Norway's complacency about its national security - despite warnings from US and UK security authorities, and for under-resourcing the police.

The Norway attacks are a reminder for us of the continuing need to monitor individuals with extreme right-wing views as security Persons of Interest (POIs). They should obviously not be allowed to join gun clubs, own guns, or be able to buy quantities of explosive precursors. Another lesson is the need for a quick law enforcement response to shooter incidents that might occur in isolated locations - and might be timed to coincide with other police commitments.

China's Economic Offensive in Russia and ASEAN

Amparo Pamela H. Fabe



The Chinese Government through its investment arm, the CITIC Company Holdings of China Capital has led an economic offensive by pouring massive investments into energy projects both in the Russian Far East (RFE) and in the ASEAN countries. This foreign direct investment points to a well-planned strategy to gain a strong economic foothold over much of the Asian continent. These Chinese energy investments are part of a program to ensure the continuous reinforcement of a stable energy supply that will support the growth and expansion of Chinese companies within China, as well as Chinese multinational companies operating overseas.

This remarkable and aggressive Chinese economic push has happened simultaneously with the perceptible weakening of Japanese and Russian economic influence in the RFE and in the ASEAN region. The Japanese economy recently slid to second place behind the resurgent Chinese economy. The economic consequences flowing from the recent earthquake and tsunami will also weigh heavily on the local economy in the coming years. The continuing suboptimal performance of the Russian economy has led to sluggish economic growth and a corresponding decline in strategic influence in the ASEAN region.

Amidst the scenario of less vibrant competitors in Asia, the Chinese Government has pushed for the acquisition of stable energy supplies and the establishment of infrastructure energy projects in the two regions. Beginning 2006, the Chinese Development Bank (CDB) has funded Chinese companies in Sakhalin to invest in energy projects. In 2009, the Chinese Government made loans to the Russian Bank for Economic Development and Foreign Affairs, Vneshekonombank (VEB). China has also acquired a strategic interest in Lukoil, Russia's biggest oil producing company and in Yukos Oil Company. China's well-designed strategy comes at a delicate time when political turmoil and military problems have affected the Middle East, triggering serious concerns on energy and oil sufficiency and sustainability.

Similarly, within the ASEAN region, China has stepped up energy investments in the Philippines, Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, Cambodia and Vietnam. Massive equity investments and soft concessional loans in hydropower, solar and wind power, coco oil, bio-diesel, and coal have soared. The combined Chinese investment in these projects has reached at least US\$80 billion. About 45 Chinese multinational corporations implemented Burma's 63 hydropower projects, which include investments in substation and transmission lines. The largest hydropower project is the 7,100 MW Tasang Dam on the Salween River. Hanenergy Holding Group and China Gold Water Resources have also invested in a 2,400 MW hydropower project. In oil and gas, 16 Chinese multinational corporations have invested in 21 onshore and offshore projects. China has also been the major recipient of coal from the ASEAN countries which are coal exporters.

Chinese multinational corporations have also been establishing small hydropower projects to promote energy sustainability in regions of ASEAN countries where communist insurgency is relatively strong. Chinese energy investments in the ASEAN region and in the Russian Far East are expected to triple in the next five years. China's energy investment thrust is complemented by a renewed effort to discover mineral resources in Southeast Asia. This mineral resource strategy is focused on acquiring gold, copper and coal mining areas, exploring methane gas production and identifying steel, aluminum and iron ore development areas. The Chinese have also complemented this energy investment strategy with investments in international ports and in low-cost but high-speed railways to ensure a secure supply pipelines to its heavy manufacturing industries.

By dominating energy assets in the two regions, China exercises a gentle control on the geographical areas where the energy projects are located. The presence of multiple energy assets is reinforced by industrial security provided by the Chinese government. Given the multiplicity of Chinese energy projects, this situation has implications for regional security. The indirect impact would be a Chinese monopoly on energy assets in the RFE and in the ASEAN region. The energy monopoly would siphon off profits from energy companies in these countries to China.

The continuing Chinese economic offensive in long-term energy investments will have a definite impact on security and stability in Southeast Asia and the Russian Far East. It will also have ramifications in the political, social and economic sectors. Energy investments can act as a prelude to the strengthening of government relations and the establishment of linkages with the businesses of the local community, civil society organizations, residents and the local politicians. Hydropower plants can have a positive impact on the development of ancillary businesses for small and medium scale entrepreneurs. Thus, the business presence of the Chinese multinational corporations in major energy projects may strengthen China's overall influence in these sectors: government, business, and nonprofit and civil society organizations.

Given this scenario, there is a need for an alternative energy investment strategy that can level the playing field in the energy investments sector and stave off the full domination and control of energy assets in these two regions by China. The entry of American and European energy investments in the region would also ensure the benefits of competition. •

1 Chinese energy investments in the Russian Far East and the ASEAN point to a well-planned strategy to gain an economic foothold over much of Asia

2 This push coincides with the weakening of Russian and Japanese economic influence, suggesting China is becoming the dominant player in this region

3 Implications for regional security include a Chinese monopoly on energy assets in the Russian Far East and ASEAN region, and the strengthening of China's overall political influence

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